Herman Philipse

Postmodernism in philosophy holds that traditional philosophy has come (or should come) to an end, and that it must be succeeded by something else, such as “thinking” (Heidegger), empirical science (Quine), linguistic therapy (Wittgenstein), or an “attempt to prevent the conversation of the West from attaining the secure path of science” (Rorty). Clearly, the claim to be postmodern presupposes a view of traditional philosophy, of its characteristics, and of its genesis. In this essay, such a view will be developed, and its consequences for our conception of philosophy will be discussed. The view defended here is different from those of Heidegger and Rorty. For ease of exposition the discussion will refer to Rorty's Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.

It is difficult to imagine that a Royal Institute of Physics would organize an annual lecture series on the theme ‘conceptions of physics’. Similarly, it is quite improbable that a Royal Institute of Astronomy would even contemplate inviting speakers for a lecture series called ‘conceptions of astronomy’. What, then, is so special about philosophy that the theme of this lecture series does not appear to be altogether outlandish? Is it, perhaps, that philosophy is the reflective discipline par excellence, so that the very nature of philosophy is a topic that belongs to its domain of investigations? Or is there something more serious at issue? Let me first tell you how the question concerning the nature of philosophy arose for me as a young student, and how I tried to answer it, quite naively, by endorsing Edmund Husserl's programme of turning philosophy into a rigorous science. In a second section, I shall offer three diagnoses of the fact that all such attempts seem to have failed. Finally, I'd like to say a few words on my own research agenda in philosophy and on a public function of philosophers.

Theistic and analytic philosophers of religion typically privilege classical theism and monotheism by ignoring or underestimating the great threat of polytheism. We develop an argument from infinitely many alternatives, which decisively demonstrates that if a monotheistic or polytheistic god-model obtains, it will almost certainly be polytheistic. Probabilistic calculations are performed in order to illustrate the difficulties faced by the monotheistic proponent. After considering possible objections, such as whether there should be limits placed on how many possible god-models could obtain, we conclude that our argument from infinitely many alternatives is sound, and highly unlikely to be overcome.