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2After SolipsismIn Schmidtz David (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Volume 6, Oxford University Press. 2017.
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80GuaranteesSocial Philosophy and Policy 14 (2): 1. 1997.People have accidents. They get old. They eat too much. They have bad luck. And sooner or later, something will be fatal. It would be a better world if such things did not happen, but they do. There is no use arguing about it. What is worth arguing about is whether it makes for a better world when people have to pay for other people's misfortunes and mistakes rather than their own
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92Diminishing Marginal Utility and Egalitarian RedistributionJournal of Value Inquiry 34 (2/3): 263-272. 2000.
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37Life, Death, and Meaning: Key Philosophical Readings on the Big Questions (edited book)Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 2004.Do our lives have meaning? Should we create more people? Is death bad? Should we commit suicide? Would it be better to be immortal? Should we be optimistic or pessimistic? Since Life, Death, and Meaning: Key Philosophical Readings on the Big Questions first appeared, David Benatar's distinctive anthology designed to introduce students to the key existential questions of philosophy has won a devoted following among users in a variety of upper-level and even introductory courses.
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168Respect for EverythingEthics, Policy and Environment 14 (2): 127-138. 2011.Species egalitarianism is the view that all living things have equal moral standing. To have moral standing is, at a minimum, to command respect, to be more than a mere thing. Is there reason to believe that all living things have moral standing in even this most minimal sense? If so—that is, if all living things command respect—is there reason to believe they all command equal respect?1 I explain why members of other species command our respect but also why they do not command equal respect. Th…Read more
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55What Nozick did for decision theoryIn Person, polis, planet: essays in applied philosophy, Oxford University Press. pp. 282-294. 2008.
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33The Virtues of Justice1In Timpe Kevin & Boyd Craig (eds.), Virtues and Their Vices, Oxford University Press. pp. 59. 2013.
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29Equality and Public Policy: Volume 31, Part 2 (edited book)Cambridge University Press. 2015.If ever there were a time in which concerns about equality as a primary issue for social policy disappeared from public view, now is not that time. Recent work in economics on inequality has climbed to the top of best-sellers lists, and the issue was a major talking point in American midterm elections in 2014. The sheer bewildering volume of scholarship and discussion of equality makes it difficult to distinguish signal from noise. What, of all that we know about ways in which we are equal and w…Read more
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32Self-Interest: What's in it for Me?Social Philosophy and Policy 14 (1): 107-121. 1997.We have taken the “why be moral?” question so seriously for so long. It suggests that we lack faith in the rationality of morality. The relative infrequency with which we ask “why be prudent?” suggests that we have no corresponding lack of faith in the rationality of prudence. Indeed, we have so much faith in the rationality of prudence that to question it by asking “why be prudent?” sounds like a joke. Nevertheless, our reasons and motives to be prudent are every bit as contingent as our reason…Read more
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46Person, polis, planet: essays in applied philosophyOxford University Press. 2008.This volume collects thirteen of David Schmidtz's essays on the question of what it takes to live a good life, given that we live in a social and natural world. Part One defends a non-maximizing conception of rational choice, explains how even ultimate goals can be rationally chosen, defends the rationality of concern and regard for others (even to the point of being willing to die for a cause), and explains why decision theory is necessarily incomplete as a tool for addressing such issues. Part…Read more
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66Brief History of Liberty (edited book)Wiley-Blackwell. 2010.Stimulating and thought-provoking," A Brief History of Liberty" offers readers a philosophically-informed portrait of the elusive nature of one of our most ...
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137Natural enemies: An anatomy of environmental conflictEnvironmental Ethics 22 (4): 397-408. 2000.Sometimes people act contrary to environmentalist values because they reject those values. This is one kind of conflict: conflict in values. There is another kind of conflict in which people act contrary to environmentalist values even though they embrace those values: because they cannot afford to act in accordance with them. Conflict in priorities occurs not because people’s values are in conflict, but rather because people’s immediate needs are in conflict. Conflict in priorities is not only …Read more
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57When Preservationism Doesn't PreserveEnvironmental Values 6 (3). 1997.According to conservationism, scarce and precious resources should be conserved and used wisely. According to preservation ethics, we should not think of wilderness as merely a resource. Wilderness commands reverence in a way mere resources do not. Each philosophy, I argue, can fail by its own lights, because trying to put the principles of conservationism or preservationism into institutional practice can have results that are the opposite of what the respective philosophies tell us we ought to…Read more
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Famine, poverty, and property rightsIn Christopher W. Morris (ed.), Amartya Sen, Cambridge University Press. 2009.
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109History and patternSocial Philosophy and Policy 22 (1): 148-177. 2005.This essay compares Rawls's and Nozick's theories of justice. Nozick thinks patterned principles of justice are false, and offers a historical alternative. Along the way, Nozick accepts Rawls's claim that the natural distribution of talent is morally arbitrary, but denies that there is any short step from this premise to any conclusion that the natural distribution is unjust. Nozick also agrees with Rawls on the core idea of natural rights liberalism: namely, that we are separate persons. Howeve…Read more
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10The Meanings of LifeIn Robert Nozick, Cambridge University Press. 2002.I remember being a child, wondering where I would be—wondering who I would be—when the year 2000 arrived. I hoped I would live that long. I hoped I would be in reasonable health. I would not have guessed I would have a white collar job, or that I would live in the United States. I would have laughed if you had told me the new millennium would find me giving a public lecture on the meaning of life. But that is life, unfolding as it does, meaning whatever it means. I am grateful to be here. I also…Read more
Tucson, Arizona, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Applied Ethics |
Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |
Social and Political Philosophy |