Leah Kalmanson

Whoever writes in blood and aphorisms does not want to be read, but rather to be learned by heart.Here's what is necessary: one blow with a club, one scar; one slap on the face, a handful of blood. Your reading of what other people write should be just like this. Don't be lax!In several recent articles, Leigh Kathryn Jenco questions the use of Eurocentric methodologies in conducting cross-cultural research within and about Chinese traditions.3 As she says, "postcolonial and 'non-Western' societies can be positioned as particularly challenging case studies, offering 'alternative' views of self, culture, and society. However, their rich traditions of historical, political, and literary scholarship can play no role in...

Does the Buddhist doctrine of no-self imply, simply put, no-other? Does this doctrine necessarily come into conflict with an ethics premised on the alterity of the other? This article explores these questions by situating Emmanuel Levinas’s ethics in the context of contemporary Japanese philosophy. The work of twentieth-century Japanese philosopher Watsuji Tetsurō provides a starting point from which to consider the ethics of the self-other relation in light of the Buddhist notion of emptiness. The philosophy of thirteenth-century Zen Master Dōgen casts doubt on Watsuji’s commitment to reciprocal self-other relationality, showing that the idea of self-emptiness disrupts any conventional understanding of reciprocity and promotes instead other-oriented compassion. Despite interesting similarities between the ethics of alterity and Buddhist compassion, a Buddhist-influenced understanding of alterity differs from Levinas on important points, by making possible the claim that all others—human, animal, plant, and mineral—are ethical others

This article engages bell hooks's concept of “radical black subjectivity” through the lens of the Buddhist doctrine of no‐self. Relying on the Zen theorist Dōgen and on resources from Japanese aesthetics, I argue that non‐attachment to the self clarifies hooks's claim that radical subjectivity unites our capacity for critical resistance with our capacity to appreciate beauty. I frame this argument in terms of hooks's concern that postmodernist identity critiques dismiss the identity claims of disempowered peoples. On the one hand, identity critique has an emotional component, as it involves questioning the self and possibly letting go of aspects of that self in which a person has inevitably made emotional investments. On the other hand, it has an aesthetic component, as it opens a space for the creative crafting and recrafting of identity. Japanese aesthetics emphasizes that all aesthetic appreciation is accompanied by feelings of mournfulness, for the object of aesthetic appreciation is transient. Linking hooks's liberatory aesthetics with the resources of the Japanese tradition suggests that mournfulness in the face of self‐loss necessarily accompanies all instances of critical resistance. Thus non‐attachment becomes a useful framework in which to understand both the emotional and aesthetic components of empowered identity critique.

This interdisciplinary collection of essays highlights the relevance of Buddhist doctrine and practice to issues of globalization. From various philosophical, religious, historical, and political perspectives, the authors show that Buddhism—arguably the world’s first transnational religion—is a rich resource for navigating today's interconnected world. Buddhist Responses to Globalization addresses globalization as a contemporary phenomenon, marked by economic, cultural, and political deterritorialization, and also proposes concrete strategies for improving global conditions in light of these facts. Topics include Buddhist analyses of both capitalist and materialist economies; Buddhist religious syncretism in highly multicultural areas such as Honolulu; the changing face of Buddhism through the work of public intellectuals such as Alice Walker; and Buddhist responses to a range of issues including reparations and restorative justice, economic inequality, spirituality and political activism, cultural homogenization and nihilism, and feminist critique. In short, the book looks to bring Buddhist ideas and practices into direct and meaningful, yet critical, engagement with both the facts and theories of globalization.

The recently published collection Japanese and Continental Philosophy: Conversations with the Kyoto School, edited by Bret Davis, Brian Schroeder, and Jason Wirth, gathers together the best in contemporary scholarship on the Kyoto School and its legacy. This review essay is an opportunity to raise questions about the implications of this scholarship and to reflect critically on the future of the field. Although early Kyoto School philosophers are renowned for their lofty intellectual rigor, almost every one at some point bemoaned the overly abstract flavor of their own work and that of their contemporaries. The call to make the philosophy concrete is without a doubt the unfinished business of the Kyoto School. This review assesses the collected volume’s range of critical and creative perspectives on the practical implications of Kyoto School theory, while indicating room for further engagement with this issue in future research.

Postcolonial studies and decolonial theory make visible the nature and extent of Eurocentrism through a critique of constructed categories as basic as “history” and “culture.” Walter Mignolo asserts a strong claim that the concept of “culture” is itself a colonial construction, and hence all cultural difference bears the mark of coloniality. This thesis presents a challenge to the field of comparative philosophy: What does “cross-cultural” philosophy even mean if all so-called cultural difference is indeed colonial difference? Could comparativists, in the wake of this critique, preserve the possibility of cross-cultural philosophical inquiry even when basic terms of discourse are suspended? This essay is a thought experiment in accepting Mignolo's general premise that all cultural difference is colonial difference, through which I offer three strategies for philosophizing comparatively under this constraint: historical contextualization, subversive categorization, and decen..