Tiziana Andina

“What is art?” All in all it sounds like a fairly trivial question: art is so ingrained in our world that intuitively we believe everyone is able to answer it. If we look at this question closely, however, we realize that things are not so simple. Among the first who tried to clarify the issue was Plato, one of the most ardent Western philosophers for definitions. In the 10th book of the Republic he drew a long lasting distinction: the objects that make up our universe are divided among the most perfect ones, the ideas, after which everything is shaped, the less perfect ones, the material things, which are modeled after the ideas, and at the bottom of the hierarchy there are the works of art, which are more flawed, imperfect, useless and even dangerous than material things in general. It has been written that the history of philosophy is ‘nothing but a series of footnotes to Plato’. As far as the philosophy of art is concerned that is certainly true until the 20th century, when - at least since Modernism - the elegant Platonic thesis began to show signs of aging and it was no longer able to provide a good answer to the question with which we began. The talk develops the idea that the works of art are a kind of higher order objects; in particular, they are semantics vehicles, namely objects that carry meanings, which are the product of human representations.

The Imperative of Responsibility, by the German philosopher Hans Jonas, is a work that aspires to a re-foundation of ethics based on an analysis of the contemporary world as well as on a prediction about the fate of globalized humanity. Through a discussion of the fundamental concepts of Jonas’ work, the essay shows that the central themes of his research, which are still very relevant today, should be addressed by moving from the ethical level to that of ontology and social ontology in particular. To this end, the paper offers a definition of transgenerational action that aims to replace Jonas’ use of prevision. The transgenerational action is here considered as a particular type of social action: that which enables societies to exist over time. Finally, the essay proposes an essential taxonomy of transgenerational actions, showing how working on this notion might lead to a consciously utopian and positive social model.

As it is well known an historical comprehension of the time in which people live and philosophers work is something essential in order to outline a theory that could grasps something of the world. The history of the relationship between art and philosophy is almost as old as philosophy itself. Among the first to take up the topic was Plato who posed the question in the most classical of ways—that is, by facing the problem of definition. The question of definition is nowadays deeply debated by philosophy of art and ontology. The paper address the problem of the definition suggesting a proposal which synthesizes ontology, epistemology and theory of perception.

In its mainstream analysis, social ontology seems to make use of the modern idea of subjectivity. Margaret Gilbert, and David Lewis in his previous book on conventions, consider the subject as an auto transparent postulate. The thesis I will discuss in this paper is based on the idea that the ethical position outlined by Friedrich Nietzsche, which remains problematic in its positive outcomes, becomes a useful instrument for the comprehension of the pre-institutional components of the social world when applied to an entirely different and more articulate framework such as those offered by contemporary social ontologies.

Our intuitions related to art are generally associated to ideas such as creativity, freedom of expression, experimentation. The fact that so many artists (especially writers, but also musicians, painters, performance artists) are or have been people with training in legal disciplines should be taken into account when considering the apparently extrinsic relationship between art and law. The question we have to answer is the following. When we make a judgment of taste looking, say, at the Mona Lisa, what does that mean exactly? What do we mean when we say that “the Mona Lisa is beautiful and an absolute masterpiece of Western art”? This statement contains a judgment of taste (Mona Lisa is beautiful) and an artistic judgment (it is a masterpiece of Western art). In what follows I will show that: i) the two judgments are different, ii) both judgments have normative nature, but the normativity of the judgment of taste refers to different elements from the artistic judgment and, finally, iii) contemporary visual arts require the formulation of an artistic judgment rather than a judgment of taste.

The research Lucia Pizzo Russo carried out all over her academic and scientific career is focussed on a the following idea: human mind and behaviour make up a cognitive device from whose complexity stems an evolutionary advantage. Hence, the psychological study of mind should take into account all those cognitive functions that underlie man’s ability of perceiving structures and affordances in the visual world as much as of solving problems, where perception and thought deeply interact, and of giving shape to representations, be they artistic forms or scientific theories. But for an adequate psychological account to obtain that complexity must be traded off against the assumption that mind and behaviour are a psychophysical unity. That means that cognition does imply a neurobiological basis, and at the same time that a phenomenological stance is required just as that instanced by Gestalt psychology. In this interview a picture of a piece of life is meant to be given as it goes along with a research whose reference are issues in psychology, psychology of arts and such figures as Brandi, Piaget, Gombrich, Arnheim, Bozzi.

È ancora possibile il giudizio in arte? L’articolo si occupa di rispondere a questa domanda esaminando le due forme di giudizio fondamentali all’interno del dominio dell’arte. Il giudizio ontologico-artistico (relativo all’identità delle opere d’arte) e il giudizio estetico (relativo alle proprietà estetiche).Dopo aver argomentato in favore del fatto che i casi filosoficamente più interessanti sono quelli nei quali l’attività del giudicare, per diverse ragioni, pare impossibile, l’articolo illustra ed esamina le componenti necessarie alla formulazione dei due giudizi che compongono il dominio dell’arte.