Thomas M. Osborne

This article expands on a central theme of John Deely’s Four ages of understanding, which is that John Poinsot’s understanding of the concept as a formal sign sidesteps many problems raised by modern epistemology and contemporary scholars. First, I will look at the Thomistic view that the concept is a quality which is distinct from the act of understanding. Second, I shall show how according to Poinsot this concept both represents the object and is a formal sign, even though these two roles are distinct. Third, I will show that his understanding of the connection between the relations of representation and signification allows him to develop a semiotic in which the concept is the fundament of what later semioticians such as Peirce and Deely describe as the triadic sign relation.

This essay shows a consistent Jesuit attitude towards scholastic theology that forms during Ignatius’s early years in Paris and is reflected in the writings of Jesuits at least until the end of the sixteenth century. The Jesuit attitude in particular reflects the Parisian censures of Desiderius Erasmus and Jacques Lefèvre d’Étaples, and earlier debates between humanism and scholasticism. It might seem to us in hindsight that scholastic theology was never likely to be overthrown in the sixteenth century. But the extreme humanists in Paris had the support of the King, the King’s sister, and many members of the academic community. The eventual success of scholasticism would perhaps not have seemed obvious to Ignatius or to his companions. The defense of scholastic theology was a characteristic mark of the Jesuits. Ignatius gave scholastic theology a special place both in his “Rules for Thinking with the Church” and in the Jesuit Constitutions. Ignatius’s first companions give witness to Ignatius’s concern to combat attempts to undermine scholastic theology, and in particular the work of Thomas Aquinas. Alfonso Salmeròn, one of Ignatius’s earlies followers, wrote at length about the value of scholastic theology in combatting error, and he indicated how theology could only fully develop with the use of scholastic dialectics and terminological precision. Three of the greatest Jesuit theologians of the later sixteenth century, namely Franciscus Toletus, Gregory of Valencia, and Gabriel Vázquez, identified themselves as followers of Thomas Aquinas. They even admired Dominicans who were critical of Ignatius, such as Melchor Cano, and those who seemed to lack an appreciation for Jesuit spirituality, such as Dominic Soto. Valencia and Vázquez in particular developed arguments about the importance of scholastic theology for refuting heresy, and they showed how scholastic theology was a development of the theological activity of the Fathers and even some New Testament Figures.

The question of whether there is a distinct kind of practical truth has its source in Aristotle's claim that "[I]n the case of thought that is theoretical, and not practical nor productive, ‘well’ and ‘badly’ consist in the true and the false (that is, after all, the function of any faculty of thought), but that of a faculty of practical thought is truth in agreement with the correct appetite." (EN 6.2.1139a27-30) Although medieval philosophers do not share many of the presuppositions common to contemporary philosophers and historians of ancient philosophy, they do share their puzzlement over the same Aristotelian texts. I will argue that both Thomas Aquinas and John Scotus shed light on the issue in that they avoid the more extreme positions of either severing practical truth from action entirely or of holding that the truth of practical statements is entirely different from our ordinary notions of truth. Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus plausibly understand Aristotle to hold that practical truth includes the ordinary truth and falsehood of statements. They also show that in addition to such truth and falsehood there must be some real or possible connection with appetite. Thomas interprets practical truth as importantly and essentially distinct from theoretical truth without arguing that it can be severed from the truth of statements, or that such truth primarily belongs to actions rather than statements. In contrast, Scotus’s account prefigures those contemporary accounts that make the actual connection to action in some way inessential to the practically true statement, even though on Scotus's account a kind of relation to the action is essential. Both accounts are reasonable and preferable to many contemporary accounts.

Thomas Aquinas produced a voluminous body of work on moral theory, and much of that work is on virtue, particularly the status and value of the virtues as principles of virtuous acts, and the way in which a moral life can be organized around them schematically. Thomas Osborne presents Aquinas's account of virtue in its historical, philosophical and theological contexts, to show the reader what Aquinas himself wished to teach about virtue. His discussion makes the complexities of Aquinas's moral thought accessible to readers despite the differences between Thomas's texts themselves, and the distance between our background assumptions and his. The book will be valuable for scholars and students in ethics, medieval philosophy, and theology.

In the Summa Theologiae, I, q. 5, art. 4, Thomas argues that the good has the ratio of the final cause.1 This thesis is problematic because there seems to be a difference between the definitions and uses of “good” and “final cause.” If Thomas is arguing that the good and the final cause are in no way distinct, then why might we plausibly describe something as good even if it has no causal role? If not, then what does it mean for the ratio of goodness to be the same as that of final causality? Later Thomists disagree over the precise relationship between goodness and final causality, and their disagreement is reflected in their different interpretations of the argument and conclusion of this text. Few hold that Thomas merely means to say that goodness is the fundament of being an end, or that being an end is something like a proper passion of goodness. But they disagree over what the additional connection between the two might be.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Dieu comme soi-même: connaissance de soi et connaissance de Dieu selon Thomas d’Aquin: l’herméneutique d’Ambroise Gardeil by Camille de BelloyThomas M. Osborne Jr.Dieu comme soi-même: connaissance de soi et connaissance de Dieu selon Thomas d’Aquin: l’herméneutique d’Ambroise Gardeil. By Camille de Belloy, O.P. Paris: Vrin, 2014. Pp. 297. €32.00 (paper). ISBN: 978-2-7116-2605-2.This book is a discussion of La Structure de l’âme et l’expérience mystique (1927) by Ambroise Gardeil (1859–1931). In this two-volume work of mystical theology, Gardeil explains the material cause of the experiential knowledge that comes from the gift of wisdom, which is one of the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit. La Structure is the third book in a trilogy that focuses on the supernatural knowledge of God, beginning with apologetics in La Crédibilité et l’apologétique (1st ed. 1908), and continuing with the nature of revelation in Le Donné révélé et la théologie (1st ed. 1910). In La Structure, Gardeil develops the thesis that there is an analogy between experiential self-knowledge and the mystical experiential knowledge of God. In the course of his inquiry, Gardeil touches upon philosophical and theological problems concerning self-knowledge, intentionality, the structure of the mind (mens), God’s indwelling in the souls of the just, and the relationship between faith and the gift of wisdom. De Belloy’s new volume is on Gardeil’s presentation of this analogy and its reception by his contemporaries.De Belloy considers largely the issues that surround self-knowledge, the structure of the soul, and mystical experience. He draws together material from Gardeil’s own sources, Gardeil’s contemporaries, and subsequent Thomistic scholarship. He sheds light on the issues themselves, the historical context, and different hermeneutical strategies in Thomism. According to De Belloy, this twentieth-century Thomistic and largely Dominican discussion is important for contemporary philosophers and theologians. To shed light on the context, De Belloy considers a lengthy three-part “Examen de conscience” in Revue Thomiste (1928–29), in which Gardeil responded to published and unpublished comments by his fellow Dominicans Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange (a former student), Marie-Dominique Roland-Gosselin (Le Saulchoir), and Albino González Menéndez-Reigada, as well as a young student, Jean Daujat. De Belloy remarks that Maritain’s discussion of Gardeil in The Degrees of Knowledge to some extent attempts to harmonize the substance of Gardeil’s work with Garrigou-Lagrange’s critical comments. De Belloy emphasizes the interaction between Gardeil and Roland-Gosselin, and at the end of his volume, includes their previously unpublished correspondence.Although De Belloy often notes the difficulty of reading Gardeil’s neo-Scholastic prose, it seems to me that the non-native French reader will find Gardeil more accessible than De Belloy, especially when the latter draws on writers such as Henri Bergson and Hans-Georg Gadamer. Moreover, De Belloy’s discussion is easier to follow if one has already read and is familiar with the four parts of Gardeil’s La Structure. In part 1, Gardeil addresses the structure of mind or spirit (mens), and in particular considers Augustine’s [End Page 472] three main, threefold divisions of the soul in De Trinitate (mens, notitia, amor; memoria [sui], intelligentia, voluntas; memoria [Dei], intelligentia, amor) and Aquinas’s own interpretation and appropriation of these divisions. In part 2, Gardeil describes the way in which sanctifying grace, a created quality that is distinct from the infused virtues, causes the soul’s conformity to God’s essence. In part 3, he discusses God’s presence within the souls of the just and agrees with previous Thomists that God is especially present to the just as an object of faith and love. In part 4, he applies the previous discussion to the structure of mystical knowledge. This last part is the culmination of the entire work, as it addresses the analogy between self-knowledge and the knowledge of God that was defended by earlier Dominican Thomists such as John of St. Thomas (1589–1644) and Thomas de Vallgornera (c. 1595–1665).Part...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Amours: L’Église, les divorcés remariés, les couples homosexuels by Adriano OlivaThomas M. Osborne Jr.Amours: L’Église, les divorcés remariés, les couples homosexuels. By Adriano Oliva, O.P. Paris: Cerf, 2015. Pp. 166. €14.00 (paper). ISBN: 978-2-204-10679-5.This book, written by a Dominican priest who is president of the Leonine Commission, has generated public controversy primarily on account of its treatment of homosexuality. For instance, the French news magazine Le Point published an article on it called “How Saint Thomas Justifies Homosexuality.” This perception is bolstered by the cover artwork of Saints Sergius and Bacchus, who are considered in some circles to be patron saints of homosexual love. In fact, the book has two distinct parts. The first part is entirely on marriage between persons of the opposite sex. Oliva argues that Thomas Aquinas’s teaching on marriage was obscured in the nineteenth century, reappropriated by the Second Vatican Council, and now can be used to justify the reception of Communion and sacramental penance by Catholics who divorce and remarry while their spouse is still living and their marriage is not annulled. Only in the second part of the book does Oliva argue for the civil and ecclesiastical recognition of homosexual unions that are not marriages.The book is addressed to a general audience, although it refers to scholarship when needed. Oliva’s purpose is to use Thomas to contribute to contemporary theology and pastoral care. He does not entirely reject magisterial teaching on sexual ethics. For instance, he sympathetically discusses the treatment of heterosexual sex in Humanae vitae, and is generally opposed to simultaneous sexual relationships that are between more than two persons.In the first part of the book, Oliva notes that for Thomas marriage has a twofold perfection. The first perfection consists in the union of the spouses (which need not involve sexual acts), and the second in the generation and education of children. According to Oliva, only the first perfection is essential to marriage, which is shown by the fact that a marriage is valid even if the spouses voluntarily choose to abstain from the sexual act. Oliva eventually argues that recognition of this point should lead to the acceptance of second marriages (i.e., marriages after divorce) and the recognition that circumstances might prevent sexual acts in such marriages from being sinful.According to Oliva, Thomas’s understanding of the essence of marriage was used by the Fathers of the Council of Trent in what he describes as a decision to avoid the condemnation of divorce and remarriage for those in the Christian East. This interpretation of Trent is highly questionable and seems to rely partly on Giancarlo Pani’s recent popularization of Piet Fransen’s controversial scholarship (147 n. 41). In fact, Oliva does not show how Thomas’s understanding of marriage was supposedly used against those who wished to condemn divorce and remarriage. In general, he ignores the Council of Florence and various medieval and late Scholastic discussions of marriage, and generally passes over theologians from outside the Dominican Order. [End Page 137]Oliva correctly notes that the Catechism of the Council of Trent follows Thomas in distinguishing between three motives or ends of marriage, namely, society and mutual support, procreation, and the remedy for concupiscence. He passes over the other motives discussed in the Catechism, such as beauty, wealth, and the desire for heirs. Moreover, he does not mention the Catechism’s discussion of the three goods of marriage, namely, union, children, and fidelity, and how these might be related to marriage’s motives and essence. This oversight is odd because the Catechism’s treatment resembles Thomas’s discussion in the Summa contra Gentiles, book IV, chapter 78, in which Thomas explains how marriage is ordered to procreation. In general, Oliva neglects texts that might not fit well with his interpretation of Thomas, such as this chapter and the unedited IV Sentences, d. 33, q. 1, a. 2c.Oliva argues that Thomas’s teaching on the essence of marriage was neglected by the Magisterium and rejected by the 1917 Code, although it was revived to some extent...

Thomists need to learn from and address MacIntyre’s account of moral disagreement, whether or not they will ultimately agree with its broad outlines. First, they should consider that MacIntyre’s emphasis on social roles as an explanation of moral disagreement accounts for only some kinds of moral disagreement and growth. Second, a recognition of different kinds of disagreement shows that only some can be adequately addressed by moral philosophy, and even those that can be so addressed require not only instruction but also other forms of moral formation. Third, MacIntyre’s account of how some disagreements can be resolved through epistemological progress indicates that Thomists need to consider more carefully the connection between moral and scientific inquiry. I do not intend in this paper to present a full argument for the compatibility or incompatibility of MacIntyre with some version of Thomism, or for the correctness of his views. My purpose is to show that Thomists need to address these three areas more carefully, whether MacIntyre is ultimately correct or not.

Readers have found at least two distinct and perhaps contradictory accounts of civil authority in the works of Francisco de Vitoria, and some hold that Vitoria himself holds contradictory positions. This article argues that Vitoria holds one consistent position, namely that civil power is based on a necessity that is rooted in human nature, and in particular on the final cause of human life, and not on a necessity that is a result of any historical decision or process on its own. Rulers receive from the community their authority, which is a power to act on behalf of the community. In general, scholars have failed to consider how Vitoria’s understanding of civil power is Aristotelian and Thomistic to the extent that it is based on the thesis that the political community is natural in a way similar to how families and individuals are natural.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Thomas Aquinas on the Metaphysics of the Human Act by Can Laurens LöweThomas M. Osborne Jr.Can Laurens Löwe. Thomas Aquinas on the Metaphysics of the Human Act. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021. Pp. 225. Hardback, $99.99.This book is about the way in which Thomas Aquinas understands the human act to be composed of form and matter. It provides a fresh reading of many central texts from Thomas and addresses philosophical concerns that are relevant to the contemporary literature. Although Löwe is not clear about this point, Thomas does not use in this context the terms 'formal' and 'material' in the strictest sense, as when he describes the soul as the form of the body, but in different extended senses, as when he says that charity is the form of the other virtues because it gives them a new character (Summa Theologiae, II–II, q. 23, art. 8).Löwe focuses on choice, which he considers to be antecedent to the human act, and the commanded or exterior act, which he considers to be the entire human act. This focus simplifies his account, since in one and only one text—the Prima Secundae of the Summa Theologiae—does Thomas appear to give as many as twelve acts that are stages or phases of a complete human act. Thomas devotes special attention to three acts of the will concerning the end, namely simple willing, intention, and enjoyment; and three acts of the will concerning the means, namely consent, choice, and use; and two intellectual acts, namely deliberation and command. Four other possible phases or stages are mentioned in passing, such as the judgment of choice. According to the standard interpretation, a human [End Page 152] act such as almsgiving might consist of intending to help an indigent person, deliberating about whether to give food or money, making a judgment of choice about the best means of helping (such as giving money), choosing to give the money, and then commanding the will's use of certain other powers, such as the movement of the hands and feet. In his other writings, Thomas mentions only some of these stages, and he often mentions only simple willing, deliberation, and choice. Scholars disagree over the number and importance of the acts or parts of acts discussed in the Prima Secundae and how to integrate them with what Thomas says in other texts. Löwe argues that the human act is what Thomas describes as the act's execution; he claims that this act has the intellect's command for its extrinsic form, the will's use for its intrinsic form, and the commanded act for its matter.This book has three parts. Part 1 provides a general account of the author's view that choice explains the act's freedom even if it is not part of the resulting act. In part 2, Löwe gives a novel account of Thomas's claim that the judgment of the intellect gives form to the act of choice. He draws on the distinction that Thomists make (although Thomas is less clear) between the composition of terms, or the enunciative proposition, and the judgement, or judicative proposition. For instance, the statement 'carrots are orange' as an enunciative proposition might be entertained as doubtful or likely, or placed in a conditional statement. However, someone might assent to this same composition by judging that it is true. Löwe's account is confusing on this point, as he describes as "judgment" what his Thomists describe as the enunciative proposition, which is the composition of terms (38–41). Terminological difficulties aside, Löwe draws on what he sees as the related distinction between the content of a judgment and the attitude toward the judgment, using this distinction to describe the freedom of the judgment that precedes choice. The intellect composes different precepts and then assents to one of them. According to Löwe, Thomas thinks that the agent's ability to choose between different goods is reduced to the intellect's ability to assent to the content of one precept and not the content of another according to a kind of second-order...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Aquinas and the Infused Moral Virtues by Angela McKay KnobelThomas M. Osborne Jr.KNOBEL, Angela McKay. Aquinas and the Infused Moral Virtues. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2021. 214 pp. Cloth, $65.00This book is the first substantial English monograph on Aquinas's account of the infused virtues in many years, and the most significant treatment of the issue since Gabriel Bullet, Vertus morales infuses et vertus morales acquises selon Saint Thomas d'Aquin (Fribourg: Éditions Universitaires, 1958). The infused virtues are about, or they are intrinsically ordered to, the supernatural end of human beings. Aquinas was among the first to argue that the infused virtues include not only the three theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity, but also supernatural counterparts to the acquired virtues, which are proportionate to the natural end of humans. These infused moral virtues are infused with charity and lost with mortal sin. Aquinas never addressed at length the relationship between acquired [End Page 144] and infused moral virtues, and many theologians rejected Aquinas's position that there are infused moral virtues.Knobel's book has two parts. The first part of the book consists of three chapters about Aquinas's own views. Chapter 1 is on natural virtue, which can be acquired through the agent's own efforts. Knobel emphasizes the way in which this virtue is proportionate to the natural end and abilities of humans. She correctly notes that Aquinas thinks that humans can perform such virtuous acts without grace. However, since she does not distinguish between morally good acts and morally good agents, she does not adequately address Aquinas's view of how sinners without grace might possess acquired virtue. Additionally, although she correctly notes the way in which moral virtue orders the agent to the end, it is often unclear whether she is discussing the proximate end of the will (which is an object), a further end (as when someone steals to commit adultery), or the ultimate end (which is God as the object of charity or the self as an object of disordered love). For example, she writes, "[I]f an act is not sinful, it cannot be ordered to an evil end." She might be making the uncontroversial claim that good acts are made evil when directed to a bad end, but in her argument she seems to be making the stronger claim that someone with a disordered ultimate end cannot habitually order good acts to such an end.Chapter 2 is on the infused virtues. Knobel notes that for Aquinas synderesis, which is a habit of grasping first practical principles, is a seed of the natural virtues, and that faith, which grasps revealed principles, plays this role in infused virtue. She shows how infused moral virtues, which share the same matter as the acquired moral virtues, have different ends and rules than the acquired virtues. Chapter 3 concerns Aquinas's account of the relationship between the acquired and infused virtues, and in particular the infused moral virtues. Knobel draws attention to texts in which Aquinas argues that the two coexist in someone who has grace, but she states that this coexistence is contradicted in the discussion of Macrobius's fourfold division of virtue in the Summa Theologiae (I-II, q. 61, a. 5). In this article, she thinks, acquired virtue is political virtue, and a stage toward infused virtue. She does not address how Aquinas uses the term "political virtue" differently in different texts, and how the schema of four virtues in this text might be read as describing both four stages of acquired virtue and four stages of infused virtue. Knobel supports her view—that those with grace lack acquired virtue—by claiming that Aquinas consistently states that there is no acquired virtue in heaven. This view only tenuously (at best) supports her point that acquired virtue does not exist in this life among those in a state of grace. Moreover, Aquinas seems to suggest that acquired virtue persists in the next life in ST I-II, q. 67, a. 1-2.The second part of the book is a criticism of contemporary interpretations of Aquinas, and an exposition of...

When viewed in its historical context, Ockham’s moral psychology is distinctive and novel. First, Ockham thinks that the will is free to will for or against any object, and can choose something that is in some sense not even apparently good. The will is free from the intellect’s dictates and from natural inclinations. Second, he emphasizes the will’s independence not only with respect to passions and habits, but also with respect to knowledge, the effects of original sin, grace, and God. Third, Ockham consequently argues that someone is even able to will to be unhappy, and can will another’s happiness more than or even instead of his own.

Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham disagree over how and whether virtues are specified by their objects. For Thomas, habits and acts are specified by their formal objects. For instance, the object of theft is something that belongs to someone else, and more particularly theft is distinct from robbery because theft is the open taking of another’s good, whereas robbery is open and violent. A habit such as a virtue or a vice shares or takes the act’s object. For Scotus, although the same virtue or act cannot have objects which differ formally, different virtues and acts can have an object which is identical according to its formal ratio, in the way that the different theological virtues might even formally have God as their object. Ockham accepts Scotus’s view that charity and hope are two kinds of love, we will see how, unlike Scotus, he argues that these theological virtues differ on account of their immediate complex objects. The disagreement between these three figures raises important difficulties concerning what it even means to be a formal object.

the contrast and similarity between Rist and Macintyre can be better understood if we take into account their different interpretations of the Republic, especially their 1) descriptions of the primary problem faced by Plato, 2) their interpretation of Plato’s response to the problem, and 3) their evaluation of the contemporary relevance of the problem and his response. The differences and similarities between the views of MacIntyre and Rist on the Republic reflect much larger difference and similarities on the fundamental nature of moral philosophy, the problem of relativism, and the importance of God for ethics. I have illustrated these similarities and differences in the context of their understanding of the problems faced by Plato, the nature and adequacy of his response, and the relevance of the response of later philosophical ethics.

This Element provides an account of Thomas Aquinas's moral philosophy that emphasizes the intrinsic connection between happiness and the human good, human virtue, and the precepts of practical reason. Human beings by nature have an end to which they are directed and concerning which they do not deliberate, namely happiness. Humans achieve this end by performing good human acts, which are produced by the intellect and the will, and perfected by the relevant virtues. These virtuous acts require that the agent grasps the relevant moral principles and uses them in particular cases.

Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274) held two theses that might seem incompatible to contemporary readers, namely 1) that an act of faith is reasonable even by the standards of human reason without grace, and 2) that this act surpasses the power of such unaided human reason. In the later Middle Ages, many theologians who were not Thomists held that someone who performs acts of infused faith must also perform such acts through an acquired faith that is based on natural reason. I argue that debates with Protestants and Jesuits caused Dominican Thomists to clarify and develop Thomas Aquinas’s understanding of the traditional position that acts of faith surpass natural human abilities in such a way as to reject the older non-Thomistic understanding of acquired faith. This enquiry will show that major early modern disputes over the authority of Scripture and the source of faith are at least partially rooted in differences among medieval scholastic theologians. Although the Protestants and the Jesuits adhere to distinct confessions, their theological views on faith are based in part on an acceptance of or reaction to Scotistic and nominalist medieval views. Thomists drew on the same resources to respond to non-Thomistic medieval theologians, Protestants, and Jesuits.

The essay on thirteenth-century ethics will trace the history of three major themes in moral philosophy and theology, namely the morality of individual acts, virtue, and happiness. Both Peter Lombard’s rejection of Abelard’s focus on intention and the Fourth Lateran Council’s remarks on confession caused thinkers such as William of Auvergne and Philip the Chancellor to develop a way of classifying acts and determining responsibility for such acts. Thomas Aquinas and clarified and changed the technical vocabulary but adopted much from their views on knowledge and moral responsibility. A similar development took place in the understanding of virtue. Philip and others discussed the nature and unity of the virtues in the context of a patristic inheritance that was largely influence by Stoicism. Thomas Aquinas was among the first to discuss the connection between specifically distinct virtues, bringing to bear Aristotle’s description of prudence in Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics. Moreover, whereas previous thinkers had primarily distinguished between political and theological virtues, Thomas distinguished more carefully between both infused and acquired moral virtues, and theological virtues that are only infused. He explained that the intellectual virtues, although better in themselves, are inferior to the moral virtues when it comes to making a good human being. Debates over the role of happiness in ethics were related to such distinctions. Early generations had focused primarily on the role that moral and theological virtue plays in its role as leading to happiness in heaven. In contrast, some Aristotelians seem to emphasize the priority of intellectual virtue over moral virtue, and consequently the life of the philosopher over the life of the citizen. Thomas Aquinas distinguished between the different perfections of intellectual and moral virtue, and distinguished carefully between the imperfect happiness of this life and the perfect happiness of the next. Although Thomas brought these issues together in an admirable synthesis, few of his contemporaries thought that he had successfully addressed these issues.

Some philosophers seem to argue that faith is or should be produced by arguments, whereas others describe faith as non-rational or even irrational. In the Summa Theologiae, Thomas states that arguments and miracles can show that faith is reasonable, even though unaided reason on its own cannot produce an act of faith. The insufficiency of reason for faith is a necessary condition of faith’s freedom and merit. The explanation of this insufficiency lies in the formal object of faith, which makes the virtue and its acts essentially supernatural. Faith’s principles, namely the articles of faith, are seen to be true only by God and the blessed in heaven. Those who have faith assent to these revealed principles not though their natural ability, but through the “light of faith,” which is somehow similar to the “light of reason” by which humans assent to principles that are known through their terms. Faith’s supernatural character explains why reason is properly applied to faith only after one already possesses faith. It also explains how faith can be more certain than other intellectual habits, even though great uncertainty might arise on account of the believer’s imperfection.

During the last fifteen years some theologians during have supported their understanding of how unbelievers might be saved by appealing to Thomas Aquinas and the development of his thought in by sixteenth-century Dominicans at Salamanca. These Salamancan Dominicans applied Thomas’ thought in the context of the New World’s discovery. These recent theologians attribute two claims to this tradition: first, that not every unbeliever is guilty of unbelief, and second, that unbelievers can perform good acts which in some strong manner enable them to receive grace. I shall argue that although the first claim about the culpability of unbelief is held by the Thomist tradition, it has no historical or logical connection to the salvation of unbelievers. I shall argue that the second claim was not held by the tradition and that the contemporary misinterpretation results from a confusion over the relationship between moral goodness and merit. Whereas the first claim is historically accurate but irrelevant to the contemporary views for which it is invoked, the second claim is historically false if attributed to Thomas Aquinas or the Dominican tradition at Salamanca.

I argue that Diego Alvarez and Thomas de Lemos through their participation in the De auxiliis controversy developed and defended Cajetan’s view of the causation of sin in such a way that they were able to defend the predetermination of the material aspect of sin while at the same time assimilating important aspects from his critics. It is important to recognize that Lemos and his associates hold both that the premotion of sin’s material aspect is not necessarily connected with the Catholic faith and that it is knowable by natural reason. Even though they argued that other Molinist theses should be condemned as heretical, they held that this rejection of the Dominican thesis concerning sin is simply wrong but not heretical. First, I consider Cajetan’s position. Second, I consider the reception of this position by Medina, Zumel, and Báñez. Third, I show that Alvarez and Lemos make distinctions that allow them to incorporate the insights of both Cajetan and his critics.

The proliferation of new accounts of infused and acquired virtue in Thomas has brought much welcome attention to his understanding of the relationship between nature and grace. But the very originality of these interpretations has raised a multitude of unanswered questions and difficulties. For any of these accounts to be plausible, they must be accompanied by an account of the way in which Thomas thinks that the specifically one virtue of prudence considers the matter of all virtues, and his statement that such prudence depends on a correct order to the ultimate end. The current disagreement over acquired moral virtue cannot be resolved until these related disagreements are adequately addressed

James of Viterbo’s ethical writings focus mostly upon happiness and virtue. His basic approach is Aristotelian. Although he is not a Thomist in the sense that some of his contemporary Dominicans were, he frequently quotes or paraphrases Thomas while arguing for his own positions, especially in response to views defended by such figures as Giles of Rome, Godfrey of Fontaines, and Henry of Ghent. James departs from Thomas by arguing that all acquired virtue is based on an ordered self-love. James’s emphasis on self-love is in turn supported by his own understanding of willing and happiness, which involves a Neoplatonic account of the ratio boni as consisting in unity. Consequently, many aspects of James’s Aristotelian moral thought are ultimately based upon an understanding of the good that has roots in Neoplatonic authors.

In two recent books Bernard Mulcahy and Steven Long defend the classical Thomistic understanding of pure nature. They contribute to the longstanding debate over Henri de Lubac’s understanding of the relationship between nature and grace in Thomas Aquinas and the Thomistic tradition. Although Mulcahy and Long criticize de Lubac, they respect his intentions and do not use ad hominem arguments. In order to correctly situate these recent works, it is important to review some elements in the history of the twentieth-century debate over natura pura.