Brady Bowman

Clark Butler has given us an English version of Hegel’s 1831 Lectures on Logic, the last course he was to complete before his death. The course was transcribed by his son Karl and first published in 2001. Although the manuscript is not Hegel’s own, its contents are unmistakably authentic, opening an interesting window on Hegel’s thinking while he was preparing a second edition of the Logic. Readers familiar with that work will find that the content of the lectures conforms to the standard version. But the real interest of these lectures lies in Hegel’s freer discussion of the logical categories, in the course of which he frequently gives illustrations from ethics and history.Butler’s interest in the lectures is in keeping with Hegel’s intention to reach a wider audience ; accordingly, Butler has introduced numerous interpolations in order to “produce a readable text for those who are not Hegel scholars” and to “make the science of logic not only readable but teachable”. It may be questioned, however, to what extent Butler has succeeded. One difficulty stems from his intention to heed “Hegel’s professed true intent”, even where this brings him into conflict with the letter of the text. Noting that Hegel’s “panlogicist.

This work brings together, for the first time in English translation, Hegel's journal publications from his years in Heidelberg, writings which have been previously either untranslated or only partially translated into English. The Heidelberg years marked Hegel's return to university teaching and represented an important transition in his life and thought. The translated texts include his important reassessment of the works of the philosopher F. H. Jacobi, whose engagement with Spinozism, especially, was of decisive significance for the philosophical development of German Idealism. They also include his most influential writing about contemporary political events, his essay on the constitutional assembly in his native Württemberg, which was written against the background of the dramatic political and social changes occurring in post-Napoleonic Germany. The translators have provided an introduction and notes that offer a scholarly commentary on the philosophical and political background of Hegel's Heidelberg writings.

Hanna proposes a version of non-conceptualism he closely associates with Kant. This paper takes issue with his proposal on two fronts. First, there are reasons to dispute whether any version of non-conceptualism can be rightly attributed to Kant. In addition to pointing out passages that conflict with Hanna's interpretation, I also suggest ways in which the Kant of the Opus Postumum could integrate key insights of non-conceptualism into a basically conceptualist framework. In Part Two of the paper, I turn to a more systematically oriented critique of Hanna's nonconceptualism. Drawing on work by Gareth Evans, John McDowell, Sonia Sedivy, and Alva Noë, I argue that conceptualism is in a position to integrate the points which are taken by Hanna to speak most strongly in favor of non-conceptualism. In particular, I argue for the deep compatibility of conceptualism and direct realism. At the same time, I point to what I see as weaknesses in Hanna's defence of non-conceptualism.