Friedrich Stadler

The relation of Logical Empiricism and North-American Pragmatism has been increasingly investigated in the last decade. This seems reasonable enough given the various personal and scholarly exchanges between the Vienna Circle and Berlin Group with pragmatist philosophers after World War I leading up to the transfer and transformation of Logical Empiricism caused by the rise of National Socialism. But there was a significant prehistory of this philosophical encounter: the relation of Ernst Mach and US-pragmatism. This mostly ignored philosophical interaction can be exemplified with Mach’s Popular Scientific Lectures. One result of this case study is that pragmatic philosophy was already present in Austria and Germany in parallel to the interaction with Paul Carus, Charles S. Peirce, William James, and John Dewey, even if not under this specific notion and label. Mach, together with Wilhelm Jerusalem, had already claimed pragmatic positions in epistemology and methodology before his reading of Peirce and encounter with James.

This edited volume features essays written in honor of Ernst Mach. It explores his life, work, and legacy. Readers will gain a better understanding of this natural scientist and scholar who made major contributions to physics, the philosophy of science, and physiological psychology. The essays offer a critical inventory of Mach’s lifework in line with state-of-the-art research and historiography. It begins with physics, where he paved the way for Einstein’s Theory of Relativity. The account continues with Mach's contributions in biology, psychology, and physiology pioneering with an empiricist and gestalthaft Analysis of Sensations. Readers will also discover how in the philosophy of science he served as a model for the Vienna Circle with the Ernst Mach Society as well as paved the way for an integrated history and theory of science.

On 1 to 4 October 1991, the international symposion “Vienna-Berlin-Prague. The Rise of Scientific Philosophy” took place on the occasion of the centenaries of three prominent representatives of logical empiricism, organized by the newly founded Institute ‘Vienna Circle’ together with the Institut far Wissenschaft and Kunst and supported by the Austrian Federal Ministries for Science and Education. In the following report, most attention will be paid to German-speaking authors, as the English-language presentations are published in the present Yearbook,whereas the German material has appeared separately in the volume Wien — Berlin — Prag, published this year by Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky Verlag in Vienna

Based on two previous reports (1970 and 1993), the development of philosophy of science in Austria (covering the history and sociology of the sciences) since 1991 is described and analyzed with regard to its manifestation and institutionalization at the universities (mostly placed at the departments of philosophy in Graz, Innsbruck, Klagenfurt, Linz, Salzburg, and Vienna). Some extra-university societies and institutes are included as well as related journals and book series in this research field, which has changed significantly within the last two decades. A sort of disruption of the earlier strong presence of philosophy of science in the capitals of the Austrian provinces occurred and at the same time a late revival took place in Vienna after the forced migration of the Vienna Circle since the 1930s and long aftermath. One additional result of this account is the extension of the traditional core discipline (analytic) "logic and philosophy of science" to the historical and sociological domain of all sciences (including the basic natural sciences and the humanities, as well as the cultural and social sciences). A list of related and selected publications on philosophy of science in Austria is appended as complementary biographical information. A list of Austrian institutions in the philosophy of science with some mission statements complements this survey, which is certainly not complete for practical and systematic reasons

This abridged and revised edition of the original book (Springer-Verlag Vienna, 2001) offers the only comprehensive history and documentation of the Vienna Circle based on new sources with an innovative historiographical approach to the study of science. With reference to previously unpublished archival material and more recent literature, it refutes a number of widespread clichés about "neo-positivism" or "logical positivism". Following some insights on the relation between the history of science and the philosophy of science, the book offers an accessible introduction to the complex subject of "the rise of scientific philosophy" in its socio-cultural background and European philosophical networks till the forced migration in the Anglo-Saxon world. The first part of the book focuses on the origins of Logical Empiricism before World War I and the development of the Vienna Circle in "Red Vienna" (with the "Verein Ernst Mach"), its fate during Austro-Fascism (Schlick's murder 1936) and its final expulsion by National-Socialism beginning with the "Anschluss" in 1938. It analyses the dynamics of the Schlick-Circle in the intellectual context of "late enlightenment" including the minutes of the meetings from 1930 on for the first time published and presents an extensive description of the meetings and international Unity of Science conferences between 1929 and 1941. The chapters introduce the leading philosophers of the Schlick Circle (e.g., Hans Hahn, Otto Neurath, Rudolf Carnap, Philipp Frank, Felix Kaufmann, Edgar Zilsel) and describe the conflicting interaction between Moritz Schlick and Otto Neurath, the long term communication between Moritz Schlick, Friedrich Waismann and Ludwig Wittgenstein, as well as between the Vienna Circle with Heinrich Gomperz and Karl Popper. In addition, Karl Menger's "Mathematical Colloquium" with Kurt Gödel is presented as a parallel movement. The final chapter of this section describes the demise of the Vienna Circle and the forced exodus of scientists and intellectuals from Austria.The second part of the book includes a bio-bibliographical documentation of the Vienna Circle members and for the first time of the assassination of Moritz Schlick in 1936, followed by an appendix comprising an extensive list of sources and literature.

Ever since the first meeting of the proponents of the emerging Logical Empiricism in 1923, there existed philosophical differences as well as personal rivalries between the groups in Berlin and Vienna, headed by Hans Reichenbach and Moritz Schlick, respectively. Early theoretical tensions between Schlick and Reichenbach were caused by Reichenbach’s Kantian roots, who himself regarded the Vienna Circle as a sort of anti-realist “positivist school”—as he described it in his Experience and Prediction. One result of this divergence was Schlick’s preference of Carnap over Reichenbach for a position at the University of Vienna, and his decision not to serve as a co-editor with Reichenbach for the journal Erkenntnis that they jointly established in 1930. A second split rooted in different views on induction and probability, which culminated in the Hans Reichenbach’s refusal to serve as an invited author on probability within the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science series ed. by Rudolf Carnap, Charles Morris and Otto Neurath from 1938 onwards. In this regard it is remarkable that also Richard von Mises, who was the second leading figure of Logical Empiricism in Turkish exile, criticized the theory of probability put forward by his former Berlin colleague. In this paper I analyse this controversial exchange, drawing on the relevant correspondence and asking whether these philosophical differences were a typical feature of the pluralism inherent in Logical Empiricism in general.

On November 9, 2002, Richard Jeffrey died in Princeton at the age of 76. Jeffrey - Dick to all who knew him - was Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at Princeton University, where he obtained his Ph. D. in 1957. After a long struggle against cancer, which allowed him extended periods of well-being, Dick had to surrender, but before the final defeat he was able to finish a book called Subjective Probability: the Real Thing, on the web at //www.princeton.edu/-bayesway/, to be published by Cambridge University Press. This book, completed the day before Dick died, can be seen as his philosophical legacy, the point of arrival of the long intellectual journey he embarked on while studying under Rudolf Carnap in Chicago in the years 1946-51.

On November 9, 2002, Richard Jeffrey died in Princeton at the age of 76. Jeffrey - Dick to all who knew him - was Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at Princeton University, where he obtained his Ph. D. in 1957. After a long struggle against cancer, which allowed him extended periods of well-being, Dick had to surrender, but before the final defeat he was able to finish a book called Subjective Probability: the Real Thing, on the web at //www.princeton.edu/-bayesway/, to be published by Cambridge University Press. This book, completed the day before Dick died, can be seen as his philosophical legacy, the point of arrival of the long intellectual journey he embarked on while studying under Rudolf Carnap in Chicago in the years 1946-51

History and Philosophy of Science. Between Description and Construction. Taking into consideration the huge amount of programs and departments in ‘History and Philosophy of Science’ (HPS), partly including also technology and sociology of science, the rather weak theoretical conceptualization of this field seems surprising. HPS is conceived of neither as a mere addition of history of science and philosophy of science, nor as a good will parallel action. Therefore, the question arises about the genuine subject and method of this trans‐ and interdisciplinary field of research and teaching. The recent postulate of an “integrated HPS” indicates the need of a closer and more intrinsic cooperation and interaction between history of science and philosophy of science (covering also the social and cultural sciences) from a theoretical and practical point of view. In addition, there should be no more privileging of any part in this joint scholarly enterprise by overcoming the context of discovery and the context of justification. Some best practices and desiderata are mentioned together with the forgotten history of the philosophy of science itself. Based on the description of the scholarly field an ideal‐typical model of HPS is offered.

Ever since Aristotle it has been accepted that there exists a combination of inductive and deductive reasoning and a sort of unified inductive-deductive methodology. If one analyzes the procedures and logic of scientific explanation and the methods of generating and justifying scientific knowledge, one recognizes the prototype of philosophy of science found in Aristotle’s inductive and deductive procedure that is described in his Posterior Analytics, Physics and Metaphysics, where heviewed scientific inquiry as a progression from observations to general principles and back to observation. He maintained that the scientist should induce explanatory principles from the phenomena to be explained, and then deduce statements about the phenomena from premisses which include these principles.