Elisa Paganini

Vague predicates and cognitive coherence I intend to offer an analysis of vagueness and of the sorites paradox, adopting the notion of cognitive coherence and arguing in disfavour of semantic coherence which has been frequently adopted by philosophers as a relevant criterion to approach the sorites paradox. According to the semantic method what is relevant is what determines the truth value of assertions with vague predicates, while according to the cognitive method it is essential to consider the rules which govern the application and the non-application of such predicates. In this work, I propose to substitute the notion of minimal semantic coherence with the notion of minimal cognitive coherence. My presentation is divided into the following sections: (1) after presenting the sorites paradox, I explain what I mean by minimal semantic coherence; (2) I introduce the notion of cognitive coherence and argue in disfavour of semantic coherence; (3) I compare the cognitive approach with the verificationist approach and I present Wright’s argument for the incoherence of vague predicates if the latter approach is adopted; (4) I present a revision of Wright’s assumptions and I defend the idea that minimal cognitive coherence is relevant.

Dean Zimmerman focuses on the debate between a serious-tenser B-theorist and an eternalist A-theorist concerning truth and truth-conditions of tensed propositions. According to Zimmerman, the only way for the A-theorist to distinguish herself from the B-theorist is to argue for the non-relative (temporary monadic) truth of tensed propositions denying some aspects of the doctrine of temporal parts. I claim instead that the A-theorist can argue for the non-relative truth of tensed propositions adopting tensed truth-conditions incompatible with the B-theorist's hypotheses.