John O'Callaghan

Wilfrid Sellars’ engagement with Thomism in “Being and Being Known” is examined, specifically for his reformulation of the thesis that the mind in its mental acts is in some sense identical in form to the object known. Borrowing the notion of “isomorphism” from modern set theory, Sellars describes an identity of form between mind and world that is non-intentional in the “Realm of the Real,” while confining all questions of meaning and truth to the “Realm of the Intentional.” John McDowell’s response to Sellars’ reformulation is then examined. McDowell is critical of Sellars’ “blind spot” on the normativity of truth, and argues for the embedding of the intentional in the Realm of the Real under the guise of truth. This paper notes difficulties with both authors’ discussions. Both authors are misled in their discussions of Aquinas by an overemphasis upon the “mental word” as described by Peter Geach. In addition it is proposed that Sellars’ notion of “isomorphisms” has the additional problem of adequately distinguishing various types of mental statements as neural states in the Realm of the Real. The paper concludes by arguing for a deep affinity between McDowell and Aquinas on the normativity of truth.

In the opening passages of the De interpretatione, Aristotle provides a brief description of how words, the mind, and reality are related. Spoken words signify mental impressions, which in turn are natural likenesses of things. Traditionally, this description has been taken to imply a relation of words to things--words are related to things, because they are related to mental impressions of things. Among some contemporary philosophers, e.g. Hilary Putnam and Michael Dummett, it is commonly held that Aristotle's account has had a relatively continuous history through British empiricism, up to contemporary accounts of language and mind. However, in the wake of the later Wittgenstein, these philosophers believe that this tradition is fundamentally flawed, because it yokes language to an untenable philosophy of mind. As they see it, the Aristotelian believes words are primarily or directly about mental impressions, which are directly known, and only secondarily about things, which are indirectly known. But then language cannot succeed in "hooking on to the world," because knowledge of mental representations does not succeed in determining knowledge of the world. ;In the dissertation I examine the criticism that is directed at the "Aristotelian tradition" as it finds expression in one of its moments, namely as it is interpreted by St. Thomas Aquinas. After discussing St. Thomas' appropriation of Aristotle, I discuss the historical context in which the contemporary criticism takes place, the British empiricists and their twentieth century descendants. Then I identify a number of theses constitutive of the contemporary criticism--that mental impressions are things interposed between the mind and reality, individuated by the mind, and known to it by introspection. I examine St. Thomas' account to determine whether and in what way any of these theses apply to his interpretation of Aristotle. I conclude that his appropriation of Aristotle is not subject to the criticisms directed at contemporary accounts of language and mental representation.

The nuclear weapons predicament has troubled humanity since the first atomic bomb was exploded in Alamogordo, New Mexico, July 16, 1945. Currently, the issue has been injected with new life, characterized by intense debate and widespread protests. ;This study addresses primarily the ethical dimensions of the issue. First, in the context of the adversary relationship of the nuclear superpowers, there is a summary of some quantitative aspects related to nuclear weapons, such as numbers, configuration of forces, possible effects of a nuclear conflict, and a brief discussion of the concept of balance and various nuclear policies and strategies. ;Second, the study reviews the evolution of the just war theory and discusses opposing opinions on the application of just war principles both to the question of the use and the deterrent role of nuclear weapons. ;Third, the centerpiece of the study is an analysis of the Machiavellian/Hobbesian assumptions basic to nuclear deterrence theory. These assumptions are seen as giving preeminence to the negative or evil in man/woman, from which a system of nuclear terror is constructed and defended as being a realistic and appropriate way to regulate relations between political communities. ;This perspective is contrasted with that of Catholic social theory, which, it is argued, expresses a more balanced conception of human nature and consequently proposes social arrangements that incorporate the negative and positive dimension of man/woman. Related to nuclear weapons, this world view, which is considered to be more realistic, calls for nuclear disarmament since, on the one hand, such weapons provide an unwarranted risk and temptation for fallible mortals and, on the other hand, are offensive to the dignity and good of human persons. ;Finally, two attitudes to the nuclear dilemma--the retention of nuclear weapons with some form of arms control, or their abolition--are criticized in the light of principles previously enunciated. As a program toward a solution, it is suggested that a shift from the Machiavellian/Hobbesian conception and practice of the State toward a more Rousseauian or moral-contractual view will be both necessary and effective in bringing about disarmament.