•  919
    Oppressive speech
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (3). 2009.
    I here present two different models of oppressive speech. My interest is not in how speech can cause oppression, but in how speech can actually be an act of oppression. As we shall see, a particular type of speech act, the exercitive, enacts permissibility facts. Since oppressive speech enacts permissibility facts that oppress, speech must be exercitive in order for it to be an act of oppression. In what follows, I distinguish between two sorts of exercitive speech acts (the standard exercitive …Read more
  •  222
    Conversational exercitives: Something else we do with our words
    Linguistics and Philosophy 27 (1): 93-111. 2004.
    In this paper, I present a new (i.e., previously overlooked) breed of exercitive speech act (the conversational exercitive). I establish that any conversational contribution that invokes a rule of accommodation changes the bounds of conversational permissibility and is therefore an (indirect) exercitive speech act. Such utterances enact permissibility facts without expressing the content of such facts, without the speaker intending to be enacting such facts and without the hearer recognizing tha…Read more
  •  194
    On silencing, rape, and responsibility
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1). 2010.
    In a recent article in this journal, Nellie Wieland argues that silencing in the sense put forward by Rae Langton and Jennifer Hornsby has the unpalatable consequence of diminishing a rapist's responsibility for the rape. We argue both that Wieland misidentifies Langton and Hornsby's conception of silencing, and that neither Langton and Hornsby's actual conception, nor the one that Wieland attributes to them, in fact generates this consequence
  •  71
    This paper argue that metaphysical realism is insufficient to solve Goodman's grue paradox
  •  35
    On Pragmatics, Exercitive Speech Acts and Pornography
    Lodz Papers in Pragmatics 5 (1): 133-155. 2009.
    On Pragmatics, Exercitive Speech Acts and Pornography Suppose that a suspect being questioned by the police says, "I think I'd better talk to a lawyer." Whether that suspect has invoked her right to an attorney depends on which particular speech act her utterance is. If she is merely thinking aloud about what she ought to do, then she has not invoked that right. If, on the other hand, she has thereby requested a lawyer, she has. Similarly, suppose that an unhappily married man says "I want my wi…Read more