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42Review of Rae Langton, Sexual Solipsism: Philosophical Essays on Pornography and Objectification (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (6). 2009.
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112“On Indirect Speech Acts and Linguistic Communication: A Response to Bertolet”1: McGowan, Tam and HallPhilosophy 84 (4): 495-513. 2009.Suppose a diner says, 'Can you pass the salt?' Although her utterance is literally a question (about the physical abilities of the addressee), most would take it as a request (that the addressee pass the salt). In such a case, the request is performed indirectly by way of directly asking a question. Accordingly this utterance is known as an indirect speech act. On the standard account of such speech acts, a single utterance constitutes two distinct speech acts. On this account then, 'Can you pas…Read more
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139A Partial Defense of Illocutionary SilencingHypatia 26 (1). 2011.Catharine MacKinnon has pioneered a new brand of anti-pornography argument. In particular, MacKinnon claims that pornography silences women in a way that violates their right to free speech. In what follows, we focus on a certain account of silencing put forward by Jennifer Hornsby and Rae Langton, and we defend that account against two important objections. The first objection contends that this account makes a crucial but false assumption about the necessary role of hearer recognition in succe…Read more
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115Shiffrin, Seana Valentine. Speech Matters: On Lying, Morality, and the Law.Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014. Pp. 234. $35.00 (review)Ethics 126 (2): 536-541. 2016.This is a review of Seana Shiffrin's _Speech Matters_.
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910Oppressive speechAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (3). 2009.I here present two different models of oppressive speech. My interest is not in how speech can cause oppression, but in how speech can actually be an act of oppression. As we shall see, a particular type of speech act, the exercitive, enacts permissibility facts. Since oppressive speech enacts permissibility facts that oppress, speech must be exercitive in order for it to be an act of oppression. In what follows, I distinguish between two sorts of exercitive speech acts (the standard exercitive …Read more
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215Conversational exercitives: Something else we do with our wordsLinguistics and Philosophy 27 (1): 93-111. 2004.In this paper, I present a new (i.e., previously overlooked) breed of exercitive speech act (the conversational exercitive). I establish that any conversational contribution that invokes a rule of accommodation changes the bounds of conversational permissibility and is therefore an (indirect) exercitive speech act. Such utterances enact permissibility facts without expressing the content of such facts, without the speaker intending to be enacting such facts and without the hearer recognizing tha…Read more
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189On silencing, rape, and responsibilityAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1). 2010.In a recent article in this journal, Nellie Wieland argues that silencing in the sense put forward by Rae Langton and Jennifer Hornsby has the unpalatable consequence of diminishing a rapist's responsibility for the rape. We argue both that Wieland misidentifies Langton and Hornsby's conception of silencing, and that neither Langton and Hornsby's actual conception, nor the one that Wieland attributes to them, in fact generates this consequence
Wellesley, Massachusetts, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Law |
Philosophy of Gender, Race, and Sexuality |