Don Ross

Consciousness has clearly been the topic of the decade in the philosophy of mind. In a series of papers published throughout this period of frenzied attention, Norton Nelkin worked his way more painstakingly through the conceptual tangles than, perhaps, any other philosopher. While battling with cancer, he fused his ideas into the present book, and managed to complete it only days before the disease triumphed. So this is a heroic work of scholarship, in the most literal sense. It is also a very enlightening one.

This book explores and offers solutions to a range of conceptual and philosophical problems that underlie attempts to understand metaphor processing in the context of cognitive science. The author vigorously criticizes the prevailing philosophical prejudice against traditional «comparison» theories of metaphor, arguing that the problems with the comparison theory are exciting problems that demand solutions, rather than grounds for rejecting the theory itself. Furthermore, it is through these problems that the study of metaphor processing is linked to wider issues in cognitive science, including disputes about computational architectures and neural mechanisms.

This insightful Modern Guide offers a broad coverage of questions and controversies encountered by contemporary economists. A refreshing approach to philosophy of economics, chapters comprise a range of methodological and theoretical perspectives, from lab and field experiments to macroeconomics and applied policy work, written using a familiar, accessible language for economists. Highlighting key areas of methodological controversy, the Modern Guide looks at estimating utility functions in choice data, causal modelling, and ethics in randomised control trials. Chapters further explore topical issues, including: economists' attitudes to other disciplines; gender bias in economic research; methods of modelling social influence in economics; behavioural welfare economics; anti-poverty policy controversies; and inflexible reliance on DSGE models in macroeconomics. Furthermore, it explores the implications of the last financial crisis for macroeconomic confidence, and ways to adapt abstract theory to everyday policy advice. Avoiding philosophical jargon, and with the majority of chapters written by economists, this Modern Guide will challenge economists and scholars of philosophy of economics to engage with different approaches to the topic. This will also be a useful tool for policy makers administering nudges, development initiatives, macro-forecasting and monetary policy."--Publisher's description.

Economics is the only established discipline that is regularly charged not just with including ideologically motivated research programs and hypotheses, but with actually being (at least in its institutionalized mainstream form) an ideology. As Coleman (2002) documents, this charge has followed economics since its modern inception as ‘political economy’ in the eighteenth century. There is a veritable tradition of what Coleman calls ‘anti-economics’, most famously populated by people such as Ruskin and Carlyle, and extending in the contemporary environment to include philosophers John Gray[1] and John Dupré,[2] numerous popular agitators associated with environmentalism and the self-styled ‘anti-capitalist’ and ‘anti-globalization’ movements, and no small number of disillusioned economists.[3] Of course all disciplinary establishments rightly attract critical literature; but as far as I know no one has ever published a book called ‘The Death of Geology’ featuring a hangman’s noose on the cover.[4] Coleman’s compendium of evidence shows conclusively, in case anyone hasn’t been keeping their eyes and ears open, that economics is actively hated by a substantial number of people. There is no other discipline of which this is true, except insofar as some people hate all actual and would-be scientific disciplines from religious, green, or aesthetic motivations.

Three recent book-length studies in the philosophy of economics (Mirowski 2002, Davis 2003, Ross 2005) have drawn attention to the fact that mainstream economic theory has consistently avoided commitment to any particular model of the person. This is the most significant respect in which economics has kept aloof from part of psychology. The widespread belief, on the other hand, that economists’ attentiveness to the psychology of choice and decision had to wait for the Allais challenge and then for Kahneman and Tversky is a myth. It is true that for a brief period after World War II economists led by Samuelson tried to operationalize choice as analytically derivative from observed consumer demand. This was a minor episode in the history of theory. Ross (2005) argues that, if anything, mainstream microeconomics has been more sensitive to theoretical fashions in the psychology of choice than has been good for it.

It is widely appreciated that establishment and maintenance of coordination are among the key evolutionary promoters and stabilizers of human language. In consequence, it is also generally recognized that game theory is an important tool for studying these phenomena. However, the best known game theoretic applications to date tend to assimilate linguistic communication with signaling. The individualistic philosophical bias in Western social ontology makes signaling seem more challenging than it really is, and thus focuses attention on theoretical problems – for example, coordination on lexical meaning – that actual evolution did not need to solve by improving humans’ strategic or social intelligence relative to the endowments of other primates. At the same time, issues of genuine evolutionary significance related to language, especially those around the tensions between individual and collective agency, and around intergenerational accumulation of knowledge, are obscured. This in turn leads to underestimation of the potential contribution that game theory can make to enlightening models of the evolution of human language. JEL classification: A11, A12, B52, C73, D02, D03, D82, Z13

Does the desirability of social institutions for public goods provision depend on the extent to which they include mechanisms for endogenous enforcement of cooperative behavior? We consider alternative institutions that vary the use of direct punishments to promote social cooperation. In one institution, subjects participate in a public goods experiment in which an initial stage of voluntary contribution is followed by a second stage of voluntary, costly sanctioning. Another institution consists of the voluntary contribution stage only, with no subsequent opportunity to sanction. In a third stage subjects vote for which institution they prefer for future interactions: do they prefer one that does allow sanctions or one that does not allow sanctions? Our results show that even though sanctions are frequently used when available, the clear majority of individuals vote for the institution that does not allow sanctions. Thus, a distinction is required between the principles that guide the choice of institutions and the principles that apply to actions guided by institutions. Our results indicate that it is the wealth generated by the institution that determines its desirability.

People differ in the extent to which they discount the values of future rewards. Behavioural economists measure these differences in terms of functions that describe rates of reduced valuation in the future – temporal discounting – as these vary with time. They measure differences in preference for risk – differing rates of probability discounting – in terms of similar functions that describe reduced valuation of rewards as the probability of their delivery falls. So-called ‘impulsive’ people, including people disposed to addiction, tend to choose rewards in patterns that are described by unusually steeply sloped discount functions. The empirical literature is ambivalent as to whether this applies to pathological gamblers (PGs) who manifest most other behavioural patterns associated with addiction, with different, equally careful studies suggesting opposite conclusions (Petry & Casarella 1999; Holt, Green & Myerson 2003). This puzzle may arise from the fact that most previous experiments on discounting behaviour were not designed so as to allow effects of high temporal discounting to be distinguished from effects of low probability discounting. (Addiction has sometimes been associated with the latter because it seems to involve, at least in the starting addict, under appreciation of risk.) Our research project investigates both forms of discounting behaviour and their relationship to severity of risk of PG in a community sample of South African gamblers.

This paper argues that the most common reading of Robbins’s Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science in the methodology literature, according to which it was an historical foil for subsequent positivist-empiricist ideas, underestimates its contemporary relevance. In light of recent scholarship on 1930s positivism in philosophy, Robbins’s Essay is better interpreted as representing an attitude I call ‘broad positivism’, which remains a live option in contemporary philosophy of science. In consequence, the basis of Robbins’s preference for clear demarcation between economics and psychology should be regarded as not merely historical in interest, but as raising valid considerations against the widespread current trend towards ‘correcting’ aspects of economic theory by reference to psychological experiments.

This paper critically discusses Amartya Sen’s case for broadening the basket of wellbeing indicators in development policy beyond income and consumption expenditure. I first argue that, contrary to what Sen has suggested, the theoretical and practical motivations that he gives for this do not form a mutually complementary set. In the second, policy-focused, part of the paper I present problems Sen’s approach to measurement raises in the context of a case study from rural South Africa. I conclude by suggesting that development indicators should be regarded as narrower – in particular, that we should give privileged attention to women’s incomes – rather than broader. Keywords: development policy; well-being proxies; welfare; Amartya Sen Word count: 11,315..

Writing in the Business Day on 2 October 2007, economics journalist Hilary Joffe notes that “it was not long ago that there was a famine of infrastructure investment [in South Africa]; now there’s a feast, with each new week bringing reports of new projects and new, much higher estimates of the totals to be spent in years to come.” Joffe expresses enthusiasm about this, for reasons with which we agree: The infrastructure feast has already helped to raise SA’s investment ratio to nearly 21% of gross domestic product, from a low of below 15% just five years ago. We are already seeing the beginnings of a shift from consumptiondriven to investment-driven growth that the economy needs if it is to grow on a sustainable basis. And of course much of that infrastructure is already urgently needed; and the need will grow as economic growth takes place. However, she is immediately led to ask two pressing questions. First, “even if these are all good and necessary projects, can SA’s economy afford them … all at the same time?” And second, “is anyone counting the total cost to the economy and puzzling out which projects should take priority, and whether some should wait (or be dropped altogether)?”.