• PhilPapers
  • PhilPeople
  • PhilArchive
  • PhilEvents
  • PhilJobs
  • Sign in
PhilPeople
 
  • Sign in
  • News Feed
  • Find Philosophers
  • Departments
  • Radar
  • Help
 
profile-cover
Drag to reposition
profile picture

Hasok Chang

Cambridge University
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    65
    • Most Recent
    • Most Downloaded
    • Topics
  •  Events
    22
  •  News and Updates
    58

 More details
  • Cambridge University
    Department of History and Philosophy of Science
    Professor
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Physical Science
General Philosophy of Science
  • All publications (65)
  •  252
    A misunderstood rebellion
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 24 (5): 741-790. 1992.
    The Twin Paradox
  •  147
    The Chemical Revolution revisited
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 49 91-98. 2015.
    Scientific RevolutionsHistory of ChemistryChemical Elements and SubstancesIncommensurability in Scie…Read more
    Scientific RevolutionsHistory of ChemistryChemical Elements and SubstancesIncommensurability in ScienceSociology of Science
  •  204
    Ontological principles and the intelligibility of epistemic activities
    In Henk W. De Regt, Sabina Leonelli & Kai Eigner (eds.), Scientific Understanding: Philosophical Perspectives, University of Pittsburgh Press. pp. 64--82. 2008.
    Epistemic VirtuesExplanation and UnderstandingOntology, Misc
  •  230
    Hasok Chang. 2012. Is Water H2O? Evidence, Realism and Pluralism
    Theoria: Revista de TeorĂ­a, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 28 (2): 331-334. 2013.
    Varieties of Scientific Realism
  •  368
    Causality and realism in the EPR experiment
    with Nancy Cartwright
    Erkenntnis 38 (2): 169-190. 1993.
    We argue against the common view that it is impossible to give a causal account of the distant correlations that are revealed in EPR-type experiments. We take a realistic attitude about quantum mechanics which implies a willingness to modify our familiar concepts according to its teachings. We object to the argument that the violation of factorizability in EPR rules out causal accounts, since such an argument is at best based on the desire to retain a classical description of nature that consist…Read more
    We argue against the common view that it is impossible to give a causal account of the distant correlations that are revealed in EPR-type experiments. We take a realistic attitude about quantum mechanics which implies a willingness to modify our familiar concepts according to its teachings. We object to the argument that the violation of factorizability in EPR rules out causal accounts, since such an argument is at best based on the desire to retain a classical description of nature that consists of processes that are continuous in space and time. We also do not think special relativity prohibits the superluminal propagation of causes in EPR, for the phenomenon of quantum measurement may very well fall outside the domain of application of special relativity. It is possible to give causal accounts of EPR as long as we are willing to take quantum mechanics seriously, and we offer two such accounts.
    Scientific Realism, MiscEinstein-Podolsky-Rosen
  • Prev.
  • 1
  • 2
  • 3
  • Next
PhilPeople logo

On this site

  • Find a philosopher
  • Find a department
  • The Radar
  • Index of professional philosophers
  • Index of departments
  • Help
  • Acknowledgments
  • Careers
  • Contact us
  • Terms and conditions

Brought to you by

  • The PhilPapers Foundation
  • The American Philosophical Association
  • Centre for Digital Philosophy, Western University
PhilPeople is currently in Beta Sponsored by the PhilPapers Foundation and the American Philosophical Association
Feedback