Francis Cheneval

European Stories is the first book of its kind in any European language. Its authors explore the many different ways 'public intellectuals' have debated Europe - the EU and its periphery - within distinct epistemological, disciplinary, ideological and above all national traditions. The chapters focus on the post-1989 era but with a view to the long history of the 'European idea' and its variants across the continent. To what extent such ideas frame the attitude of European publics is left open. But the authors assume that they matter to the European project as a whole. While the twelve national cases have been selected for the broad range they offer, from founding to non-EU member states, they are not exhaustive as the book is meant to encourage further research. The authors of these chapters are all themselves fully immersed in their respective public spheres although generally not strongly identified with one 'camp' or another. The expected readership is broad and interdisciplinary, ranging from political philosophy, to political science, international relations, history, sociology and the history of ideas. Beyond academia, European Stories is meant for all readers interested in the intellectual debates of our time.

This article argues that obligatory, simultaneous, and simple Treaty ratification by referenda is the next step in the consolidation of the political core of European citizenship. In the first part, general remarks about the special nature of EU citizenship highlight the relevance of referenda on EU Treaties for EU citizenship. In the second part, the normative and empirical case in favour of direct democracy is put forward. It is followed by the assessment of direct democracy in European integration as we have known it so far. The practice is irreversible and gaining in momentum. But it is in need of substantial reform due to procedural dysfunctions and discriminatory consequences for the citizens. Section V relates this result to a legal analysis of EU citizenship. The suppression of the discriminatory consequences of the Treaty ratification procedure is necessary from a legal point of view, but it cannot be expected from the 'judicial incrementalism' that has characterised the development of EU citizenship regarding free movement and residence. In section VI, the conclusions of the previous sections are drawn into the final proposal of obligatory, simultaneous and simple Treaty reform by referenda in all Member States. At the end, five counter-arguments to the proposal are discussed.

This article proposes the political organisation of interstate integration – characterised by functional differentiation and unbundled multi-level territoriality – as a political ideal type. The theoretical foundations and empirical conditions of this new form of political organisation are explored focussing on basic security threats, such as nuclear armament, transnational terrorism, and organised crime. The empirical conditions of multilateral democratic integration are not essentially different from the conditions of democratic state-building and not limited to Europe. The political reality of multilateral integration is often misperceived in political theory. This is due, either to the uncritical presupposition of a traditional political ontology, defined by an essentialist understanding of the unitary state; or by an apolitical discourse on flows and scapes that loses sight of the specific features of political authority in the postnational realm

In this paper an analysis of Hobbes' argument in favor of the Leviathan is combined with a reassessment in a new security environment. The analysis shows that Hobbes' premises are complex and lead to conclusions that differ from the realist as well as from the world-state position, both attributed to Hobbesian logic in IR theory. A strict application of the Hobbesian argument in today's security context leads to a rationale of multilateral institution-building among states. In the first part of the paper the internationalist analogy in the concept of war of all against all is uncovered and analyzed in relation to the security dilemma, domestic analogy, and methodological individualism. The second part reassesses the Hobbesian security rationale in a security environment which is assumed to be shaped by transnational terrorism and nuclear WMD.

The article argues that Rawls’s property-owning democracy should not be understood as a necessary standard of democratic legitimacy. This position contradicts Rawls’s own understanding to some extent, but a rejoinder with elements of political liberalism is possible. He concedes that justice as fairness is a ‘comprehensive liberal doctrine’ and that a well ordered society affirming such a doctrine ‘contradicts reasonable pluralism’. Rawls makes clear that reasonable pluralism in combination with the burdens of judgment lead to rare unanimity in political life and to the necessity of majority and plurality voting procedures

In a ‘demoi-cracy’, separate statespeoples enter into a political arrangement and jointly exercise political authority. Its proper domain is a polity of democratic states with hierarchical, majoritarian features of policy-making, especially in value-laden redistributive and coercive policy areas, but without a unified political community (demos). In its vertical dimension, demoi-cracy is based on the equality and interaction of citizens’ and statespeoples’ representatives in the making of common policies. Horizontally, it seeks to balance equal transna- tional rights of citizens with national policy-making autonomy. The EU belongs to the domain of demoi-cracy and has established many of its features. We argue that both vertical and horizontal demoi-cratization have been triggered by processes of supranational integration in the European Union (EU). They differ, however, in the origins and the outcomes. Vertical demoi-cratization has initially been a reaction of parliamentary institutional actors to majoritarian decision-making in regulatory policy-areas, resulting in the empowerment of the European Parliament (EP) and the strengthening of parliamentary oversight at the national level. By contrast, hori- zontal demoi-cratization has been promoted by governments as an alternative to majoritarian and legally binding policy-making in core areas of statehood, as well as coercive and redistributive policy-areas; it has resulted in soft, co-ordinative forms of policy-making, seeking to protect national autonomy. The extent to which these developments actually meet the normative standards of demoi-cracy in practice, however, is mixed.

The Eurozone crisis has brought the imperative of democratic autonomy within the EU to the forefront, a concern at the core of demoicratic theory. The article seeks to move the scholarship on demoicratic theory a step further by exploring what we call the social construction of demoicratic reality. While the EU’s legal-institutional infrastructure may imperfectly approximate a demoicratic structure, we need ask to what extent the ‘bare bones’ demoicratic character of a polity can actually be grounded in a full-flesh social construct that is or could be acted out in the democratic experience and the self-awareness of its peoples. Ultimately, such an enquiry should help us understand whether a polity like the EU is actually and potentially a stable or unstable political form. We develop a consistent theory of popular sovereignty drawing on John Searle and HLA Hart to conceive the constitutionalised people as a social fact and the sovereignty of the people as a status ascribed to the people. We use this construction of demoicratic reality as a conceptual framework to understand the possibility of popular sovereignty being exercised concurrently by several rather than just one dêmos.

This article studies the reception of Christian Wolff's theory of the civitas maxima by Hermann Friedrich Kahrel (1719-1787) and Michael Hanov (1695-1773). According to his previous work mentioned in the article (n. 2), the author considers the concept of civitas maxima as a methodological innovation. It is the normative fiction of a presumed rational consensus of mankind and of the states. As the article tries to show, this concept was misunderstood, not only by the enemies of Wolff but also by his followers. Kahrel considered the consensus of mankind and of the states a tacit factual consensus. The innovative idea of a presumed normative consensus was thereby lost. Hanov interpreted the civitas maxima as a civitas dei in the sense of Leibniz. He transformed the normative idea of a presumed consensus into a fact of metaphysics and natural theology. Nevertheless, he introduced a diachrone dimension into the concept of civitas maxima which he sees as an infinite sequence of all generations of mankind. This anticipates Kant's integration of cosmopolitanism in a certain concept of history. Kahrel and Hanov however misconceived Wolff's idea of a normative fiction of reason by its reduction to a factual reality, be it natural or metaphysical. They thereby are representative for a common misunderstanding of Wolff's theory that also leads to an inadequate critique