Francis Cheneval

In a ‘demoi-cracy’, separate statespeoples enter into a political arrangement and jointly exercise political authority. Its proper domain is a polity of democratic states with hierarchical, majoritarian features of policy-making, especially in value-laden redistributive and coercive policy areas, but without a unified political community (demos). In its vertical dimension, demoi-cracy is based on the equality and interaction of citizens’ and statespeoples’ representatives in the making of common policies. Horizontally, it seeks to balance equal transna- tional rights of citizens with national policy-making autonomy. The EU belongs to the domain of demoi-cracy and has established many of its features. We argue that both vertical and horizontal demoi-cratization have been triggered by processes of supranational integration in the European Union (EU). They differ, however, in the origins and the outcomes. Vertical demoi-cratization has initially been a reaction of parliamentary institutional actors to majoritarian decision-making in regulatory policy-areas, resulting in the empowerment of the European Parliament (EP) and the strengthening of parliamentary oversight at the national level. By contrast, hori- zontal demoi-cratization has been promoted by governments as an alternative to majoritarian and legally binding policy-making in core areas of statehood, as well as coercive and redistributive policy-areas; it has resulted in soft, co-ordinative forms of policy-making, seeking to protect national autonomy. The extent to which these developments actually meet the normative standards of demoi-cracy in practice, however, is mixed.

The Eurozone crisis has brought the imperative of democratic autonomy within the EU to the forefront, a concern at the core of demoicratic theory. The article seeks to move the scholarship on demoicratic theory a step further by exploring what we call the social construction of demoicratic reality. While the EU’s legal-institutional infrastructure may imperfectly approximate a demoicratic structure, we need ask to what extent the ‘bare bones’ demoicratic character of a polity can actually be grounded in a full-flesh social construct that is or could be acted out in the democratic experience and the self-awareness of its peoples. Ultimately, such an enquiry should help us understand whether a polity like the EU is actually and potentially a stable or unstable political form. We develop a consistent theory of popular sovereignty drawing on John Searle and HLA Hart to conceive the constitutionalised people as a social fact and the sovereignty of the people as a status ascribed to the people. We use this construction of demoicratic reality as a conceptual framework to understand the possibility of popular sovereignty being exercised concurrently by several rather than just one dêmos.

This article studies the reception of Christian Wolff's theory of the civitas maxima by Hermann Friedrich Kahrel (1719-1787) and Michael Hanov (1695-1773). According to his previous work mentioned in the article (n. 2), the author considers the concept of civitas maxima as a methodological innovation. It is the normative fiction of a presumed rational consensus of mankind and of the states. As the article tries to show, this concept was misunderstood, not only by the enemies of Wolff but also by his followers. Kahrel considered the consensus of mankind and of the states a tacit factual consensus. The innovative idea of a presumed normative consensus was thereby lost. Hanov interpreted the civitas maxima as a civitas dei in the sense of Leibniz. He transformed the normative idea of a presumed consensus into a fact of metaphysics and natural theology. Nevertheless, he introduced a diachrone dimension into the concept of civitas maxima which he sees as an infinite sequence of all generations of mankind. This anticipates Kant's integration of cosmopolitanism in a certain concept of history. Kahrel and Hanov however misconceived Wolff's idea of a normative fiction of reason by its reduction to a factual reality, be it natural or metaphysical. They thereby are representative for a common misunderstanding of Wolff's theory that also leads to an inadequate critique

Der Artikel erläutert mit dem kosmopolitischen Republikanismus einen Aspekt, der in der nationalstaatlich fixierten und meist euroskeptischen Republikanismus-Forschung vernachlässigt worden ist, aber in der frühen Phase der Französischen Revolution eine wichtige Rolle spielte. In der Perspektive des hier vorliegenden Artikels erscheint der revolutionäre Republikanismus zumindest in seinen Anfängen nicht als Inbegriff nationalstaatlich gehegter Demokratie und Autonomie, sondern als kosmopolitische oder zumindest Europa einigende Idee. Das Beispiel von Cloots zeigt, dass der Republikanismus in jener Zeit des Umbruchs und am historischen Ursprung der modernen europäischen Demokratie nicht partikularstaatlich, sondern kosmopolitisch konnotiert war. Heutige Versuche, den Republikanismus kosmopolitisch zu transformieren, wie sie von R. Bellamy und D. Castiglione unternommen werden, können in die Tradition des kosmopolitischen Republikanismus gestellt werden. Der Artikel würdigt sechs systematisch bedeutende Merkmale von Cloots’ Theorie und stellt diese in Beziehung zum kantischen Kosmopolitismus, der sich hauptsächlich durch seinen prozessualen, historisch-hermeneutisch reflektierten Charakter von Cloots’ kosmopolitischem Republikanismus unterscheidet

This paper assesses the theory, first voiced by Schelling and Kant, according to which an infinite historical process will lead to cosmopolitan institutions.The assessment will mainly be done on the basis of theories about infinitely repeated games. The first part of the paper reconstructs “infinitesimal” historical cosmopolitanism as proposed by Schelling and Kant. The second part confronts this position with the results of the theory of infinitely repeated games among groups. The third part offers reflections on additional conditions and contingencies of the theory and the forth part draws the conclusion: while we can reasonably assume global cooperation to increase and stabilize over time under sustainable conditions, we cannot predict the institutional design of that cooperation.

This special issue is motivated by the observation that conservatism plays a marginal role in contemporary philosophy even though it appears to be of considerable importance in moral, social, and political reality. One reason for this neglect is that defenders of conservatism have often refrained from articulating their arguments in a language that is acceptable to and understandable by analytically -trained philosophers. The contributions of this special issue show that conservatism can profitably be approached from the point of view of analytic philosophy. Many of them are indebted to Jerry Cohen’s (2012) seminal paper on conservative value, which develops a sophisticated justification of what Oakeshott (1991) called the disposition to be conservative.

The normative theory of multilateral democratic integration starts within the context of liberal peoples engaged in the common realization of rights, freedoms, and life chances for their citizens while seeking to preserve self-government and popular sovereignty. The point argued in the paper is that the fair terms of multilateral democratic integration must be determined by an integrated original position of citizen and people representatives choosing basic principles of liberal multilateralism. The proposal to merge the two Rawlsian original positions offers a political solution to the contrast between rival conceptions of grand universalism and national particularism. After a general discussion of the wider problematic and the original position, I explain the concept and the reality of multilateral democratic integration. In part three, I justify why citizen and people representatives ought to be seen as participants of the original position of multilateral democratic integration. I then assess the rational motives of both types of representatives and determine the veil of ignorance of the integrated original position. In section, the original position is applied to the test of several normative hypotheses prima facie considered as candidates for basic principles of multilateral democratic integration. These principles are not necessarily new, but they are principles which presumably apply to multilateral democratic integration as a specific political order and system of cooperation.