•  209
    Indeterminate people
    Analysis 45 (3): 141-145. 1985.
    Here is the paper that was attacked by George Rea in his “How many minds…?” paper. Has this issue been resolved? Can there be entities such that there is no definite answer to the question “Are there 13 minds at work here, or 14?”
  •  265
    Some Ontological Arguments
    Faith and Philosophy 10 (1): 18-32. 1993.
    This was an attempt to show what is wrong with Anselm’s ‘Ontological Argument’ for the existence of God. My present view is that Peter Millican has given us a similar, but much better line of attack in his “The One Fatal Flaw….” Paper.
  •  305
    Wittgenstein on the Resurrection
    Philosophical Investigations 33 (4): 321-338. 2010.
    Wittgenstein probably did not believe in Christ's Resurrection (as an historical event), but he may well have believed that if he had achieved a higher level of devoutness he would believe it. His view seems to have been that devout Christians are right in holding onto this belief tenaciously even though, in fact, it's false. It's historical falsity, is compatible with its religious validity, so to speak. So far as I can see, he did not think that devout Christians should believe that it doesn't…Read more
  •  67
    Cook's reductionis
    Philosophia 17 (4): 509-515. 1987.
  •  748
    If God necessarily exists this has some interesting consequences. In this little note I mention some of these.
  •  1266
    In 1974 Putnam was a ‘realist’ in regard to the physical world. By 1981 he had become a 'non-realist' in this regard. (I don’t know where he stands today.) In this paper I argue that his realism was more plausible than his non-realism. The physical world is what it is independently of any rational being’s interpretation of it.