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812This is a concordance of page numbers in the following editions of Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception: English editions prior to the Routledge Classics 2002; Routledge Classics edition, with the new pagination; the French edition from Gallimard, prior to 2005; the 2e edition from Gallimard, 2005, with new pagination.
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138Edward S. Casey: Getting back into place: Toward a renewed understanding of the place-world and Edward S. Casey: The fate of place: A philosophical history (review)Continental Philosophy Review 32 (1): 37-48. 1999.
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174What Is Living and What Is Non-Living in Merleau-Ponty’s Philosophy of Movement and ExpressionChiasmi International 7 225-238. 2005.In ancient philosophy life has priority: non-living matter is made intelligible by living activity. The modern evolutionary synthesis reverses this priority: life is a passive result of blind, non-living material processes. But recent work in science and philosophy puts that reversal in question, by emphasizing how living beings are self-organizing and active. “Naturalizing” this new emphasis on living activity requires not simply a return to ancient philosophy but a new ontology, a new concept …Read more
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1Philosophy of MindIn Constantin V. Boundas (ed.), The Edinburgh Companion to Twentieth-Century Philosophies, Edinburgh University Press. pp. 531-544. 2007.
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122Bergsonian intuition, Husserlian variation, Peirceian abduction: Toward a relation between method, sense and natureSouthern Journal of Philosophy 43 (2): 267-298. 2005.Husserlian variation, Bergsonian intuition and Peircean abduction are contrasted as methodological responses to the traditional philosophical problem of deriving knowledge of universals from singulars. Each method implies a correspondingly different view of the generation of the variations from which knowledge is derived. To make sense of the latter differences, and to distinguish the different sorts of variation sought by philosophers and scientists, a distinction between extensive, intensive, …Read more
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20Interrogating Ethics: Embodying the Good in Merleau-Ponty (review)Symposium 11 (1): 180-183. 2007.
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58The Open Figure of Experience and MindDialogue 45 (2): 315-326. 2006.This review of John Russon's Human Experience: Philosophy, Neurosis, and the Elements of Everyday Life focuses on Russon's position that experience is open (having a developmental, situated and dynamic, rather than fixed, structure) and figured (having a structure inseparable from forms of bodily function), and that mind is something learned in the process of working out experience as figured and open. These themes are drawn together in relation to recent scientific discussions (e.g., of bodily …Read more
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4Lived time and absolute knowing: Habit and addiction from infinite jest to the phenomenology of spiritClio: A Journal of Literature, History, and the Philosophy of History 30 (4): 375-415. 2001.A study of habit and other unconscious backgrounds of action shows how shapes of spiritual life in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit each imply correlative senses of lived time. The very form of time thus gives spirit a sensuous encounter with its own concept. The point that conceptual content is manifest in the sensuous form of time is key to an interpretation of Hegel's infamous and puzzling remarks about time and the concept in ``absolute knowing.'' The article also shows how Hegel's Phenomenol…Read more
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19The paradoxes of translation: reflections on expression in Don Landes’s Recreative translation of Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of PerceptionContinental Philosophy Review 49 (3): 371-382. 2016.
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155Animals and humans, thinking and naturePhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (1): 49-72. 2005.Studies that compare human and animal behaviour suspend prejudices about mind, body and their relation, by approaching thinking in terms of behaviour. Yet comparative approaches typically engage another prejudice, motivated by human social and bodily experience: taking the lone animal as the unit of comparison. This prejudice informs Heidegger’s and Merleau-Ponty’s comparative studies, and conceals something important: that animals moving as a group in an environment can develop new sorts of “se…Read more
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223The fold and the body schema in Merleau-ponty and dynamic systems theoryChiasmi International 1 275-286. 1999.
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94Ecstatic body, ecstatic nature: Perception as breaking with the worldChiasmi International 8 201-217. 2006.I survey some unusual phenomena in which the body seems to be projected into other things. I argue that these phenomena should not be understood as illusions, as erroneous distortions of an objective body, but as indicating that the body is first of all a being absorbed in outside things. The usual questions about perception are thus reversed: the question is not how the outside world is represented in an inside, but how a moving body ecstatically absorbed in things ever breaks out of that absor…Read more
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50Measurement as transcendental–empirical écart: Merleau-Ponty on deep temporalityContinental Philosophy Review 50 (1): 49-64. 2016.Merleau-Ponty’s radical reflection conceptualizes the transcendental and the empirical as intertwined, emerging only via an écart. I advance this concept of transcendental empirical écart by studying the problem of measurement in science, in both general and quantum mechanical contexts. Section one analyses scientific problems of measurement, focusing on issues of temporality, to show how measurement entails a transcendental that diverges with the empirical. Section two briefly interprets this r…Read more
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327The Sense of SpaceState University of New York Press. 2004.A phenomenological account of spatial perception in relation to the lived body. The Sense of Space brings together space and body to show that space is a plastic environment, charged with meaning, that reflects the distinctive character of human embodiment in the full range of its moving, perceptual, emotional, expressive, developmental, and social capacities. Drawing on the philosophies of Merleau-Ponty and Bergson, as well as contemporary psychology to develop a renewed account of the moving, …Read more
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2BodyIn Rosalyn Diprose & Jack Reynolds (eds.), Merleau-ponty: Key Concepts, Acumen Publishing. pp. 111-120. 2008.This chapter studies the theme of the body in Merleau-Ponty by first showing how it is anticipated in The Structure of Behaviour and is central to the Phenomenology of Perception. In addition to illuminating Merleau-Ponty's concept of the body, the aim is to show how the body is, for Merleau-Ponty, a key methodological term, since it marks philosophy's inherent openness to something prephilosophical, to which philosophy must be responsible. The chapter shows how this openness and the body's expr…Read more
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209Thinking the body, from Hegel's speculative logic of measure to dynamic systems theoryJournal of Speculative Philosophy 16 (3): 182-197. 2002.A study of shifts in scientific strategies for measuring the living body, especially in dynamic systems theory: sheds light on Hegel's concept of measure in The Science of Logic, and the dialectical transition from categories of being to categories of essence; shows how Hegel's speculative logic anticipates and analyzes key tensions in scientific attempts to measure and conceive the dynamic agency of the body. The study's analysis of the body as having an essentially dynamic identity irreducible…Read more
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135Diabetes, Chronic Illness and the Bodily Roots of Ecstatic TemporalityHuman Studies 31 (4): 399-421. 2008.This article studies the phenomenology of chronic illness in light of phenomenology’s insights into ecstatic temporality and freedom. It shows how a chronic illness can, in lived experience, manifest itself as a disturbance of our usual relation to ecstatic temporality and thence as a disturbance of freedom. This suggests that ecstatic temporality is related to another sort of time—“provisional time”—that is in turn rooted in the body. The article draws on Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Percep…Read more
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49Touching intelligenceJournal of the Philosophy of Sport 29 (149-162): 149-162. 2002.Touch requires that one move in concert with one's tactile object. This provokes the question how joint movement of this sort yields perception of tactile qualities of the object vs. tactile qualities of an object-augmented body. Phenomenological analysis together with results of dynamic systems theory (in psychology) suggest that the difference stems from 'resonant' vs. 'reverberant' modalities of body-object movement. The further suggestion is that tactile movement is itself a form of discrimi…Read more
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149Faces and the invisible of the visible: Toward an animal ontologyPhaenEx 2 (2): 124-169. 2007.This paper studies the role of faces in animal life to gain insight into Merleau-Ponty's philosophy, especially his later ontology. The relation between animal faces and moving, animal bodies involves a peculiar, expressive logic. This logic echoes the physiognomic structure of perception that Merleau-Ponty detects in his earlier philosophy, and exemplifies and clarifies a logic elemental to his later ontology, especially to his concept of an invisible that is of (endogenous to) the visible. The…Read more
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159Optical Idealism and the Languages of Depth in Descartes and BerkeleySouthern Journal of Philosophy 35 (3): 363-392. 1997.
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2The time and place of the organism: Merleau-ponty's philosophy in embryoAlter: revue de phénoménologie 16 69-86. 2008.Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy attempts to locate meaning-sense-within being. Space and time are thus ingredient in sense. This is apparent in his earlier studies of structure, fields, expression and the body schema, and the linkage of space, time and sense becomes thematic in Merleau-Ponty’s later thinking about institution, chiasm and reversibility. But the space-time-sense linkage is also apparent in his studies of embryogenesis. The paper shows this by reconstructing Merleau-Ponty’s critical ana…Read more
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93Reversibility and ereignis: On being as Kantian imagination in Merleau-ponty and HeideggerPhilosophy Today 52 (Supplement): 135-143. 2008.This paper aims to clarify Merleau-Ponty’s difficult concept of “reversibility” by interpreting it as resuming the dialectical critique of the rationalist and empiricist tradition that informs Merleau-Ponty’s earlier work. The focus is on reversibility in “Eye and Mind,” as dismantling the traditional dualism of activity and passivity. This clarification also puts reversibility in continuity with the Phenomenology’s appropriation of Kant, letting us note an affiliation between Merleau-Ponty’s re…Read more
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5Elliot L. Jurist, Beyond Hegel and Nietzsche: Philosophy, Culture, and Agency Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 22 (3): 192-194. 2002.
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97The logic of the body in bergson's motor schemes and Merleau-ponty's body schemaPhilosophy Today 44 (Supplement): 60-69. 2000.
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Maurice Merleau-Ponty |
Phenomenology |
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Maurice Merleau-Ponty |