Panos Eliopoulos

THE MORAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE WORK OF SENECA (pp. 351) (Η ΗΘΙΚΗ ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΑ ΣΤΟ ΕΡΓΟ ΤΟΥ ΣΕΝΕΚΑ) The thesis consists of contents, foreword, abbreviations, introduction, three parts, conclusion, bibliography, index nominum and index verborum. In the introduction the author defines the main parameters of Stoic philosophy, regarding issues of logic, nature and ethics, but also briefly examines specific concepts such as the Heimarmene, Logos, Virtue (arete), Eudemonia, etc, so as to demarcate the context of Seneca’s views as well as the theoretical setting inside which his thought is developed. In the introduction there is found reference to Seneca’s biography as well as to his philosophical goals. The author, all in all, uses the analytical method. Further, he assesses the existing bibliography and the related studies of the past and, thus, proceeds to define the originality of his thesis in the absence of any former book on the issue of the moral philosophy of Seneca, in the adoption of more recent hermeneutical schemata from the fields of philosophy and psychology, evaluating the absence of anterior bibliography through the international database of L'Année philologique. Having clarified, in the previous chapters of his thesis, the partial differentiations of Seneca from the rest of the Stoics, in issues such as apathy, the autonomy of certain emotions, good and evil, virtue, eudemonia, etc, in the conclusion the author gives emphasis on the assimilation of the concept of dignitas in the main corpus of the stoic terminology. Particular attention, in consequence, is paid to the fact that the Roman Stoic revivifies the classical doctrines of his School, making innovative responses to older problematic areas of the stoic thought, and contributes to the necessary evolution of the Stoic philosophy. In this context, the author gives a negative answer to the hypothesis of Seneca’s eclecticism. Moreover, he connects the concept of will (voluntas) with the moral responsibility each man assumes in the events of his life, he discusses the different use of the term humanitas (especially compared to that of Cicero), he elucidates certain aspects of Seneca’s views but also of the historical era, and provides information, which is essential for the continuation of the research on the Roman Stoic’s philosophy. In his concluding remarks, the author evidently shows that, while for Seneca a certain teleology is not essential (one that would answer to the dilemma of the immortality of the soul), still the sage is defined as the human being who overcomes the fact of death, as well as anything else which is considered to be an evil by the majority of the people, through his absence of fear. This turn to the nucleus of the Being, that each man separately is, in his deepest interiority, highlights this theorization as an individualistic one, but simultaneously, by means of the active participation of the sage in the work of wisdom and in the mission of therapy of the other people who are not yet sages, reconciles it with the social reality.

The discussion of Moira, Destiny, Heimarmene, Necessity, Fortune, and the constellation of related concepts entails a sustained inquiry into some of the most fundamental problems of ancient philosophy: free will, causality, determinism, divination, belief in the gods, and moral responsibility. In earlier forms of Greek thought, from ancient tragedy to the Cynics and Cyrenaics, the atomists and the Ionians, the Sophists, Socrates and Plato, the Epicureans and the Sceptics, the emphasis falls upon the emergence of the human factor within an unequal and essentially dualistic struggle between two opposing powers. Later, both Neoplatonic and Christian thinkers introduce into their theories objections and qualifications that reveal a stronger concern for the vindication of God than for the autonomy of the human being. Stoicism, by contrast, constitutes the major philosophical current of antiquity in which the most significant doctrines concerning Heimarmene are developed; for this reason, it has also been subjected to intense and, to some extent, justified criticism. The present monograph follows the historical trajectory of ancient philosophy in a synthetic and analytical manner, identifying, interpreting, and critically assessing the positions of the principal schools and their representatives, with Stoic theory serving as its central point of reference. The philosophers examined are selected according to the different arguments they deploy concerning Heimarmene, so that the present study may offer a comprehensive account of the ancient debate. Its main emphasis lies on the epistemological, physical, metaphysical, and ethical dimensions of the doctrines advanced by the philosophers and philosophical schools under consideration, while also taking into account further relevant elements wherever these prove necessary for the interpretation of the problem.

THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE WORK OF SENECA The Political Philosophy in the Work of Seneca, attempts to answer questions that refer to the particular issue as well as to address some misconceptions of the international literature on the social and political views of this philosopher of the Hellenistic era. The Hellenistic period is a particularly difficult one to approach. The great variety of philosophical doctrines, the interaction among the philosophical schools, the (often not ungrounded) accusations for eclecticism, not only in the Imperial Stoa, but also in the Middle Stoa, in the teachings of Posidonius and Panaetius, to whom much of Seneca’s reflections are owed, create a difficult, unavoidably critical, environment for any scholar who aspires to carefully consider their respective theories. As regards the philosophical writings of Seneca, the researcher also feels obliged to cope with the following primary questions: a) Is the philosopher from Cordoba an authentic thinker? And (b) is his life in accordance with his philosophical views? Seneca is, undoubtedly, an original thinker. One of the problems presented, however, in the study of his work is that the writings of the philosopher from Cordoba are non-systematic, in the sense that his views on several concepts and issues which are important for the Stoics are found inside a plethora of different passages. The researcher needs to gather Seneca’s views on a subject, from many of his letters and treatises, so that one could become finally aware of the fact that his perceptions are, in general, not really contradictory. Frequently though, his philosophical theories have been accused of eclecticism. With the present monograph, The Political Philosophy in the Work of Seneca, and the previous one, The Moral Philosophy in the Work of Seneca, we aim to aid in the re-evaluation of the political and ethical works of the Roman philosopher, under our central hypothesis that Seneca is normatively integrated into the circle of Stoic thinkers and is not a case of an eclectic writer. Seneca is concerned with a difficult task: the acquisition of virtue, so that man can be led to the eudemonistic way of life by living according to nature, based on his inherent capacity for right reason. In addition to the general proclamation of this plan, and with the obvious difficulties that are contained in it, there is still the problem that, in the centuries during which the Roman intellectual produces his philosophical work, the former "innocence," vitality and zeal of ancient Greek philosophy seem to have been significantly diminished. The Epicureans propose that man withdraws from all activities, suggesting that a kind of hesychasm and the peaceful enjoyment of pleasure will end the human concerns, the Cynics encourage the return of a more "rigid" and ascetic way of living and criticize the institutions of their contemporaries, the Peripatetic School has practically confined itself to defending and commenting on the Aristotelian teachings, and the younger Skeptics refer, for the most part, to the Pyrrhonic rather than to their Academic heritage and speak now, mainly in favour of treatment rather than of right theory. In all schools, more emphasis is gradually placed on moral philosophy. The Roman senator has set out for himself a clear philosophical mission: to lead people to a radical change of perception regarding their living conditions. This philosophical task is carried over, to a greater extent, in his moral philosophy. First of all, he is attracted by the relationship of man to his own self, by the processes in the psychological-mental sphere, and only subsequently -and subject to the solution of the original problem- by the relationship of man with the world around him, in a subject-object connection. But this does not signify that politics is inferior, or "ancilla Ethicae": in Seneca’s practical philosophy, living according to nature continues to be the response to the political and social question of his time, "quid agis?", as an expansion of the Socratic question of how life should be experienced. Seneca belongs to those theoreticians for whom the moral quest is consistent with social sensitivity. His social philosophy, as elaborated in the present monograph, is mainly analyzed in the context of the following: a) a certain circle of stoic sages; b) moral action on the grounds of "humanitas". The important thing that Seneca does with this view is that he thus honors man as a gnomon for another man, and does not highlight an impersonal moral rule as a measure for human activity. The sage himself is seen as a model for moral life. Instead of providing an abstract moral rule, Seneca refers to Cato, to Socrates, and others, not because they possess the perfect virtue or wisdom, but as examples of how close with the absolute and with divine virtue can man be found despite his limited physical powers and despite the restraints of temporality. The purpose of virtuous action is the conquest of “sapientia”, the overcoming of “stultitia”. Evil, in the human world, is no other than the surrender of the human being to desires and passions, the non-resistance of the human mind to wrong judgments. This is the evil that intrudes into the subjective space of the person, as well as in the human societies. The political philosophy of the particular Roman philosopher acquires a strong moral and social foundation, without being transformed into a philosophy that fosters absolutist dogmatism. The existence of "praecepta", the rules set by another, and the "decreta" of moral norms that are universal and unalterable, is understood as wisdom related always with free choice. As follows, freedom, self-esteem, free will, are considered as the greatest conquests of the human spirit. The State that Seneca proposes is surrounded by the Natural Law which is the supreme law. It is a transition from collectivity, in the form of ordinary societies, namely the "vulgus", the mobs, into the virtuous community of a "contubernium", i.e. the coexistence of a teacher and a student. These two are negotiating in the frame of an equal relationship. The stoic person, according to Seneca, is not a social revolutionary, he is a moral reformer. This is his main social and political distinction. Thus, active humanism, the "humanitas" of Seneca, prevails on two levels: one is the level of friends, the participants in the "contubernium," the other is the level of the wider society, either within the conventional States, or in the more ample context of the stoic Cosmos. The "humanitas" of Seneca is the result of the shift, in his theory, from Nature to man; practically, it is no less than an extension of the Greek concept of philanthropy. The fact that Seneca reduces the inner distance from the stoic sage is a concession due to "humanitas", which has no emotional reference, and consists in a claim to right reason. Social and political action lies at the heart of the "res socialis"; the main element, in this kind of action, is the social one, which means that any such action is taken for the sake of another person, not for the thing itself. Seneca's political vision restates, clarifies, extends and interprets the private self-review of an individual as a vision of a human universe. It is an overwhelming anthropocentrism that encompasses both the individual and the collective, in a new kind of "humanitas", quite different from the one of Cicero. The first part of the monograph records the central philosophical views of the Stoa in order to serve as an outline for Seneca's political philosophy. The main convictions of Seneca, as well as the answers to questions about his eclecticism and possible deviation from Stoicism, are also brought up. It turns out that Seneca is led to the contemplative acceptance of the orthodox stoic doctrines, but also assists in their evolutionary transformation. In the second part, the anthropological conditions of the communal life, as formulated in his thought, are thoroughly discussed. To this end, we analyze the main parameters of the Roman philosopher's thinking, defining the moral and political axes of his theory, such as “constantia”, “voluntas”, which is distinctly differentiated from the Chrysippean version, “sapientia”, et cetera. We further examine how his theory, a theory of self-reference and inwardness, ends in the wider sociality of a secular city. The third part highlights the importance of friendship in the State of Seneca as well as the feasibility of human consensus according to right reason. It analyzes the way in which the circle of friends of wisdom forms a political core of ideal friendship, founded on the constant solidarity of merit. Moreover, reference is made to the emphasis given by the Roman philosopher on the unity between responsibility and will, which concerns all the phases of human life, both the individual-moral and the collective- political, especially as regards the exercise of power and the exchange of benefits. It turns out that moral autonomy is a prerequisite for the practical realization of "humanitas", of stoic philanthropy, based on principles derived from the human factor, namely the activity of the sage, and from the free exercise of his will. Another conclusive contribution is how there is a political prerequisite in the moral agency of the stoic person and, also, in what manners the criteria for political power may be defined.

The Methodological seminar was conducted by the scientific journal “Philosophy of Education” (Institute of Higher Education, National Academy of Educational Sciences of Ukraine). The participants of the seminar were Prof. Panos Eliopoulos (University of Peloponnese, Greece), Lyudmyla Gorbunova, Mykhailo Boychenko, Olga Gomilko, Mariia Kultaieva, Volodymyr Kovtunets, Sergiy Kurbatov, Anna Laktionova, Tetiana Matusevych, Natalia Radionova, Iryna Stepanenko, Maya Trynyak and Viktor Zinchenko. On March 30, 2016, a methodological seminar was conducted at the Institute of Higher Education NAES of Ukraine. This seminar was devoted to the discussion of educational problems in the area of mass culture, and relative opportunities for the development of individuality. The report «Mass culture, education and the perspective of individuality» was made by Panos Eliopulos, professor of Peloponnese University, a member of journal’s «Філософія освіти. Philosophy of Education” editorial board. The scientists from the Institute of Higher Education, Institute of Philosophy of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Skovoroda National Pedagogical University of Kharkiv participated in thisevent. Designated issues were observed primarily from the point of view of the Frankfurt School representatives, as well as representatives of modern critical philosophy of education and critical pedagogy. It was emphasized that T.Adorno’s ideas and ideas of other Frankfurt School members, which were developed in the middle of the last century, continue to be relevant in current socio-cultural contexts. The technical rationalism which became the rationalism of dominance in the context of technological civilization, could not provide the way toward the liberation of man and the development of his or her individuality. Market society with its instrumental rationality leads to homogenization and standardization of mass culture and as a result, we have a semi-education, leading to destruction of personality and social pathologies. The panelists agreed that semi-education reflects the crisis of ideals of education and training as far as a suspension of human emancipation process. Due to suspension of the creative process of a person formation, replacing it by the processes of stereotyping based on mimetic rationality, culture itself loses creative potential. The process of degradation of education and culture in the semi-education eventually leads to its destruction at theoretical level and the elaboration of the practice of anti-education. Only through returning of the individual and maintaining his or her social importance due to the tools of holistic education it is possible to overcome such stereotyping. For Frankfurt School members, and those who share their ideals, true education in its meta-theoretical sense becomes the important factor, contributing to the emancipation of society and individual. This idea is particularly important in the context of contemporary challenges and threats from instrumentalization of approaches to the process of transformation of the Ukrainian culture and education.

This paper focuses on a specific area of interest within the philosophical system of Schopenhauer and Buddhism which is human rights, the concept of compassion and the issue of the pure motive behind human action. Both theories express pessimism regarding the transitoriness of life and the pain caused, and how this deprives man of inner peace. The common acknowledgment of the fact that human life entails great suffering guides the two philosophies into an awareness of the need for salvation. In their metaphysics, there is a number of similarities that conclude to the point that moral truthfulness is a principal virtue in human life, practically indispensable for right living. In this particular context, while compassion is highlighted as the main ethical factor, it is a question of paramount importance in these doctrines whether the motive behind the action is a motive concentrated on the Self or purely on the Other.

For Seneca passions are not just bad judgments that need to be defeated. Even though he generally agrees with Chrysippus on the matter of the ontology of passions, Seneca differentiates mainly in his emphasis that passions are the reason why man leads an inauthentic, unhappy and undignified life. The Roman philosopher employs practical techniques that refer to the ordinary man, the man who rationally desires to change his merely-being into well-being. But that action requires the energetic engagement of the individual and the admittance of his particular responsibility. The role of individuality is particularly stressed, especially on the premises that man needs to make this constant and conscious effort to help himself, and to cure his own soul, often with the aid of others who share the same path. Under this prism, the treatment of passions leads to a culmination where man is not only bound to achieve his ontological excellence, but also to relieve his soul from the traumas of passions and to connect himself with the moral and existential safety that the presence of “recta ratio” guarantees. Seneca in De Ira defines passion as the result of an ‘impetus’, an horme, which lacks self-control and is closed to reason and counsel. As such, a passion makes the soul unfit to know the right and the true. In such a condition, man loses contact with the firm cognitive criteria that would allow him this knowledge and would ensure a eudaemonistic living “secundum naturam”. Although Seneca is convinced that the stoic teaching should address literally everyone in order to ameliorate one’s life and make it authentic and right, he upholds that it is better to totally exclude passions from the soul than try to control them. That gives certain gravity to the recognition that virtue, although it potentially belongs to every human being, is an absolute good, the only good that can be attained. But virtue, through this condition of emancipation from passion and of correction, is not an idealistic situation. Virtue is necessary, because only virtue can save man from leading an unhappy life, since it is the crucial prerequisite for the life of a rational and conscientious being.

The Methodological seminar was conducted by the scientific journal “Philosophy of Education”. The participants of the seminar were Prof. Panos Eliopoulos, Lyudmyla Gorbunova, Mykhailo Boychenko, Olga Gomilko, Mariia Kultaieva, Volodymyr Kovtunets, Sergiy Kurbatov, Anna Laktionova, Tetiana Matusevych, Natalia Radionova, Iryna Stepanenko, Maya Trynyak and Viktor Zinchenko. On March 30, 2016, a methodological seminar was conducted at the Institute of Higher Education NAES of Ukraine. This seminar was devoted to the discussion of educational problems in the area of mass culture, and relative opportunities for the development of individuality. The report «Mass culture, education and the perspective of individuality» was made by Panos Eliopulos, professor of Peloponnese University, a member of journal’s «Філософія освіти. Philosophy of Education” editorial board. The scientists from the Institute of Higher Education, Institute of Philosophy of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Skovoroda National Pedagogical University of Kharkiv participated in this event. Designated issues were observed primarily from the point of view of the Frankfurt School representatives, as well as representatives of modern critical philosophy of education and critical pedagogy. It was emphasized that T.Adorno’s ideas and ideas of other Frankfurt School members, which were developed in the middle of the last century, continue to be relevant in current socio-cultural contexts. The technical rationalism which became the rationalism of dominance in the context of technological civilization, could not provide the way toward the liberation of man and the development of his or her individuality. Market society with its instrumental rationality leads to homogenization and standardization of mass culture and as a result, we have a semi-education, leading to destruction of personality and social pathologies. The panelists agreed that semi-education reflects the crisis of ideals of education and training as far as a suspension of human emancipation process. Due to suspension of the creative process of a person formation, replacing it by the processes of stereotyping based on mimetic rationality, culture itself loses creative potential. The process of degradation of education and culture in the semi-education eventually leads to its destruction at theoretical level and the elaboration of the practice of anti-education. Only through returning of the individual and maintaining his or her social importance due to the tools of holistic education it is possible to overcome such stereotyping. For Frankfurt School members, and those who share their ideals, true education in its meta-theoretical sense becomes the important factor, contributing to the emancipation of society and individual. This idea is particularly important in the context of contemporary challenges and threats from instrumentalization of approaches to the process of transformation of the Ukrainian culture and education.

This paper explores the issue of knowledge management in modern Democracies, along with the demands posed by the truth problem. While a singular concept of truth can neither be epistemically safe, thus becoming flexible for partial or subjective demonstrations of its authentic or ideal value, nor applicable for every society, it can still take the form of a critical consensus, based on two new principles that are introduced here. The continuity of such a consensus that lies beyond the manipulation of an un-ethical rhetoric or demagogy can safeguard the existence of the Polis, without having to cease espousing typical logic syllogisms as well as the moral qualities that are essential for a meaningful way of social and political life. If not conducive to the collective good, the search for truth remains futile in the practical level of making people’s lives better and of enhancing their common bonds.

For Adorno and Horkheimer, rationalism – in fact, a technical rationalism which becomes a rationalism of domination– failed to provide the path to the liberation of man and society. The aftermath, half education of the masses, is not an incomplete education or lack of education, but substantially hostility towards culture and genuine education, decay and involvement of education in individual considerations and benefits, with the contribution of mass dissemination of culture and art. Half education is the spread of culture and art without a living relationship with the consciousness of people, without consequences for their lives. Adorno clarifies that in this context, the relationship between life and production reduces the former into the transitory epiphenomenon of the latter, as life and individual existence are not known in their immediacy, they do not connect directly, but they rather become part of the teaching for of material production. For Ortega y Gasset, a new type of human being has been born, the massman, who becomes isolated, trapped in the irrational feeling that nothing else, apart from his own private welfare, matters, but he also continues to demand as if it were his natural right to do so. Nonetheless, and although he remains an individualist, he does not have real access to the gifts of individuality. Marcuse understands that, ultimately, there is a conflict between production and profit on the one hand and self-determination on the other. As technology spreads its dominance over nature, man conquers man through mass control, diffused through work and culture. In this way, technological rationalism becomes ultimately political rationalism.

Seneca expounds a theory of therapy and teaching with the ultimate goal of self knowledge and wisdom. Some of his techniques are based on Pythagorean principles or derive ideas from them, among them the focused and constant ascesis of self control. Iamblichus in De Vita Pythagorica exhibits great interest on the fact that man’s inherent abilities along with the aid of proper education suffice for his attainment of wisdom. For both thinkers, knowledge through practice is considered to be one of the major philosophical demands in the perspective of an “ars vitae”. The human being has to canalize himself into the modeling of a new way of living, an “art of living” which will contribute decisively to the fulfillment of his teleology, to his perpetual eudaimonia. The admittance of individual differences in people’s ability to reform themselves only signifies the more intense effort of the teacher towards a purification of their intellect and greater engagement of the individuals’ volition but not their inability for correction.

The word cosmopolitanism is derived from “cosmos” (universe) and “polites” (citizen). The cosmopolite is a citizen of the world. The Stoics elaborate on the theme, using the ideas of oikeiosis and sympathy as its basis, thus drawing from their physics. Particularly, Epictetus defends cosmopolitanism on the assumption that man is akin to God, whereas Marcus Aurelius highlights the common possession of mind (νοῦς) and that man is by nature able for communal life. For the Stoics man is a social being who can be perfected only within the society of other human beings. The brotherhood of men is grounded on the indubitable axiom that the human soul is the source of the unique good, which is virtue. The distinctive parameter for creating a community is virtue, which is an objective for everyone but also an inherent and ecumenical capacity.

Even though he generally agrees with Chrysippus on the matter of the ontology of passions, Seneca differentiates mainly in his emphasis that passions are the reason why man leads an inauthentic, unhappy and undignified life. Although Seneca is a very orthodox Stoic, in most of the cases where his stoic credibility is challenged, he resorts to a therapy plan that exceeds the usual stoic strictness on the absoluteness of the status of the sage. In this scheme, the Roman philosopher employs practical techniques that refer to the ordinary man, the man who rationally desires to change his merely-being into well-being. This shift of focus is partially explained through the social orientation of the moral context: man is not alone while achieving his perfection of character; there are others who need to be helped, so that the pursuit of wisdom becomes a pananthropic effort, not an act of alienation. Since moral success is connected with the other person in such a manner, it is not a paradox that it needs to start from within, from the nucleus of personhood. The role of individuality is particularly stressed, especially on the premises that man first ought to make this constant and conscious effort to help himself, to cure his own soul, often with the aid of others who share the same path, before he attempts to be engaged in the therapy of the passions of others. Under this prism, the senecan proposal for the therapy of passions leads to a practical culmination where man is not only bound to achieve his ontological excellence but also to relieve his soul from the traumas of passions and to connect himself with the moral and existential safety that the presence of “recta ratio” guarantees.

Epicurean physics elaborates on a system of universal kinetics as regards the creation of the world. One of the main principles is that there is no genesis without motion. The human being, as all other beings, is the product of the motion of atoms within the cosmic void. Due to a sudden swerve in the motion of some atoms, it can be upheld, according to the Epicureans and Lucretius, that there is no determinism in the universe and the human being is capable of free will. The atomic motions and the swerves also take place in the space of the human soul. Lucretius, in the De Rerum Natura, follows with precision the content of the Epicurean dogmas, and divides the soul into an irrational part, which he calls anima, and a rational one, animus, according to the distinction between ψυχή and διάνοια.