Joseph Raz

(? - 2022)

Under what conditions can one compare the strength of conflicting reasons for and against an action where they are a function of irreducibly different values that its performance manifests, contributes to, or detracts from? Two sets of conflicting reasons are incommensurable when neither is at least as weighty as the other, and so are the actions they are the only reasons for. It is argued that it is a conceptual truth that one has reason to realize value, and that the greater the value, the more stringent the reason. Moreover, belief in value explains why the action was done and makes its performance intelligible. The extent to which social practices are relevant to the existence or validity of at least some values is also explored.

The ideal of autonomy, together with pluralism, underlies the doctrine of political freedom. Autonomy underlies both positive and negative freedom. Toleration is underpinned by the competitive pluralism that is essential to autonomy. Autonomy is consistent with perfectionism, yet also underlies the ‘harm principle’, which asserts that the only purpose for which the law may use its coercive power is to prevent harm. Perfectionism and the harm principle are consistent with one another because the recommended type of perfectionism abjures coercion, focusing instead on maintaining the framework conditions that are conducive for pluralism and autonomy.

The doctrine of liberty is underpinned by the ideal of autonomy. While the rights that have traditionally been of concern to liberals serve the interests of the individuals protected by those rights, they also tend to promote collective goods, such as the good of toleration, and the good of membership. What accounts, in part, for the force of these rights is their ability to serve such collective goods. The connection between rights and collective goods shows that rights should not be constitutionally entrenched in such a way that they are forever beyond the reach of political action.

Two options are incommensurable if it is neither true that one of them is better than the other, nor true that they are of equal value. A test of incommensurability between two options, which yields a sufficient but not necessary condition of incommensurability, is that there is, or could be, another option that is better than one but is not better than the other. Two incommensurable options may be of roughly equal value, but do not have to be. The existence of significant incommensurability is attested to in our refusal to compare the value of options, and this refusal to compare the value of options helps, in turn, to determine the nature of those values. Incommensurability also helps to illuminate the nature of moral dilemmas.

In previous writings, I joined those who take the view that action with an intention is an action for a reason, where whatever value there is in the action is a reason for it. This paper sketches the role of reasons and intentions in leading to action with an intention. Section 1 explains that though belief in the value of the intended action is not an essential constituent of intentions, nevertheless when humans act with an intention they act in the belief that there is value in the action. Section 2 explains the relative role of value and intention in “producing” the action, and relates their role to that of motivation.

The relation between reason and the will is explored in reference to the nature of reasons and of normativity. Must we hold beliefs for decisive reasons? Can we be unreflectively motivated by reasons? It is maintained that one need not necessarily be motivated by all the reasons that apply to an agent. Reasons are argued to be optional to the extent that the fact that there are reasons for a certain response make it an eligible response, but not one that is wrong not to adopt. The mediation of the will helps to explain how we are governed by our rationality.

Explaining normativity requires, amongst other things, an examination of the relationship between rationality and reasons and the connection between reasons and principles of reasoning. Essentially, explaining normativity will consist in demonstrating what it is to be a reason and solving related puzzles about reasons. The capability to reason, to justify our reasons for acting, whether we require substantive principles of reason, and the standing of formal reason is considered. The claim that normativity should be defended and justified amounts to a demand for the justification of reason.

Egalitarian principles should be distinguished from principles, which merely state relevantly complete grounds for the distribution of goods, and which thereafter enjoy a generality of application to those who meet the relevant conditions. Strict or paradigmatic egalitarian principles aim at an equal distribution of a certain good, on grounds generated by existing inequalities in the distribution of that good. Strict egalitarianism should be distinguished from rhetorical egalitarianism, in which equality is invoked simply as a way of drawing attention to the bad effects of inequality; effects that might have arisen in the absence of inequality. Strict egalitarian principles cannot be applied to diminishing principles of entitlement, which already have distributive commitments built into them. Strict egalitarian principles could be applied to non‐diminishing principles of entitlement, but these principles are of doubtful significance to political morality.

Autonomy is an ideal of self‐creation, or self‐authorship; it consists in an agent's successful pursuit of willingly embraced, valuable options, where the agent's activities are not dominated by worries about mere survival. Autonomy in its primary sense is to be understood as the actual living of an autonomous life; autonomy in its secondary sense is to be understood as the capacity to live autonomously. To be autonomous, agents have to meet three conditions: they must possess certain mental capacities, they must have an adequate range of valuable options, and they must enjoy independence from coercion and manipulation. Autonomy should be distinguished from self‐realization, as autonomous persons may choose not to realize their capacities. Autonomy itself, in an environment that supports autonomy, is not similarly optional, as living autonomously is the only way of flourishing within an autonomy‐supporting environment.

Against Rawls's ‘separateness of persons’ objection to consequentialism, it can be replied that consequentialism does take into account differing personal viewpoints in legitimating trade‐offs between persons’ interests. Nozick's Kantian‐inspired view of rights as side‐constraints is also indecisive, as this view can only proscribe trade‐offs between individuals’ interests that have already been deemed, on independent grounds, to be impermissible. The appearance of agent‐relativity, which underlies both Nozick's case for constraints, and Nagel's argument for partiality, can to some degree be rendered consistent with consequentialism's commitment to agent‐neutrality. More precisely, what might appear to be agent‐relativity may be just agent‐neutrality, but agent‐neutrality as applied to agents’ action's reasons, rather than to their outcome reasons. Williams's argument from integrity, despite its elusiveness, may offer more promising materials for challenging consequentialism.

This chapter addresses the question: what is authority? Authority cannot simply be regarded as a right to rule, as Robert Ladenson has claimed. The recognitional conception of authority, which regards authoritative utterances as reasons to believe that one has a reason to act as instructed, fails to explain why authoritative utterances are also reasons for action. The inspirational conception of authority describes authority in terms of love, but this conception cannot account for authorities that are not ‘loved’ by those whom it rules, nor can it account for the conceptual distinctness of love and authority. Authoritative utterances provide content independent reasons for action, as do promises, threats, offers, and requests, in the sense that there is no direct connection between the reason and the action for which it is a reason.

The connection between action, reason, and value is explored by examining the connection between reasons and intentions, and between reasons and what we take to be good. This is done in comparison to the classical view, which maintains that valuable aspects of the world constitute reasons for agents. In attempting to explain common features of what it is for people to be rational agents, Raz examines whether there are reasons, which are neutral in values, the explanatory and justificatory role of reasons, the intelligibility of acting for reasons, and the ability to intentionally act in an expressive, yet unreasoned fashion.

The privilege of having three sets of extensive and hard-hitting comments on one's work is as welcome as it is rare, and especially so on this occasion as the lectures were, for me, but thefirst (well, not entirely first) stab at a subject I hope to explore at greater length. The reflectionsthat follow will respond to some of the criticisms, but will not be a point by point reply. I will use the occasion to clarify some obscurities in the lectures, and to contrast my view with some of my critics' own positions. I will proceed thematically, starting with some observations about method and about ontology, proceeding to explore several questions about the relations between social dependence and relativism, between genre, value, and normativity, and concluding with a fewwords on pluralism and liberal values.

Aspects of the world are normative in as much as they or their existence constitute reasons for persons, i.e. grounds which make certain beliefs, moods, emotions, intentions or actions appropriate or inappropriate. Our capacities to perceive and understand how things are, and what response is appropriate to them, and our ability to respond appropriately, make us into persons, i.e. creatures with the ability to direct their own life in accordance with their appreciation of themselves and their environment, and of the reasons with which, given how they are, the world presents them. An explanation of normativity would explain the various puzzling aspects of this complex phenomenon. In particular it would explain how it is that aspects of the world can constitute reasons for cognitive, emotive, and volitional responses; how it is that we can come to realise that certain cognitive, emotional or volitional responses are appropriate in various circumstances, and inappropriate in others; and how it is that we can respond appropriately. This paper explores an aspect of the last of these questions.

I will provisionally take the Guise of the Good thesis to consist of three propositions: (1) Intentional actions are actions performed for reasons, as those are seen by the agents. (2) Specifying the intention which makes an action intentional identifies central features of the reason(s) for which the action is performed. (3) Reasons for action are such reasons by being facts which establish that the action has some value. From these it is said to follow that (4) Intentional actions are actions taken in, and because of, a belief that there is some good in them. I will examine reasons for, and objections to these theses, and offer a defence of a modified version of the thesis.

If promises are binding there must be a reason to do as one promised. The paper is motivated by belief that there is a difficulty in explaining what that reason is. It arises because the reasons that promising creates are content-independent. Similar difficulties arise regarding other content-independent reasons, though their solution need not be the same. Section One introduces an approach to promises, and outlines an account of them that I have presented before. It forms the backdrop for the ensuing discussion. The problems discussed in the paper arise, albeit in slightly modified ways, for various other accounts as well. It is, however, helpful to use a specific account as a springboard leading to one explanation of promissory reasons, namely of the reasons that valid promises constitute for performing the promised act (Section Two). We can call it the bare reasons account. Sections Three and Four will raise difficulties with that account, leading to its abandonment in favour of an alternative in Sections Five and Six.