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81The Value of Rationality, by Ralph WedgwoodMind 127 (508): 1253-1261. 2018._ The Value of Rationality _, by WedgwoodRalph. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp. 267.
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15The Concept of a Legal System: An Introduction to the Theory of Legal SystemPhilosophical Quarterly 21 (85): 380-381. 1971.
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43Intention and valuePhilosophical Explorations 20 (sup2): 109-126. 2017.In previous writings, I joined those who take the view that action with an intention is an action for a reason, where whatever value there is in the action is a reason for it. This paper sketches the role of reasons and intentions in leading to action with an intention. Section 1 explains that though belief in the value of the intended action is not an essential constituent of intentions, nevertheless when humans act with an intention they act in the belief that there is value in the action. Sec…Read more
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6¿ Por qué interpretar?Isonomía. Revista de Teoría y Filosofía Del Derecho 5 25-40. 1996.discussion of the nature and aims of interpretation
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379The Myth of Instrumental RationalityJournal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1 (1): 28. 2005.The paper distinguishes between instrumental reasons and instrumental rationality. It argues that instrumental reasons are not reasons to take the means to our ends. It further argues that there is no distinct form of instrumental reasoning or of instrumental rationality. In part the argument proceeds through a sympathetic examination of suggestions made by M. Bratman, J. Broome, and J. Wallace, though the accounts of instrumental rationality offered by the last two are criticised
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150Explaining normativity: On rationality and the justification of reasonRatio 12 (4). 1999.Aspects of the world are normative in as much as they or their existence constitute reasons for persons, i.e. grounds which make certain beliefs, moods, emotions, intentions or actions appropriate or inappropriate. Our capacities to perceive and understand how things are, and what response is appropriate to them, and our ability to respond appropriately, make us into persons, i.e. creatures with the ability to direct their own life in accordance with their appreciation of themselves and their en…Read more
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2The Authority of Law in the Predicament of Contemporary Social TheoryNotre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics and Public Policy 1 115-138. 1984.
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61A broadly sketched exploration of the theory of state-law and of the ways developments in international law are transforming states
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488About morality and the nature of lawAmerican Journal of Jurisprudence 48 (1): 1-15. 2003.In support of my longstanding claim that the traditional divide between natural law and legal positivist theories of law, the present paper explores a variety of necessary connections between law and morality which are consistent with theories of law traditionally identified as positivist.
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18Voluntary Obligations and Normative PowersAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 46 (1): 59-102. 1972.
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69The practice of value - replyIn Jay Wallace (ed.), The Practice of Value, Oxford University Press. 2003.The privilege of having three sets of extensive and hard-hitting comments on one's work is as welcome as it is rare, and especially so on this occasion as the lectures were, for me, but thefirst (well, not entirely first) stab at a subject I hope to explore at greater length. The reflectionsthat follow will respond to some of the criticisms, but will not be a point by point reply. I will use the occasion to clarify some obscurities in the lectures, and to contrast my view with some of my critics…Read more
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93Incommensurability and agencyIn Engaging Reason: On the Theory of Value and Action, Oxford University Press. pp. 110-28. 1998.Human agents act for reasons that contribute to their good. However, in our explanation of why agents act for reasons that depend on what they value, we encounter the problem of situations in which goods are neither better than others nor are of equal value. The incommensurability of value can then be seen to lead to an incommensurability of reasons for action. Examining rationalist and classical conceptions of human agency, Raz uses the presence of incommensurability to understand how this affe…Read more
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240Rights and Individual Well-BeingRatio Juris 5 (2): 127-142. 1992.This article challenges the view permeating much philosophical thought that the primacy of individual rights represents the individual's standpoint against the public good or against the requirements of others generally. The author explicates the underlying features of our common culture contending that the conflict between individual and general good as being central to rights misconstrues the surface features of rights. The range and nature of common goods determine the options available to in…Read more
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Columbia UniversityProfessor (Part-time)
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King's College LondonProfessor (Part-time)
London, London, City of, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Specialization
Meta-Ethics |
Philosophy of Law |
Social and Political Philosophy |
Value Theory, Misc |