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William W. Tait

University of Chicago
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    61
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  •  Events
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    60

 More details
  • University of Chicago
    Department of Philosophy
    Retired faculty
Chicago, Illinois, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind
Logic and Philosophy of Logic
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Philosophy of Mathematics
Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy
  • All publications (61)
  •  120
    Constructing cardinals from below
    The Iterative Conception of Set
  •  93
    Early Analytic Philosophy: Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein : Essays in Honor of Leonard Linsky (edited book)
    Open Court. 1996.
    These essays present new analyses of the central figures of analytic philosophy -- Frege, Russell, Moore, Wittgenstein, and Carnap -- from the beginnings of the analytic movement into the 1930s. The papers do not reflect a single perspective, but rather express divergent interpretations of this controversial intellectual milieu.
    Ludwig Wittgenstein
  •  78
    Review: H. G. Rice, On Completely Recursively Enumerable Classes and Their Key Arrays (review)
    Journal of Symbolic Logic 23 (1): 48-48. 1958.
    Logic and Philosophy of LogicLogic and Philosophy of Logic, MiscellaneousModel Theory
  •  76
    The Hilton New York Hotel New York, NY December 27–29, 2005
    with Sergei Artemov, Peter Koellner, Michael Rabin, Jeremy Avigad, Wilfried Sieg, and Haim Gaifman
    Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 12 (3). 2006.
    Science, Logic, and Mathematics
  •  54
    Nested Recursion
    Journal of Symbolic Logic 28 (1): 103-104. 1963.
    Logic and Philosophy of Logic
  •  339
    Gödel's reformulation of Gentzen's first consistency proof for arithmetic: The no-counterexample interpretation
    Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 11 (2): 225-238. 2005.
    The last section of “Lecture at Zilsel’s” [9, §4] contains an interesting but quite condensed discussion of Gentzen’s first version of his consistency proof for P A [8], reformulating it as what has come to be called the no-counterexample interpretation. I will describe Gentzen’s result (in game-theoretic terms), fill in the details (with some corrections) of Godel's reformulation, and discuss the relation between the two proofs.
    Philosophy of Mathematics, MiscLogic and Philosophy of LogicProof Theory
  •  74
    The Provenance of Pure Reason: Essays in the Philosophy of Mathematics and Its History
    OUP Usa. 2005.
    William Tait is one of the most distinguished philosophers of mathematics of the last fifty years. This volume collects his most important published philosophical papers from the 1980's to the present. The articles cover a wide range of issues in the foundations and philosophy of mathematics, including some on historical figures ranging from Plato to Gödel.
    Philosophy of Mathematics, General Works
  •  45
    Extensional Equality in the Classical Theory of Types
    Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 3 219-234. 1995.
    The classical theory of types in question is essentially the theory of Martin-Löf [1] but with the law of double negation elimination. I am ultimately interested in the theory of types as a framework for the foundations of mathematics and, for this purpose, we need to consider extensions of the theory obtained by adding ‘well-ordered types,’ for example the type N of the finite ordinals; but the unextended theory will suffice to illustrate the treatment of extensional equality
    Science, Logic, and MathematicsAreas of Mathematics
  •  46
    A Nonconstructive Proof of Gentzen's Hauptsatz for Second Order Predicate Logic
    Journal of Symbolic Logic 33 (2): 289-290. 1968.
    Logic and Philosophy of LogicProof Theory
  •  309
    The completeness of Heyting first-order logic
    Journal of Symbolic Logic 68 (3): 751-763. 2003.
    Restricted to first-order formulas, the rules of inference in the Curry-Howard type theory are equivalent to those of first-order predicate logic as formalized by Heyting, with one exception: ∃-elimination in the Curry-Howard theory, where ∃x : A.F (x) is understood as disjoint union, are the projections, and these do not preserve firstorderedness. This note shows, however, that the Curry-Howard theory is conservative over Heyting’s system.
    Intuitionistic LogicType Theory in Mathematics
  •  91
    Set Existence
    with R. O. Gandy and G. Kreisel
    Journal of Symbolic Logic 27 (2): 232-233. 1962.
    Logic and Philosophy of LogicLogical Expressions
  •  235
    Proof-theoretic Semantics for Classical Mathematics
    Synthese 148 (3): 603-622. 2006.
    We discuss the semantical categories of base and object implicit in the Curry-Howard theory of types and we derive derive logic and, in particular, the comprehension principle in the classical version of the theory. Two results that apply to both the classical and the constructive theory are discussed. First, compositional semantics for the theory does not demand ‘incomplete objects’ in the sense of Frege: bound variables are in principle eliminable. Secondly, the relation of extensional equalit…Read more
    We discuss the semantical categories of base and object implicit in the Curry-Howard theory of types and we derive derive logic and, in particular, the comprehension principle in the classical version of the theory. Two results that apply to both the classical and the constructive theory are discussed. First, compositional semantics for the theory does not demand ‘incomplete objects’ in the sense of Frege: bound variables are in principle eliminable. Secondly, the relation of extensional equality for each type is definable in the Curry-Howard theory.
    Mathematical LogicType Theory in Mathematics
  •  98
    Kurt Godel. Collected Works. Volume IV: Selected Correspondence AG; Volume V: Selected Correspondence HZ
    Philosophia Mathematica 14 (1): 76. 2006.
    Proof Theory
  •  4
    Zermelo's Conception of Set Theory and Reflection Principles
    In Matthias Schirn (ed.), The Philosophy of Mathematics Today, Clarendon Press. 2003.
    The Iterative Conception of SetRussell's ParadoxNew Axioms in Set Theory
  •  260
    Gödel's Correspondence on Proof Theory and Constructive Mathematics †Charles Parsons read part of an early draft of this review and made important corrections and suggestions
    Philosophia Mathematica 14 (1): 76-111. 2006.
    Proof TheoryMathematical ProofMathematical LogicIntuitionism and Constructivism
  •  68
    The Logic of Provability (review)
    Journal of Philosophy 96 (1): 50-53. 1999.
    Areas of Mathematics
  •  160
    Curtis Franks The Autonomy of Mathematical Knowledge: Hilbert's Program Revisited
    History and Philosophy of Logic 32 (2). 2011.
    History and Philosophy of Logic, Volume 32, Issue 2, Page 177-183, May 2011
    Logic and Philosophy of LogicLogic and Philosophy of Logic, Miscellaneous
  •  76
    The Palmer House Hilton Hotel, Chicago, Illinois April 19–21, 2007
    with Yiannis Moschovakis, Richmond H. Thomason, Steffen Lempp, Steve Awodey, and Jean-Pierre Marquis
    Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 13 (4). 2007.
    Science, Logic, and Mathematics
  •  145
    Remarks on finitism
    The background of these remarks is that in 1967, in ‘’Constructive reasoning” [27], I sketched an argument that finitist arithmetic coincides with primitive recursive arithmetic, P RA; and in 1981, in “Finitism” [28], I expanded on the argument. But some recent discussions and some of the more recent literature on the subject lead me to think that a few further remarks would be useful.
    Intuitionism and ConstructivismMathematical LogicMathematical Finitism
  •  298
    Meeting of the association for symbolic logic
    with John Baldwin, D. A. Martin, and Robert I. Soare
    Journal of Symbolic Logic 41 (2): 551-560. 1976.
    Logic and Philosophy of Logic, Misc
  • On cut elimination for subsystems of second-order number theory
    To appear in the Proceedings of Logic Colloquium 2006. (32 pages).
    Number TheoryProof Theory
  •  268
    Intensional interpretations of functionals of finite type I
    Journal of Symbolic Logic 32 (2): 198-212. 1967.
    Logic and Philosophy of Logic
  •  152
    The substitution method
    Journal of Symbolic Logic 30 (2): 175-192. 1965.
    Logic and Philosophy of LogicLogic and Philosophy of Logic, MiscellaneousProof Theory
  •  939
    Finitism
    Journal of Philosophy 78 (9): 524-546. 1981.
    Mathematical FinitismMathematical IntuitionIntuitionism and Constructivism
  • Takeuti’s consistency proof for pi^
    To appear in the Proceedings of Logic Colloquium 2006. (28 pages).
    Areas of Mathematics
  •  3
    Book review on Potter 2004 (review)
    History and Philosophy of Logic 26 (2): 164. 2005.
  •  153
    Meeting of the association for symbolic logic: Biloxi, 1979
    with Daniel Halpern and John T. Baldwin
    Journal of Symbolic Logic 46 (1): 191-198. 1981.
  •  67
    Grzegorczyk A.. Some proofs of undecidability of arithmetic. Fundamenta mathematicae, vol. 43 , pp. 166–177
    Journal of Symbolic Logic 23 (1): 46-47. 1958.
    Proof Theory
  •  104
    Kleene S. C.. Extension of an effectively generated class of functions by enumeration. Colloquium mathematicum, vol. 6 , pp. 68–78
    Journal of Symbolic Logic 25 (3): 279-280. 1960.
  •  123
    Functionals Defined by Transfinite Recursion
    Journal of Symbolic Logic 31 (3): 509. 1966.
    Logic and Philosophy of Logic, Miscellaneous
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