•  45
    Unpacking "For Reasons of Symmetry": Two Categories of Symmetry Arguments
    with Bernard R. Goldstein
    Philosophy of Science 73 (4): 419-439. 2006.
    Hermann Weyl succeeded in presenting a consistent overarching analysis that accounts for symmetry in material artifacts, natural phenomena, and physical theories. Weyl showed that group theory is the underlying mathematical structure for symmetry in all three domains. But in this study Weyl did not include appeals to symmetry arguments which, for example, Einstein expressed as “for reasons of symmetry”. An argument typically takes the form of a set of premises and rules of inference that lead to…Read more
  •  302
    Can the monster errour be slain?
    International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 5 (3). 1991.
    Abstract One cannot discount experimental errors and turn the attention to the logicomathematical structure of a physical theory without distorting the nature of the scientific method. The occurrence of errors in experiments constitutes an inherent feature of the attempt to test theories in the physical world. This feature deserves proper attention which has been neglected. An attempt is made to address this problem
  •  13
    Does a Living System Have a State?
    In A. Rojszczak, J. Cachro & G. Kurczewski (eds.), Philosophical Dimensions of Logic and Science, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 139--150. 2003.
  •  50
    Kepler's move from
    with Bernard R. Goldstein
    Perspectives on Science 13 (1): 74-111. 2005.
    : This study of the concept of orbit is intended to throw light on the nature of revolutionary concepts in science. We observe that Kepler transformed theoretical astronomy that was understood in terms of orbs [Latin: orbes] (spherical shells to which the planets were attached) and models (called hypotheses at the time), by introducing a single term, orbit [Latin: orbita], that is, the path of a planet in space resulting from the action of physical causes expressed in laws of nature. To demonstr…Read more
  •  68
    The question is raised as to the kind of methodology required to deal with foundational issues. A comparative study of the methodologies of Gödel and Einstein reveals some similar traits which reflect a concern with foundational problems. It is claimed that the interest in foundational problems stipulates a certain methodology, namely, the methodology of limiting cases