Daniel Statman

abstract Assume that some group, A, is under a serious threat from some other group, B. The only way group A can defend itself is by using lethal force against group B, but the standard conditions for using force in self‐defence are not met. Ought group A to avoid the use of force even if this means yielding to an aggressive, evil power? Most people would resist this conclusion, yet given the violation of essential conditions for self‐defence, this resistance is hard to justify. The aim of this paper is to point to an interesting yet unnoticed move made by some philosophers to find a way out of this problem, a move which relies on construing the situation at hand as a tragic dilemma. I show the attractiveness of this solution and argue that in the end it fails.

The paper discusses a neglected condition for justified self-defense, namely, 'The Success Condition [SC].' According to SC, otherwise immoral acts can be justified under the right to self-defense only if they actually achieve the intended defense from the perceived threat. If they don't, they are almost always excused, but not morally justified. I show that SC leads to a troubling puzzle because victims who estimate they cannot prevent the attack against them would be morally required to surrender. I try to solve the puzzle by relying on what I call 'The Honor Solution.' Even if defensive acts fail to protect the victim's body, property, or life, they are successful in protecting her honor, thus they do ultimately meet the success condition.

The paper discusses a neglected condition for justified self-defense, namely, 'The Success Condition [SC].' According to SC, otherwise immoral acts can be justified under the right to self-defense only if they actually achieve the intended defense from the perceived threat. If they don't, they are almost always excused, but not morally justified. I show that SC leads to a troubling puzzle because victims who estimate they cannot prevent the attack against them would be morally required to surrender. I try to solve the puzzle by relying on what I call 'The Honor Solution.' Even if defensive acts fail to protect the victim's body, property, or life, they are successful in protecting her honor, thus they do ultimately meet the success condition

This paper argues that the current discussion on the relationship between morality and halakha tends to confuse philosophical, historical, ideological and jurisprudential issues. It claims that the philosophical question of whether or not morality is dependent on religion should be separated from the historical question of how Jewish thinkers perceived the relationship between divine command and morality and from the question of the actual role played by moral considerations in the history of halakha. Similarly, the jurisprudential question regarding the formalistic nature of the law should be separated from the internal, halakhic question regarding the weight that should be assigned to formalistic, as opposed to substantive, considerations in halakha. The only way to understand the role of moral considerations in halakha as an historical phenomenon is through comprehensive inductive research on the role of moral considerations in halakha together with an investigation into the way experts in halakha viewed this role

According to a widespread view, the same constraints that limit the use of otherwise immoral measures in individual self-defense apply to collective self-defense too. I try to show that this view has radical implications at the level of jus in bello, implications which have not been fully appreciated. In particular, if the necessity condition must be satisfied in all cases of killing in war, then most fighting would turn out to be unjust. One way to avoid this result is to adopt a contractualist view of killing in war, a view which interprets the necessity condition in a way that is more permissive with regard to killing combatants in war. At least in this respect, a contractualist view of killing in war has an advantage over other candidates in explaining how wars might be fought justly

Jews and Arabs in Israel often agree that there is a reciprocal relation between rights and duties, though they derive opposing conclusions from it. Jews infer that Arabs are not entitled to the same rights and privileges as Jews are, since they do not shoulder an equal share of the duties. Arabs, by contrast, argue that they are under no duty to share the burdens, particularly military or national service, since their rights are not fully respected. The Paper assesses these opposing claims and ends up rejecting both. It argues that the rights to which citizens are entitled do not depend on citizens carrying out all their social or legal duties, while the citizens’ duty to contribute to the welfare of their countries by national service or other means is generally not contingent on the countries’ fulfillment of its duties towards them. The Paper focuses on national service by Israeli Arabs and suggests that that there is nothing wrong in making such service mandatory though there are practical considerations against doing so and that making such service optional is an excellent alternative, one that should be encouraged as much as possible

Many believe that in?supreme emergencies? collectives are granted what I elsewhere call?special permissions?, permissions to carry out self-defensive acts which would otherwise be morally forbidden. However, there appears to be a continuum between non-emergency, emergency and supreme-emergency situations, which gives rise to the following problem: If special permissions are granted in supreme emergencies, they should apply, mutatis mutandis, to less extreme cases too. If, to save itself from wholesale massacre, a collective is allowed to kill thousands of noncombatants on the side of the aggressor, then to save itself from a less murderous campaign, a collective should be allowed to kill several hundreds of noncombatants, and so on. But this conclusion seems to undermine the most fundamental ideas of just war theory. The purpose of the paper is to discuss possible solutions to this problem. I contend that a contractarian view of the war convention offers the most attractive solution, though, at the end of the day, I am not sure that it will work

Adam and Eve have the same record yet receive different punishments. Adam receives the punishment that they both deserve, whereas Eve receives a more lenient punishment. In this article, we explore whether a deserved-but-unequal punishment, such as what Adam receives, can be just. We do this by explicating the conceptions of retributive justice that underlie both sides of the debate. We argue that inequality in punishment is disturbing mainly because of the disrespect it often expresses towards the offender receiving the harsher treatment, and also because it casts doubt on whether Adam got what he deserved. We suggest that when no disrespect is involved and when it is clear that the criminal got what he deserved, inequality is not worrisome.

In light of the enormous suffering brought about by war, war might be justified only if the benefit it yields is significant enough, namely, a clear and durable victory over the enemy. The logic of this argument leads to a Clausewitz-style war of “annihilation.” I argue that the best way to justify the ending of war short of such annihilation is by relying on a contractarian view of jus ex bello. I conclude by exploring the implications of this view to warfare in which no effective social contract is in place

Cosmopolitan War is characterized by a tension between moral demandingness and moral permissiveness. On the one hand, Fabre is strongly committed to the value of each and all human beings as precious individuals whose value does not depend on their national or other affiliation. This commitment leads to serious constraints on what may be done to others in both individual and national self-defense. Yet the book is also unambiguously permissive. It opens the gate to far more wars than traditional just war theory would ever permit, in particular to what Fabre has dubbed ‘subsistence wars’, and it rejects the most fundamental constraint imposed by traditional jus in bello, namely, the prohibition against the deliberate killing of civilians. While both the demanding and the permissive aspects of the book seem troublesome to me, the latter seem more so and most of my paper is devoted to a critical examination of them. In the last part of the paper, I point to a different outlook to the one defended in the book and try to show that this outlook is less foreign to Fabre’s outlook than one might expect

The purpose of this paper is to explore the relation between the right to self-defense against an innocent attacker and the notion of moral luck. It argues that those who accept the existence of such a right rely on the assumption that mere agency makes a significant moral difference – which is precisely the assumption that underlies the view held by believers in moral luck. Those who believe in the right to self-defense against innocent attackers are thus committed to the idea of moral luck much more than they usually acknowledge. The paper also argues that the arguments offered in support of moral luck, in particular the one based on the relation between agency and self-identity, might help to shed light on the rather puzzling above right

Holy places are protected by the law, but the rationale for this protection has received little attention. The purpose of our paper is to fill this gap. The natural explanation for this protection lies in terms of religious freedom. However, since this freedom is violated only when believers are required to actively act against the dictates of their religion, this notion is of no help in the present context. Even when holy places serve as sites for worship, there is usually no religious duty to carry out worship there. Another explanation would base the protection of holy places on the prohibition against hurting religious feelings. But while this looks promising when the desecration is intentional, it is less so when the desecration or the hurt are incidental. Finally, the protection of holy places is sometimes understood as a way of preserving “cultural heritage.” But many holy sites do not fall under this definition and still enjoy protection. Our tentative conclusion is that holy places do not enjoy automatic protection just because they are perceived as such by some religious group. This protection must be earned by arguments that would establish the (“objective”) holiness of the relevant site within some religious tradition, explain the exact nature of the harm or offense that is the matter of concern, and demonstrate why the believers’ interests regarding the perceived holy place override those of the public.

I point out an odd consequence of the role that broadly pragmatic considerations regularly play in determining moral demands. As a result of the way in which moral demands are formed, it turns out that people will frequently become morally good in a strange and rather dubious way. Because human beings are not very good, we will lower our moral demands and, as a result, most people will turn out, in an important sense, to be morally good. Our relative badness, by giving us good reasons to limit moral demands, makes us morally good.