Alessandro Pinzani

The article reconstructs Habermas’ view of capitalism from the 1970s to his most recent writings. It takes its starting point from Wolfgang Streeck’s claim that Habermas has failed to acknowledge that the real enemy of democracy is not bureaucracy but capitalism and that, therefore, he underestimates the role of capitalism in shaping the global order. It first returns to the diagnoses of late capitalism that Habermas developed in the 1970s and early 1980s and then moves on to some of his later writings. This will reveal that there was indeed a shift of emphasis from a critique of capitalism to a critique of technocracy, but not because of Habermas’ unawareness of the role of capitalism in shaping reality. Rather, he has come to objectify capitalism while looking for legal and political tools for reining it in instead of looking for possible alternatives to it.

This book discusses the potential for Kant's political and juridical philosophy to shed light on current social challenges and policy. By considering Kant as a contemporary and not above moral responsibility, the authors explore his political theory as the philosophical foundation of human rights, discussing the right to citizenship, social dynamics and the scope of global justice. Focusing on topics such as society, Kant's position on human rights, domestic economic justice, public education and moral virtue, the authors analyse the shortcomings of Kant's modes of thought and help the reader to gain new perspective both on this classical thinker and on more contemporary issues.

The paper defends that it is possible to offer a Kantian argument for justifying the introduction of Universal Basic Income (UBI). It first briefly presents Philippe van Parijs’ argument for UBI based on the concept of real freedom for all. In doing so, it will focus on its general structure and central insight, without entering too much into other issues like the economic feasibility of UBI. It second briefly presents Kant’s concept of external freedom and especially focuses on some of its components to assess whether there is some closeness to van Parijs’ concept of real freedom. It further considers whether UBI is not only compatible with a Kantian position, but can be justified from such a position because it represents a tool for concretely realizing external freedom as presented in the _Doctrine of Right_ and for attaining the ethical ideal of virtuosity presented in the _Doctrine of Virtue_.

Este artículo se centra en el concepto de marginación. Al hacerlo, cuestiona el paradigma dualista dominante en la filosofía política contemporánea, centrado sobre dicotomías como nacional/extranjero, ciudadano/migrante, a este lado de la frontera/del otro lado de la frontera, y adopta un paradigma global centrado en la dialéctica centro/periferia, retomando ideas centrales de las teorías de la dependencia y del sistema-mundo. Defiende que no son sólo las fronteras nacionales las que dividen a la población mundial según criterios arbitrarios y que las fronteras de clase desempeñan el mismo papel dentro de las sociedades nacionales. En ambos casos, los individuos no son excluidos del ámbito económico, político y social, sino que son empujados a sus márgenes. La descripción de la vida a los márgenes nos debería ayudar a repensar la organización global de la economía capitalista y de las relaciones entre centro y periferia.

En este artículo intervengo en la discusión sobre si es posible encontrar en la filosofía política de Kant una fundamentación de los derechos sociales básicos. Me centraré en primer lugar en dar sentido a la idea de una doctrina metafísica del derecho. En segundo lugar, trataré de mostrar dónde se encuentran los límites de la doctrina metafísica del derecho de Kant a la hora de debatir sobre la forma en que la sociedad debe o debía organizarse (en los tiempos actuales, pero también en la época de Kant). Por último, esbozaré rutas alternativas para usar el enfoque metafísico de Kant con el fin de abordar cuestiones de justicia social, en particular, el tema de la pobreza.

This book examines the significance of Kant's moral philosophy in contemporary philosophical debates. It argues that Kant's philosophy can still serve as a guide to navigate the turbulence of a globalized world in which we are faced by an imprescriptible social reality wherein moral values and ethical life models are becoming increasingly unstable. The volume draws on Kantian ethics to discuss various contemporary issues including sustainable development, moral enhancement, sexism, and racism. It also tackles general concepts of practical philosophy such as lying, the different kinds of moral duties, and the kind of motivation one needs for doing what we consider to be the right thing. Featuring readings by well-known Kant specialists and emerging scholars with unorthodox approaches to Kant's philosophy, the volume will be of great interest to scholars and researchers of philosophy, politics and ethics. It will also appeal to moral theorists, applied ethicists and environmental theorists.

Armut hat viele Aspekte, unter denen materielle Entbehrung wohl den offensichtlichsten und allgemein anerkanntesten darstellt. Mit ihr verbunden sind aber andere Sorten von Mangel: an Würde, Selbstvertrauen, Selbstrespekt und auch an Autonomie, wie mehrere Autor*innen schon betont haben. Die Beziehung zwischen individueller Autonomie und Armut wird nichtsdestotrotz von den meisten Sozialprogrammen zur Armutsbekämpfung kaum thematisiert. Ein Grund dafür ist womöglich im Umstand zu finden, dass Autonomie kein leicht zu definierender Begriff ist.

Armut wird allgemein als ein Zustand aufgefasst, in dem die Menschen nicht imstande sind, ihre Grundbedürfnisse zureichend zu befriedigen. Obwohl diese allgemein verbreitete Vorstellung der komplexen, vielseitigen Natur von Armut nicht gerecht wird, kommt ihr eine gewisse Berechtigung insofern zu, dass in Armut lebende Menschen meistens nicht imstande sind, sich adäquat zu ernähren und zu kleiden, oder dass sie prekär wohnen – wenigstens im Vergleich mit anderen Mitgliedern ihrer Gesellschaft. Nichtsdestotrotz steht der Begriff von Bedürfnis kaum im Zentrum der wichtigsten Theorien sozialer Gerechtigkeit der letzten fünfzig Jahre.

This paper argues that Kant’s project of a metaphysics of morals represents a normative ideal grounded on the core ideas of Enlightenment. In the first section, it analyzes Kant’s concept of metaphysical principles of morals by establishing a connection between a metaphysics of morals and Kant’s concept of metaphysics in general and of metaphysics of nature in particular. It then discusses what is metaphysical in the Doctrine of Right and the Doctrine of Virtue. In its last section, it tackles the question of whether a non-metaphysical reading of Kant’s doctrines of right and of virtue is desirable if we want to remain faithful to Kant’s Enlightenment project.

ABSTRACT The paper critically evaluates Rahel Jaeggi’s concept of form of life. Particularly, it deals with the question of why one should want to criticize forms of life or society in the first place. While Jaeggi mentions issues of rationality and success, the paper refers to issues of suffering. Therefore, it introduces firstly the concept of pervasive doctrine, which aims at complementing, not at substituting, Jaeggi’s concept of form of life. A pervasive doctrine is composed by (1) a coherent system of believes, by (2) a coherent set of values inspired by these believes, as well by a set of (3) norms and of (4) social practices organized around (1) and (2). It is pervasive insofar as it aims at explaining and regulating every aspect of the life of individuals and communities. The paper establishes, secondly, a connection between pervasive doctrines and systemic suffering, i.e. a suffering whose roots lie in the very way society is structured and the power relations within it that have been distributed along its history. Analysing the effects of pervasive doctrines in provoking systemic suffering is offered as a complementary critical strategy to the critique of forms of life provided by Jaeggi.

This paper departs from the assumption that the critique of neoliberalism should not restrict itself to a criticism of an economic project. Another possible criticism of neoliberalism consists of a critique of how this specific form of life forms subjects. In this paper, we argue that a critique of a form of life is only justified in a reasonable way if it starts from the experiences of suffering produced by this form of life. As we will show, we must criticise neoliberalism not because it is inadequate for solving problems, since for a specific portion of the world population it has been extremely effective, but because it causes suffering. Suffering, unlike mere unsolved problems, represents sufficient grounds for highlighting the existence of a normative problem in a form of life. According to Max Horkheimer, the first step of a critical project committed to the transformation of a form of life are the crises of the present, which are not fully understood through the theoretical tools of “problem solving” or “learning processes”, as Rahel Jaeggi resorts to in her critical theory of society.

O artigo tece algumas considerações sobre o chamado constitucionalismo da efetividade ou neoconstitucionalismo, limitando-se, contudo a discutir seus aspetos teóricos, sem analisar casos concretos. Primeiramente são apresentados de forma sucinta os princípios centrais do neoconstitucionalismo, em particular na formulação de Luis Prieto Sanchís; em seguida, são avançadas algumas considerações a partir das observações de alguns dos seus críticos, em particular Juan García Amado. As teses destes dois autores são complementadas com algumas observações do autor e de outros autores, que insistem sobre aspectos relevantes para nossa discussão.

The paper is a commentary on Christoph Horn’s paper The Concept of Justice. It criticizes Horn’s claim that justice is overrated in contemporary philosophical debate by discussing Horn’s arguments. In doing so, it questions (1) the idea that we can easily distinguish between morally central and peripheral questions, as Horn claims; it points out (2) that this distinction is based on the values held by those who are drawing it; and finally (3) it stresses the centrality of the feeling of outrage provoked by the action whose acceptability is being challenged. Finally, it claims that morality arises from the experience of injustice and, therefore, that questions of justice are not only morally central; they are, rather, essential to morality.

Este artigo pretende fazer algumas considerações preliminares e programáticas sobre a questão da cooperação entre filosofia política e ciências sociais empíricas; oferecer uma estratégia para chegar a uma definição de pobreza que independa de dados quantitativos específicos, embora aponte para a importância deles ; apontar para a necessidade de ouvir a voz dos pobres; mostrar as razões da exclusão política dos pobres. Obviamente não se pretende discutir tudo isso de forma exaustiva, mas somente indicar possíveis caminhos a serem explorados.The present paper aims at presenting some preliminary and programmatic considerations on the question of the cooperation between political philosophy and empirical social sciences; offering a strategy to reach a definition of poverty that does not depend on specific quantitative data, while it recognizes their importance ; pointing at the necessity to hear the voice of the poor; showing the reasons for the political exclusion of the poor. Of course all this shall not be discussed in an exhaustive form, but only with the intention of indicating possible paths to be explored

The paper is structured into four parts. Firstly I discuss the connection between the concept of injustice and the idea of human or individual rights. The claim is quite trivial: the language of rights has been and is still used as a strategy to demand correctives against injustice. Since this strategy has negative effects, of which concrete examples are given, I suggest a different grammar be adopted, the grammar of needs, which is what societies adopt in their justificatory discourses anyway. This leads into a consideration of how social criticism could start precisely from such discourses and why, under specific circumstances, the grammar of needs could represent a better strategy for this criticism than the language of rights does.

O artigo analisa diferentes discursos que, neste momento, estão sendo formulados sobre a religião na esfera pública. Não se falará nele da religião ou das religiões, mas da maneira na qual esses temas são percebidos e discutidos na opinião pública ocidental, em particular europeia, pois essa discussão tem algo relevante para a discussão sobre o papel da religião na sociedade brasileira. Serão considerados três discursos que serão denominados respectivamente de “determinismo cultural”, “anti-religiosidade seletiva” e “laicismo estatal”. A intenção do artigo é apontar para os erros lógicos e categoriais e para as incoerências presentes nesses discursos que dominam o atual debate sobre o lugar da religião em geral e do Islã em particular nas sociedades ocidentais.

The paper starts from an expression used by Kant in the Doctrine of Right: Beati possidentes. It then discusses Kant’s arguments for justifying the possession of land by individuals and by political community. Its main hypothesis is the following: If we consider unacceptable the application of the Beati possidentes principle on a global level, then we have a good reason to reject it also on the domestic level. It reaches this conclusion not by pointing out the undesirable consequences of the principle, for this would be an empirical argument resulting from a consequentialist approach. Rather, it chooses a procedimental approach, showing that the way in which land was initially distributed was neither rightful on the domestic nor on the global level.