Alessandro Pinzani

The paper starts from an expression used by Kant in the Doctrine of Right: Beati possidentes. It then discusses Kant’s arguments for justifying the possession of land by individuals and by political community. Its main hypothesis is the following: If we consider unacceptable the application of the Beati possidentes principle on a global level, then we have a good reason to reject it also on the domestic level. It reaches this conclusion not by pointing out the undesirable consequences of the principle, for this would be an empirical argument resulting from a consequentialist approach. Rather, it chooses a procedimental approach, showing that the way in which land was initially distributed was neither rightful on the domestic nor on the global level.

This chapter focuses on the suffering caused by being seen and treated as a migrant or asylum seeker. It establishes a parallel between this form of suffering and that experienced by people living in economically developed countries who have become economically “useless.” It discusses some of the mechanisms leading to social suffering, namely those connected to pervasive doctrines, defined as a system of beliefs and values, and of social norms and social practices that permeate the structure of a society and influence social interactions. Finally, the chapter discusses a fictional depiction of the suffering of migrants: the movie Bread and Chocolate by Franco Brusati.

Partindo da recente renascença da tradição republicana, o presente trabalho aponta para a pluralidade de tal tradição, para em seguida distinguir entre dois tipos de solução que ela oferece aos problemas da salvaguarda da república e do controle dos efeitos negativos das ações dos indivíduos, a saber, a solução internalista e a solução externalista. Ao analisar esta última, serão discutidas questões como: a ficção democrática do “one head, one vote” e a relação entre poder político e poder econômico e social. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Republicanismo. Democracia. Poder. Madison. ABSTRACT Taking the recent renaissance of the republican tradition as a starting point, this paper points out to the plurality of this tradition and makes a distinction between the two kinds of solution this tradition gives to the problems of saving the republic and of controlling the negative effects of individual actions: the internalist and the externalist solution. Focusing on the latter, we’ll discuss questions such as: the democratic fiction of “one head, one vote” and the relationship between political power and socioeconomic power. KEY WORDS – Republicanism. Democracy. Power. Madison.

O presente texto tenta oferecer uma fundamentação dos direitos sociais quer a partir de uma perspectiva neoliberal, quer a partir de uma visão mais substantiva de cidadania. Ao mesmo tempo, contudo, será salientada a diferença entre as duas posições apresentadas e defendida a segunda. Na primeira parte será discutira a noção hayekiana de Grande Sociedade, que representa um avatar da ideia de sociedade característica da tradição liberal. Em seguida, se chegará a uma visão mais substantiva e robusta da sociedade organizada politicamente na forma-Estado e se mostrará a necessidade de políticas de inclusão, entendida não somente em sentido socioeconômico, mas também em sentido político e civil. A tese central é a de que a garantia de direitos sociais amplos é necessária quer para a estabilidade da sociedade, quer para legitimar as instituições de tal sociedade.

In diesem Beitrag werde ich auf die Frage eingehen, warum in der Rechtslehre der Begriff eines Rechts der Menschheit, nicht jedoch der von Menschenrechten zu finden ist. Im Folgenden werde ich (1) den Begriff eines subjektiven Rechts überhaupt und (2) die Begriffe eines Rechts der Menschheit und des Rechts der Menschen rekonstruieren, um dann (3) auf die offensichtliche Abwesenheit eines Begriffs von Menschenrechten und auf dessen mögliche Verortung innerhalb der Rechtslehre einzugehen. Schließlich werde ich (4) versuchen, alternative Möglichkeiten zu erörtern sowie eine Begründung von Menschenrechten aus der Perspektive von Kants moralischer und rechtlicher Theorie durchzuführen, um jedoch (5) den Sinn dieser Operation gleichzeitig in Frage zu stellen.

The essay deals with the debate between neo-republicans and liberals. It discusses particularly the positions of Quentin Skinner, Philip Pettit and Maurizio Viroli. While not operating an exhaustive critical examination of the positions of these three thinkers, it focusses an aspect they have in common: the idea that the republican tradition stays in an irreducible conflict with the liberal tradition and with a certain conception of democracy. The essay analizes briefly the three main concepts of republicanism also in order to point out to some historical and theoretical problems. It further compares the position of republican thinkers with the position of the liberal-democratic tradition which is their main target of their critics. In this context the essay introduces a further position which the neo-republicans quite curiously leave aside: constitutionalism.

Ernst Tugendhat is one of the most important living German philosophers. He was born in Brno in 1930 to a Jewish family. In 1938 the Tugendhatshad to leave the country because of the threat represented by Nazi Germany. They emigrated first toSwitzerland, then to Caracas, Venezuela. After classical studies at Stanford University ,Ernst Tugendhat moved to Germany in order to study philosophy in Freiburg and Münster . He became an assistant professor in Tübingen before getting a professorship in Heidelberg. He worked at the Max-Plack-Institut zurErforschung der Lebensbedingungen der wissenschaftlich-technischen Welt , spend some years in Chile and was a professor at the FreieUniversität Berlin till his retirement. He was and still is visiting professor in universities in Europe aswell as in North and South America. Among his many books: Vorlesungen zur Einführung in diesprachanalytische Philosophie, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1976; Selbstbewusstsein undSelbstbestimmung, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1979; Probleme der Ethik, Stuttgart: Reclam, 1984;Vorlesungen über Ethik, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1993, and Egozentrizität und Mystik. Eineanthropologische Studie, München: Beck, 2003

In this paper I shall deal with the question of whether a State-granted minimal income (which is not the same as a basic income) is a necessary condition in order for individuals (1) to attain a basic level of autonomy; and (2) to develop capabilities that allow them to improve the quality of their life. As a theoretical basis for my analysis I shall use Honneth’s theory of recognition, Sen’s capability approach (also in the version offered by Nussbaum), and Simmel’s concept of independency as developed in his Philosophy of Money. A minimal income aims at guaranteeing not only the survival of the extremely poor (this could also be achieved by emergency programs), but also – in cooperation with other State programs such as education, medical and legal assistance etc – at enabling these individuals to be more independent from their social environment, where dependence often constitutes a strong obstacle to the development of their autonomy. The social and political inclusion of millions of people, both in threshold countries and in poor countries, depends upon the existence of such programs

The paper is a commentary on Christoph Horn’s paper The Concept of Justice. It criticizes Horn’s claim that justice is overrated in contemporary philosophical debate by discussing Horn’s arguments. In doing so, it questions (1) the idea that we can easily distinguish between morally central and peripheral questions, as Horn claims; it points out (2) that this distinction is based on the values held by those who are drawing it; and finally (3) it stresses the centrality of the feeling of outrage provoked by the action whose acceptability is being challenged. Finally, it claims that morality arises from the experience of injustice and, therefore, that questions of justice are not only morally central; they are, rather, essential to morality.

This paper aims at explaining Kant’s concept of sovereignty as defined in the Doctrine of Right as well at showing its relation to the idea of republicanization and of political progress. Since Kant emphatically claims that sovereignty belongs solely to the united will of the people but, at the same time, does not want the people to intervene directly in the process of decision making, we shall distinguish between the real and the actual sovereign , as well between a synchronic and a diachronic concept both of the “united will” and of “the people”. By doing this, it will become clear in what sense Kant claims that every republic is necessarily a representative political system

Este ensayo se ocupa de discutir el renacimiento de la tradición republicana en los últimos años, particularmente gracias a pensadores como Quentin Skinner, Maurizio Viroli y Philip Pettit. Se aborda esta tradición en sus principales elementos constitutivos, a saber: 1) el concepto de república propiamente dicho; 2) el papel central de las virtudes cívicas; 3) la concepción republicana de libertad; y 4) el concepto de gobierno de las leyes. Se desarrolla, en primer lugar, un breve análisis de estos cuatros elementos, al mismo tiempo que se ponen en evidencia algunos problemas históricos y teóricos. A continuación, se compara la posición de los teóricos republicanos, tanto clásicos como contemporáneos, con la propia de la tradición liberal-democrática, que, para aquéllos, constituye el principal blanco de esta polémica. Finalmente, se introduce una nueva corriente de pensamiento que los neo-republicanos dejan, curiosamente, de lado: el constitucionalismo.