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33Externalism and Memory: Michael TyeSupplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 72 (1): 77-94. 1998.
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3Braving the Perils of an Uneventful WorldGrazer Philosophische Studien 31 (1): 179-186. 1988.Philosophers who advocate an ontology without events must show how sentences containing apparent reference to events can be systematically paraphrased, or "regimented," into sentences which avoid ontological commitment to these putative entities. Two alternative proposals are set forth for regimenting statements containing putatively event-denoting definite descriptions. Both proposals eliminate the apparent reference to events, while still preserving the validity of inferences sanctioned by the…Read more
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91Précis of Consciousness Revisited: Materialism without Phenomenal ConceptsPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1): 187-189. 2011.
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12Shoemaker’s The First-Person Perspective and Other EssaysPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2): 461-464. 2000.This excellent collection of essays by Sydney Shoemaker covers his work over the last ten years in the philosophy of mind. Shoemaker's overarching concern in the collection is to provide an account of the mind that does justice to the “first-person perspective.” The two main topics are the nature of self-knowledge and the nature of sensory experience. The essays are insightful, careful, and thought-provoking.
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12Representation in Pictorialism and ConnectionismSouthern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 26 (S1): 309--330. 1991.
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45Braving the Perils of an Uneventful WorldGrazer Philosophische Studien 31 (1): 179-186. 1988.Philosophers who advocate an ontology without events must show how sentences containing apparent reference to events can be systematically paraphrased, or "regimented," into sentences which avoid ontological commitment to these putative entities. Two alternative proposals are set forth for regimenting statements containing putatively event-denoting definite descriptions. Both proposals eliminate the apparent reference to events, while still preserving the validity of inferences sanctioned by the…Read more
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43Representation in pictorialism and connectionismSouthern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 26 (S1): 163-184. 1987.
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362Phenomenal consciousness: The explanatory gap as a cognitive illusionMind 108 (432): 705-25. 1999.The thesis that there is a troublesome explanatory gap between the phenomenal aspects of experiences and the underlying physical and functional states is given a number of different interpretations. It is shown that, on each of these interpretations, the thesis is false. In supposing otherwise, philosophers have fallen prey to a cognitive illusion, induced largely by a failure to recognize the special character of phenomenal concepts
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49The burning houseIn Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience, Imprint Academic & Paderborn. pp. 81--90. 1995.
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37Philosophical problems of consciousnessIn Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, Blackwell. pp. 23--35. 2007.
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643Tye's book develops a persuasive and, in many respects, original argument for the view that the qualitative side of our mental life is representational in..
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565Consciousness, Color, and ContentMIT Press. 2000.A further development of Tye's theory of phenomenal consciousness along with replies to common objections
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152The Imagery DebateMIT Press. 1991.Michael Tye untangles the complex web of empirical and conceptual issues of the newly revived imagery debate in psychology between those that liken mental...
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19Review: Phenomenal Character and Color: Reply to Maund (review)Philosophical Studies 113 (3). 2003.
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396A representational theory of pains and their phenomenal characterPhilosophical Perspectives 9 223-39. 1995.
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651Knowing what it is like: The ability hypothesis and the knowledge argumentIn Gerhard Preyer (ed.), Reality and Humean Supervenience: Essays on the Philosophy of David Lewis, Rowman & Littlefield. 2000.
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149QualiaStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 1997.Feelings and experiences vary widely. For example, I run my fingers over sandpaper, smell a skunk, feel a sharp pain in my finger, seem to see bright purple, become extremely angry. In each of these cases, I am the subject of a mental state with a very distinctive subjective character. There is something it is like for me to undergo each state, some phenomenology that it has. Philosophers often use the term ‘qualia’ (singular ‘quale’) to refer to the introspectively accessible, phenomenal aspect…Read more
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84The Metaphysics of MindCambridge University Press. 1989.In this provocative book, Michael Tye presents his unique account of the metaphysical foundations of psychological discourse. In place of token identity theory or eliminative materialism, he advocates a generalisation of the adverbial approach to sensory experience, the 'operator theory'. He applies this to the analysis of prepositional attitudes, arguing that mental statements cannot involve reference to mental events or objects and that therefore causal statements about the mental cannot be re…Read more
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49Externalism, twin earth, and self-knowledgeIn C. Macdonald, Peter K. Smith & C. Wright (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds: Essays in Self-Knowledge, Oxford University Press. pp. 285--320. 1998.
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52Tense Bees and Shell-Shocked Crabs: Are Animals Conscious?Oxford University Press USA. 2016.A consideration of some of the most common questions about animal minds.Do birds have feelings? Can fish feel pain? Could a honeybee be anxious? For centuries, the question of whether or not animals are conscious like humans has prompted debates among philosophers and scientists. While most people gladly accept that complex mammals - such as dogs - share emotions and experiences with us, the matter of simpler creatures is much less clear. Meanwhile, the advent of the digital age and artificial i…Read more
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118Does Conscious Seeing Have A Finer Grain Than Attention?Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (2): 154-158. 2014.Ned Block says ‘yes’ (, ). His position is based on the phenomenon of identity-crowding. According to Block, in cases of identity-crowding, something is consciously seen even though one cannot attend to it. In taking this view, Block is opposing a position I have taken in recent work (Tye 2009a, 2009b, 2010). He is also contributing to a vigorous recent debate in the philosophy of mind over the relation, if any, between consciousness and attention. Who is right? Not surprisingly, I think I am