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3Another Look At Representationalism About PainIn M. Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study, The Mit Press. Bradford Books. pp. 99-120. 2005.
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18Is Content-Externalism Compatible with Privileged Access?Philosophical Review 107 (3): 349-380. 1998.
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20On the nonconceptual content of experienceSchriftenreihe-Wittgenstein Gesellschaft. 2005.I suppose that substantive philosophical theses are much like second marriages. The philo- sophical thesis I wish to discuss in this paper is the thesis that experiences have nonconceptual content. I shall not attempt to argue that _all_ experiences have nonconceptual content nor that the only contents experiences have are nonconceptual. Instead, I want to ? esh out the thesis of nonconceptual content for experience in more detail than has been offered hithertofore and to provide a variety of mo…Read more
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747Qualia ain't in the headNoûs 40 (2): 241-255. 2006.Qualia internalism is the thesis that qualia are intrinsic to their subjects: the experiences of intrinsic duplicates have the same qualia. Content externalism is the thesis that mental representation is an extrinsic matter, partly depending on what happens outside the head. 1 Intentionalism comes in strong and weak forms. In its weakest formulation, it is the thesis that representationally identical experiences of subjects have the same qualia. 2
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55Scientific reduction and the synonymy principle of property identityPhilosophical Studies 40 (2). 1981.
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61Representationalist Theories of ConsciousnessIn B. McLaughlin & A. Beckermann (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, Oxford University Press. 2009.This essay surveys representationalist theories of phenomenal consciousness as well as the major arguments for them. It also takes up two major objections. The essay is divided into five sections. Section I offers some introductory remarks on phenomenal consciousness. Section II presents the classic view of phenomenal consciousness to which representationalists are opposed. Section III canvasses various versions of representationalism about consciousness. Section IV lays out the main arguments f…Read more
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19Review: On the Virtue of Being Poised: Reply to Seager (review)Philosophical Studies 113 (3). 2003.
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5Is Consciousness Vague or Arbitrary?Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3): 679-685. 1996.
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199The adverbial theory: A defence of Sellars against JacksonMetaphilosophy 6 (April): 136-143. 1975.
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401Consciousness Revisited: Materialism Without Phenomenal ConceptsMIT Press. 2008.We are material beings in a material world, but we are also beings who have experiences and feelings. How can these subjective states be just a matter of matter? To defend materialism, philosophical materialists have formulated what is sometimes called "the phenomenal-concept strategy," which holds that we possess a range of special concepts for classifying the subjective aspects of our experiences. In Consciousness Revisited, the philosopher Michael Tye, until now a proponent of the the phenome…Read more
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51Blindsight, the Absent Qualia Hypothesis, and the Mystery of ConsciousnessRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 34 19-40. 1993.One standard objection to the view that phenomenal experience is functionally determined is based upon what has come to be called ‘The Absent Qualia Hypothesis’, the idea that there could be a person or a machine that was functionally exactly like us but that felt or consciously experienced nothing at all. Advocates of this hypothesis typically maintain that we can easily imagine possible systems that meet the appropriate functional specifications but that intuitively lack any phenomenal conscio…Read more
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257What is the Content of a Hallucinatory Experience?In Berit Brogaard (ed.), Does Perception have Content?, Oxford University Press. forthcoming.Keith has just taken a hallucinogenic drug. A few minutes earlier, he was occupied with the beginning of H.H. Price's well-known book on perception. The combined effect of these activities is that Keith is now hallucinating a ripe tomato. This is not a de re hallucination. There is no particular tomato located elsewhere out of Keith's vision such that he is hallucinating that tomato as being before him. Keith is hallucinating a tomato without there being any particular tomato that he is hallucin…Read more
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