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63A Theory of Phenomenal ConceptsRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 53 91-105. 2003.There is widespread agreement that consciousness must be a physical phenomenon, even if it is one that we do not yet understand and perhaps may never do so fully. There is also widespread agreement that the way to defend physicalism about consciousness against a variety of well known objections is by appeal to phenomenal concepts. There is, alas, no agreement on the nature of phenomenal concepts.
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127The truth about true blueAnalysis 66 (4). 2006.Cohen, Hardin, and McLaughlin (2006) complain that my solution to the puzzle of true blue (Tye 2006) depends upon my assuming that 'all variation in colour experience among standard perceivers in standard circumstances is at the level of fine-grained hues (4)'. That assumption, they say, is false: 'there is in fact variation in colour experience among
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24Supervenience, Materialism, and Functionalism: Comments on HorganSouthern Journal of Philosophy 22 (S1): 39-43. 1984.
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125The problem of common sensiblesErkenntnis 66 (1-2). 2007.In _On The Soul_ (425a-b), Aristotle drew a distinction between those qualities that are perceptible only via a single sense and those that are perceptible by more than one. The latter qualities he called
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133Interview for Mind and Consciousness: 5 QuestionsIn Patrick Grim (ed.), Mind and Consciousness: 5 Questions, Automatic Press. 2009.I went up to Oxford as an undergraduate to study physics. I chose Oxford over Cambridge at the urging of my school physics teacher who was an Oxford man. When I arrived, I found out that, as a physics student, I was expected to spend one day a week in the laboratory. This seemed to me extremely unappealing not only because it would interfere with my social life but also because the practical side of physics was, to my mind, deadly dull. Happily, I discovered that there was a new undergraduate de…Read more
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100Feelings and experiences vary widely. For example, I run my fingers over sandpaper, smell a skunk, feel a sharp pain in my finger, seem to see bright purple, become extremely angry. In each of these cases, I am the subject of a mental state with a very distinctive subjective character. There is something it is like for me to undergo each state, some phenomenology that it has. Philosophers often use the term ‘qualia’ (singular ‘quale’) to refer to the introspectively accessible, phenomenal aspect…Read more
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254A new look at the speckled henAnalysis 69 (2): 258-263. 2009.We owe the problem of the speckled hen to Gilbert Ryle. It was suggested to A.J. Ayer by Ryle in connection with Ayer’s account of seeing. Suppose that you are standing before a speckled hen with your eyes trained on it. You are in good light and nothing is obstructing your view. You see the hen in a single glance. The hen has 47 speckles on its facing side, let us say, and the hen ap pears speckled to you. On Ayer’s view, in seeing the hen, you directly see a speckled sense-datum or appearance…Read more
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11Phenomenal externalism, lolita, and the planet xenonIn Terence E. Horgan & David Sosa (eds.), Qualia and Mental Causation in a Physical World: Themes From the Philosophy of Jaegwon Kim, Mit Press. 2015.It is usually supposed that the term
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64Reply to Crane, Jackson and McLaughlin (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1): 215-232. 2011.
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116Critical NoticePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1): 245-247. 2000.In 1995, in my book, Ten Problems of Consciousness, I proposed a version of the theory of phenomenal consciousness now known as representationalism. The present book, in part, consists of a further development of that theory along with replies to common objections. It is also concerned with two prominent challenges for any reductive theory of consciousness: the explanatory gap and the knowledge argument. In addition, it connects representationalism with two more general issues: the nature of col…Read more
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184On the possibility of disembodied existenceAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (3): 275-282. 1983.This Article does not have an abstract
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191Pains and reasons: Why it is rational to kill the MessengerPhilosophical Quarterly 64 (256): 423-433. 2014.In this paper, we defend the representationalist theory of phenomenal consciousness against a recent objection due to Hilla Jacobson, who charges representationalism with a failure to explain the role of pain in rationalizing certain forms of behavior. In rough outline, her objection is that the representationalist is unable to account for the rationality of certain acts, such as the act of taking pain killers, which are aimed at getting rid of the experience of pain rather than its intentional …Read more
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237Shoemaker’s The First-Person Perspective and Other EssaysPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2): 461-464. 2000.This excellent collection of essays by Sydney Shoemaker covers his work over the last ten years in the philosophy of mind. Shoemaker's overarching concern in the collection is to provide an account of the mind that does justice to the “first-person perspective.” The two main topics are the nature of self-knowledge and the nature of sensory experience. The essays are insightful, careful, and thought-provoking.
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1Nonconceptual content and fineness of grainIn Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience, Oxford University Press. 2006.
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651Knowing what it is like: The ability hypothesis and the knowledge argumentIn Gerhard Preyer (ed.), Reality and Humean Supervenience: Essays on the Philosophy of David Lewis, Rowman & Littlefield. 2000.
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19Review: Phenomenal Character and Color: Reply to Maund (review)Philosophical Studies 113 (3). 2003.
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396A representational theory of pains and their phenomenal characterPhilosophical Perspectives 9 223-39. 1995.
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84The Metaphysics of MindCambridge University Press. 1989.In this provocative book, Michael Tye presents his unique account of the metaphysical foundations of psychological discourse. In place of token identity theory or eliminative materialism, he advocates a generalisation of the adverbial approach to sensory experience, the 'operator theory'. He applies this to the analysis of prepositional attitudes, arguing that mental statements cannot involve reference to mental events or objects and that therefore causal statements about the mental cannot be re…Read more
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149QualiaStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 1997.Feelings and experiences vary widely. For example, I run my fingers over sandpaper, smell a skunk, feel a sharp pain in my finger, seem to see bright purple, become extremely angry. In each of these cases, I am the subject of a mental state with a very distinctive subjective character. There is something it is like for me to undergo each state, some phenomenology that it has. Philosophers often use the term ‘qualia’ (singular ‘quale’) to refer to the introspectively accessible, phenomenal aspect…Read more