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33Externalism and Memory: Michael TyeSupplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 72 (1): 77-94. 1998.
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3Braving the Perils of an Uneventful WorldGrazer Philosophische Studien 31 (1): 179-186. 1988.Philosophers who advocate an ontology without events must show how sentences containing apparent reference to events can be systematically paraphrased, or "regimented," into sentences which avoid ontological commitment to these putative entities. Two alternative proposals are set forth for regimenting statements containing putatively event-denoting definite descriptions. Both proposals eliminate the apparent reference to events, while still preserving the validity of inferences sanctioned by the…Read more
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92Précis of Consciousness Revisited: Materialism without Phenomenal ConceptsPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1): 187-189. 2011.
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12Shoemaker’s The First-Person Perspective and Other EssaysPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2): 461-464. 2000.This excellent collection of essays by Sydney Shoemaker covers his work over the last ten years in the philosophy of mind. Shoemaker's overarching concern in the collection is to provide an account of the mind that does justice to the “first-person perspective.” The two main topics are the nature of self-knowledge and the nature of sensory experience. The essays are insightful, careful, and thought-provoking.
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12Representation in Pictorialism and ConnectionismSouthern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 26 (S1): 309--330. 1991.
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45Braving the Perils of an Uneventful WorldGrazer Philosophische Studien 31 (1): 179-186. 1988.Philosophers who advocate an ontology without events must show how sentences containing apparent reference to events can be systematically paraphrased, or "regimented," into sentences which avoid ontological commitment to these putative entities. Two alternative proposals are set forth for regimenting statements containing putatively event-denoting definite descriptions. Both proposals eliminate the apparent reference to events, while still preserving the validity of inferences sanctioned by the…Read more
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43Representation in pictorialism and connectionismSouthern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 26 (S1): 163-184. 1987.
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362Phenomenal consciousness: The explanatory gap as a cognitive illusionMind 108 (432): 705-25. 1999.The thesis that there is a troublesome explanatory gap between the phenomenal aspects of experiences and the underlying physical and functional states is given a number of different interpretations. It is shown that, on each of these interpretations, the thesis is false. In supposing otherwise, philosophers have fallen prey to a cognitive illusion, induced largely by a failure to recognize the special character of phenomenal concepts
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49The burning houseIn Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience, Imprint Academic & Paderborn. pp. 81--90. 1995.
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643Tye's book develops a persuasive and, in many respects, original argument for the view that the qualitative side of our mental life is representational in..
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37Philosophical problems of consciousnessIn Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, Blackwell. pp. 23--35. 2007.
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568Consciousness, Color, and ContentMIT Press. 2000.A further development of Tye's theory of phenomenal consciousness along with replies to common objections
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152The Imagery DebateMIT Press. 1991.Michael Tye untangles the complex web of empirical and conceptual issues of the newly revived imagery debate in psychology between those that liken mental...
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5Is Consciousness Vague or Arbitrary?Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3): 679-685. 1996.
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199The adverbial theory: A defence of Sellars against JacksonMetaphilosophy 6 (April): 136-143. 1975.
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401Consciousness Revisited: Materialism Without Phenomenal ConceptsMIT Press. 2008.We are material beings in a material world, but we are also beings who have experiences and feelings. How can these subjective states be just a matter of matter? To defend materialism, philosophical materialists have formulated what is sometimes called "the phenomenal-concept strategy," which holds that we possess a range of special concepts for classifying the subjective aspects of our experiences. In Consciousness Revisited, the philosopher Michael Tye, until now a proponent of the the phenome…Read more
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51Blindsight, the Absent Qualia Hypothesis, and the Mystery of ConsciousnessRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 34 19-40. 1993.One standard objection to the view that phenomenal experience is functionally determined is based upon what has come to be called ‘The Absent Qualia Hypothesis’, the idea that there could be a person or a machine that was functionally exactly like us but that felt or consciously experienced nothing at all. Advocates of this hypothesis typically maintain that we can easily imagine possible systems that meet the appropriate functional specifications but that intuitively lack any phenomenal conscio…Read more
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257What is the Content of a Hallucinatory Experience?In Berit Brogaard (ed.), Does Perception have Content?, Oxford University Press. forthcoming.Keith has just taken a hallucinogenic drug. A few minutes earlier, he was occupied with the beginning of H.H. Price's well-known book on perception. The combined effect of these activities is that Keith is now hallucinating a ripe tomato. This is not a de re hallucination. There is no particular tomato located elsewhere out of Keith's vision such that he is hallucinating that tomato as being before him. Keith is hallucinating a tomato without there being any particular tomato that he is hallucin…Read more
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24Supervenience, Materialism, and Functionalism: Comments on HorganSouthern Journal of Philosophy 22 (S1): 39-43. 1984.