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33Externalism and Memory: Michael TyeSupplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 72 (1): 77-94. 1998.
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3Braving the Perils of an Uneventful WorldGrazer Philosophische Studien 31 (1): 179-186. 1988.Philosophers who advocate an ontology without events must show how sentences containing apparent reference to events can be systematically paraphrased, or "regimented," into sentences which avoid ontological commitment to these putative entities. Two alternative proposals are set forth for regimenting statements containing putatively event-denoting definite descriptions. Both proposals eliminate the apparent reference to events, while still preserving the validity of inferences sanctioned by the…Read more
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91Précis of Consciousness Revisited: Materialism without Phenomenal ConceptsPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1): 187-189. 2011.
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12Shoemaker’s The First-Person Perspective and Other EssaysPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2): 461-464. 2000.This excellent collection of essays by Sydney Shoemaker covers his work over the last ten years in the philosophy of mind. Shoemaker's overarching concern in the collection is to provide an account of the mind that does justice to the “first-person perspective.” The two main topics are the nature of self-knowledge and the nature of sensory experience. The essays are insightful, careful, and thought-provoking.
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12Representation in Pictorialism and ConnectionismSouthern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 26 (S1): 309--330. 1991.
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45Braving the Perils of an Uneventful WorldGrazer Philosophische Studien 31 (1): 179-186. 1988.Philosophers who advocate an ontology without events must show how sentences containing apparent reference to events can be systematically paraphrased, or "regimented," into sentences which avoid ontological commitment to these putative entities. Two alternative proposals are set forth for regimenting statements containing putatively event-denoting definite descriptions. Both proposals eliminate the apparent reference to events, while still preserving the validity of inferences sanctioned by the…Read more
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43Representation in pictorialism and connectionismSouthern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 26 (S1): 163-184. 1987.
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362Phenomenal consciousness: The explanatory gap as a cognitive illusionMind 108 (432): 705-25. 1999.The thesis that there is a troublesome explanatory gap between the phenomenal aspects of experiences and the underlying physical and functional states is given a number of different interpretations. It is shown that, on each of these interpretations, the thesis is false. In supposing otherwise, philosophers have fallen prey to a cognitive illusion, induced largely by a failure to recognize the special character of phenomenal concepts
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49The burning houseIn Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience, Imprint Academic & Paderborn. pp. 81--90. 1995.
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37Philosophical problems of consciousnessIn Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, Blackwell. pp. 23--35. 2007.
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643Tye's book develops a persuasive and, in many respects, original argument for the view that the qualitative side of our mental life is representational in..
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566Consciousness, Color, and ContentMIT Press. 2000.A further development of Tye's theory of phenomenal consciousness along with replies to common objections
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152The Imagery DebateMIT Press. 1991.Michael Tye untangles the complex web of empirical and conceptual issues of the newly revived imagery debate in psychology between those that liken mental...
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184On the possibility of disembodied existenceAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (3): 275-282. 1983.This Article does not have an abstract
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191Pains and reasons: Why it is rational to kill the MessengerPhilosophical Quarterly 64 (256): 423-433. 2014.In this paper, we defend the representationalist theory of phenomenal consciousness against a recent objection due to Hilla Jacobson, who charges representationalism with a failure to explain the role of pain in rationalizing certain forms of behavior. In rough outline, her objection is that the representationalist is unable to account for the rationality of certain acts, such as the act of taking pain killers, which are aimed at getting rid of the experience of pain rather than its intentional …Read more
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237Shoemaker’s The First-Person Perspective and Other EssaysPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2): 461-464. 2000.This excellent collection of essays by Sydney Shoemaker covers his work over the last ten years in the philosophy of mind. Shoemaker's overarching concern in the collection is to provide an account of the mind that does justice to the “first-person perspective.” The two main topics are the nature of self-knowledge and the nature of sensory experience. The essays are insightful, careful, and thought-provoking.
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116Critical NoticePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1): 245-247. 2000.In 1995, in my book, Ten Problems of Consciousness, I proposed a version of the theory of phenomenal consciousness now known as representationalism. The present book, in part, consists of a further development of that theory along with replies to common objections. It is also concerned with two prominent challenges for any reductive theory of consciousness: the explanatory gap and the knowledge argument. In addition, it connects representationalism with two more general issues: the nature of col…Read more
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1Nonconceptual content and fineness of grainIn Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience, Oxford University Press. 2006.
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19Review: Phenomenal Character and Color: Reply to Maund (review)Philosophical Studies 113 (3). 2003.
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397A representational theory of pains and their phenomenal characterPhilosophical Perspectives 9 223-39. 1995.
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651Knowing what it is like: The ability hypothesis and the knowledge argumentIn Gerhard Preyer (ed.), Reality and Humean Supervenience: Essays on the Philosophy of David Lewis, Rowman & Littlefield. 2000.