-
34Visual qualia and visual content revisitedIn David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Oxford University Press. 2002.Experiences vary widely. For example, I run my fingers over sandpaper, smell a skunk, feel a sharp pain in my finger, seem to see bright purple, become extremely angry. In each of these cases, I am the subject of a mental state with a very distinctive subjective character. There is something it is _like_ for me to undergo each state, some phenomenology that it has. Philoso- phers often use the term 'qualia' to refer to the introspectively accessible properties of experiences that characterize wh…Read more
-
25Nonconceptual content, richness, and fineness of grainIn Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience, Oxford University Press. 2006.
-
30Supervenience, materialism, and functionalism: Comments on HorganSouthern Journal of Philosophy 22 (S1): 39-43. 1984.
-
34Knowing What It Is LikeIn John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (eds.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action, Oxford University Press, Usa. pp. 300. 2011.
-
54Review: Précis of Ten Prolems of Consciousness (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3). 1998.
-
415Transparency, qualia realism and representationalismPhilosophical Studies 170 (1): 39-57. 2014.In this essay, I want to take another look at the phenomenon of transparency and its relevance to qualia realism and representationalism. I don’t suppose that what I have to say will cause those who disagree with me to change their minds, but I hope not only to clarify my position and that of others who are on my side of the debate but also to respond to various criticisms and objections that have arisen over the last 10–15 years or so.The transparency thesisI begin with four quotations, two fro…Read more
-
7In defense of representationalism: Reply to commentariesIn Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study, Bradford Book/mit Press. pp. 163-176. 2005.
-
2Another look at representationalism and painIn Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study, Mit Press. 2005.
-
193The puzzle of true blueAnalysis 66 (3): 173-178. 2006.Most men and nearly all women have non-defective colour vision, as measured by standard colour tests such as those of Ishihara and Farns- worth. But people vary, according to gender, race and age in their per- formance in matching experiments. For example, when subjects are shown a screen, one half of which is lit by a mixture of red and green lights and the other by yellow or orange light, and they are asked to ad- just the mixture of lights so as to make the two halves of the screen match in c…Read more
-
35Phenomenal consciousness and cognitive accessibilityBehavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6): 527-528. 2007.Block tries to show that the results of the Sperling experiment lend support to the view that phenomenology outstrips cognitive accessibility. I argue that Block fails to make a compelling case for this general claim on the basis of the Sperling data
-
188Is content-externalism compatible with privileged access?Philosophical Review 107 (3): 349-380. 1998.
-
103True blue reduxAnalysis 67 (1): 92-93. 2007.A chip looks true blue to John and greenish blue to Jane. On the face of it, at least one of the two perceivers has an inaccurate colour experience; for the chip cannot be both true blue and greenish blue. But John and Jane are “normal” perceivers, and there is no privileged class of normal perceivers (Block 1999). This is the puzzle of true blue (Tye
-
1Do pains have representational content?In Roberto Casati, B. Smith & Stephen L. White (eds.), Philosophy and Cognitive Sciences: Proceedings of the 16th International Wittgenstein Symposium (Kirchberg Am Wechsel, Austria 1993), Holder-pichler-tempsky. 1994.
-
173Up close with the speckled henAnalysis 70 (2): 283-286. 2010.(No abstract is available for this citation).
-
136Naturalism and the problem of intentionalityMidwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1): 122-42. 1994.
-
84Blindsight, orgasm, and representational overlapBehavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2): 268-269. 1995.It is argued that there is no fallacy in the reasoning in the example of the thirsty blindsight subject, on one reconstruction of that reasoning. Neither the case of orgasm nor the case of a visual versus an auditory experience as of something overheard shows that phenomenal content is not representational.
-
164Is there a phenomenology of thought?In Tim Bayne & Michelle Montague (eds.), Cognitive Phenomenology, Oxford University Press. pp. 35. 2011.
-
153Reflections on Dennett and consciousness (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4): 891-6. 1993.
-
468Absent qualia and the mind-body problemPhilosophical Review 115 (2): 139-168. 2006.At the very heart of the mind-body problem is the question of the nature of consciousness. It is consciousness, and in particular _phenomenal_ consciousness, that makes the mind-body relation so deeply perplexing. Many philosophers hold that no defi nition of phenomenal consciousness is possible: any such putative defi nition would automatically use the concept of phenomenal consciousness and thus render the defi nition circular. The usual view is that the concept of phenomenal consciousness is …Read more
-
63The puzzle of Hesperus and PhosphorusAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 56 (3). 1978.This Article does not have an abstract
-
93Is consciousness vague or arbitrary?Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3): 679-685. 1996.