-
33Externalism and Memory: Michael TyeSupplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 72 (1): 77-94. 1998.
-
3Braving the Perils of an Uneventful WorldGrazer Philosophische Studien 31 (1): 179-186. 1988.Philosophers who advocate an ontology without events must show how sentences containing apparent reference to events can be systematically paraphrased, or "regimented," into sentences which avoid ontological commitment to these putative entities. Two alternative proposals are set forth for regimenting statements containing putatively event-denoting definite descriptions. Both proposals eliminate the apparent reference to events, while still preserving the validity of inferences sanctioned by the…Read more
-
91Précis of Consciousness Revisited: Materialism without Phenomenal ConceptsPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1): 187-189. 2011.
-
12Shoemaker’s The First-Person Perspective and Other EssaysPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2): 461-464. 2000.This excellent collection of essays by Sydney Shoemaker covers his work over the last ten years in the philosophy of mind. Shoemaker's overarching concern in the collection is to provide an account of the mind that does justice to the “first-person perspective.” The two main topics are the nature of self-knowledge and the nature of sensory experience. The essays are insightful, careful, and thought-provoking.
-
12Representation in Pictorialism and ConnectionismSouthern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 26 (S1): 309--330. 1991.
-
45Braving the Perils of an Uneventful WorldGrazer Philosophische Studien 31 (1): 179-186. 1988.Philosophers who advocate an ontology without events must show how sentences containing apparent reference to events can be systematically paraphrased, or "regimented," into sentences which avoid ontological commitment to these putative entities. Two alternative proposals are set forth for regimenting statements containing putatively event-denoting definite descriptions. Both proposals eliminate the apparent reference to events, while still preserving the validity of inferences sanctioned by the…Read more
-
43Representation in pictorialism and connectionismSouthern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 26 (S1): 163-184. 1987.
-
360Phenomenal consciousness: The explanatory gap as a cognitive illusionMind 108 (432): 705-25. 1999.The thesis that there is a troublesome explanatory gap between the phenomenal aspects of experiences and the underlying physical and functional states is given a number of different interpretations. It is shown that, on each of these interpretations, the thesis is false. In supposing otherwise, philosophers have fallen prey to a cognitive illusion, induced largely by a failure to recognize the special character of phenomenal concepts
-
49The burning houseIn Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience, Imprint Academic & Paderborn. pp. 81--90. 1995.
-
37Philosophical problems of consciousnessIn Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, Blackwell. pp. 23--35. 2007.
-
642Tye's book develops a persuasive and, in many respects, original argument for the view that the qualitative side of our mental life is representational in..
-
565Consciousness, Color, and ContentMIT Press. 2000.A further development of Tye's theory of phenomenal consciousness along with replies to common objections
-
151The Imagery DebateMIT Press. 1991.Michael Tye untangles the complex web of empirical and conceptual issues of the newly revived imagery debate in psychology between those that liken mental...
-
164Is there a phenomenology of thought?In Tim Bayne & Michelle Montague (eds.), Cognitive Phenomenology, Oxford University Press. pp. 35. 2011.
-
153Reflections on Dennett and consciousness (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4): 891-6. 1993.
-
465Absent qualia and the mind-body problemPhilosophical Review 115 (2): 139-168. 2006.At the very heart of the mind-body problem is the question of the nature of consciousness. It is consciousness, and in particular _phenomenal_ consciousness, that makes the mind-body relation so deeply perplexing. Many philosophers hold that no defi nition of phenomenal consciousness is possible: any such putative defi nition would automatically use the concept of phenomenal consciousness and thus render the defi nition circular. The usual view is that the concept of phenomenal consciousness is …Read more
-
63The puzzle of Hesperus and PhosphorusAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 56 (3). 1978.This Article does not have an abstract
-
93Is consciousness vague or arbitrary?Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3): 679-685. 1996.
-
1Precis of Ten Problems of ConsciousnessIn John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology, Oxford University Press. 2003.
-
133Seven Puzzles of Thought and How to Solve Them: An Originalist Theory of ConceptsOxford University Press. 2012.Sainsbury and Tye present a new theory, 'originalism', which provides natural, simple solutions to puzzles about thought that have troubled philosophers for centuries. They argue that concepts are to be individuated by their origin, rather than epistemically or semantically. Although thought is special, no special mystery attaches to its nature.
-
1366Intentionalism and the Argument from No Common ContentPhilosophical Perspectives 21 (1): 589-613. 2007.Disjunctivists (Hinton 1973, Snowdon 1990, Martin 2002, 2006) often motivate their approach to perceptual experience by appealing in part to the claim that in cases of veridical perception, the subject is directly in contact with the perceived object. When I perceive a table, for example, there is no table-like sense-impression that stands as an intermediary between the table and me. Nor am I related to the table as I am to a deer when I see its footprint in the snow. I do not experience the tab…Read more
-
4Against the token identity theoryIn Brian P. McLaughlin & Ernest LePore (eds.), Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, Blackwell. 1985.
-
259The admissible contents of visual experiencePhilosophical Quarterly 59 (236): 541-562. 2009.My purpose is to take a close look at the nature of visual content. I discuss the view that visual experiences have only existential contents, the view that visual experiences have either singular or gappy contents, and the view that visual experiences have multiple contents. I also consider a proposal about visual content inspired by Kaplan's well known theory of indexicals. I draw out some consequences of my discussion for the thesis of intentionalism with respect to the phenomenal character o…Read more
-
5Christopher Peacocke, Sense and Content: Experience, Thought and Their Relations Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 5 (4): 173-175. 1985.