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4Reply to Block, Jackson, and Shoemaker on Ten Problems of ConsciousnessPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3). 1998.
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14Blurry images, double vision, and other oddities: New problems for representationalismIn Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives, Oxford University Press. 2002.
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1Image indeterminacyIn Naomi M. Eilan (ed.), Spatial Representation, Blackwell. pp. 356--372. 1993.
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905Representationalism and the transparency of experienceNoûs 36 (1): 137-51. 2002.Representationalism is a thesis about the phenomenal character of experiences, about their immediate subjective ‘feel’.1 At a minimum, the thesis is one of supervenience: necessarily, experiences that are alike in their representational contents are alike in their phenomenal character. So understood, the thesis is silent on the nature of phenomenal character. Strong or pure representationalism goes further. It aims to tell us what phenomenal character is. According to the theory developed in Tye…Read more
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310I—R. M. Sainsbury and Michael Tye: An Originalist Theory of ConceptsAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1): 101-124. 2011.We argue that thoughts are structures of concepts, and that concepts should be individuated by their origins, rather than in terms of their semantic or epistemic properties. Many features of cognition turn on the vehicles of content, thoughts, rather than on the nature of the contents they express. Originalism makes concepts available to explain, with no threat of circularity, puzzling cases concerning thought. In this paper, we mention Hesperus/Phosphorus puzzles, the Evans-Perry example of the…Read more
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211The Experience of Emotion: An Intentionalist TheoryRevue Internationale de Philosophie 62 (1): 25--50. 2008.The experience of emotion is a fundamental part of human consciousness. Think, for example, of how different our conscious lives would be without such experiences as joy, anger, fear, disgust, pity, anxiety, and embarrassment. It is uncontroversial that these experiences typically have an intentional content. Anger, for example, is normally directed at someone or something. One may feel angry at one=s stock broker for provid- ing bad advice or angry with the cleaning lady for dropping the vase. …Read more
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201Yes, Phenomenal Character Really Is Out There In The WorldPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2): 483-488. 2015.
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66On the virtue of being poised: Reply to Seager (review)Philosophical Studies 113 (3): 275-280. 2003.
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325Tracking representationalism and the painfulness of painPhilosophical Issues 21 (1): 90-109. 2011.
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30Supervenience, materialism, and functionalism: Comments on HorganSouthern Journal of Philosophy 22 (S1): 39-43. 1984.
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34Visual qualia and visual content revisitedIn David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Oxford University Press. 2002.Experiences vary widely. For example, I run my fingers over sandpaper, smell a skunk, feel a sharp pain in my finger, seem to see bright purple, become extremely angry. In each of these cases, I am the subject of a mental state with a very distinctive subjective character. There is something it is _like_ for me to undergo each state, some phenomenology that it has. Philoso- phers often use the term 'qualia' to refer to the introspectively accessible properties of experiences that characterize wh…Read more
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25Nonconceptual content, richness, and fineness of grainIn Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience, Oxford University Press. 2006.
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54Review: Précis of Ten Prolems of Consciousness (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3). 1998.
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414Transparency, qualia realism and representationalismPhilosophical Studies 170 (1): 39-57. 2014.In this essay, I want to take another look at the phenomenon of transparency and its relevance to qualia realism and representationalism. I don’t suppose that what I have to say will cause those who disagree with me to change their minds, but I hope not only to clarify my position and that of others who are on my side of the debate but also to respond to various criticisms and objections that have arisen over the last 10–15 years or so.The transparency thesisI begin with four quotations, two fro…Read more
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34Knowing What It Is LikeIn John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (eds.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action, Oxford University Press, Usa. pp. 300. 2011.
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2Another look at representationalism and painIn Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study, Mit Press. 2005.
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190The puzzle of true blueAnalysis 66 (3): 173-178. 2006.Most men and nearly all women have non-defective colour vision, as measured by standard colour tests such as those of Ishihara and Farns- worth. But people vary, according to gender, race and age in their per- formance in matching experiments. For example, when subjects are shown a screen, one half of which is lit by a mixture of red and green lights and the other by yellow or orange light, and they are asked to ad- just the mixture of lights so as to make the two halves of the screen match in c…Read more
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7In defense of representationalism: Reply to commentariesIn Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study, Bradford Book/mit Press. pp. 163-176. 2005.