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184On the possibility of disembodied existenceAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (3): 275-282. 1983.This Article does not have an abstract
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191Pains and reasons: Why it is rational to kill the MessengerPhilosophical Quarterly 64 (256): 423-433. 2014.In this paper, we defend the representationalist theory of phenomenal consciousness against a recent objection due to Hilla Jacobson, who charges representationalism with a failure to explain the role of pain in rationalizing certain forms of behavior. In rough outline, her objection is that the representationalist is unable to account for the rationality of certain acts, such as the act of taking pain killers, which are aimed at getting rid of the experience of pain rather than its intentional …Read more
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1Nonconceptual content and fineness of grainIn Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience, Oxford University Press. 2006.
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397A representational theory of pains and their phenomenal characterPhilosophical Perspectives 9 223-39. 1995.
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651Knowing what it is like: The ability hypothesis and the knowledge argumentIn Gerhard Preyer (ed.), Reality and Humean Supervenience: Essays on the Philosophy of David Lewis, Rowman & Littlefield. 2000.
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19Review: Phenomenal Character and Color: Reply to Maund (review)Philosophical Studies 113 (3). 2003.
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86The Metaphysics of MindCambridge University Press. 1989.In this provocative book, Michael Tye presents his unique account of the metaphysical foundations of psychological discourse. In place of token identity theory or eliminative materialism, he advocates a generalisation of the adverbial approach to sensory experience, the 'operator theory'. He applies this to the analysis of prepositional attitudes, arguing that mental statements cannot involve reference to mental events or objects and that therefore causal statements about the mental cannot be re…Read more
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150QualiaStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 1997.Feelings and experiences vary widely. For example, I run my fingers over sandpaper, smell a skunk, feel a sharp pain in my finger, seem to see bright purple, become extremely angry. In each of these cases, I am the subject of a mental state with a very distinctive subjective character. There is something it is like for me to undergo each state, some phenomenology that it has. Philosophers often use the term ‘qualia’ (singular ‘quale’) to refer to the introspectively accessible, phenomenal aspect…Read more
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53Tense Bees and Shell-Shocked Crabs: Are Animals Conscious?Oxford University Press USA. 2016.A consideration of some of the most common questions about animal minds.Do birds have feelings? Can fish feel pain? Could a honeybee be anxious? For centuries, the question of whether or not animals are conscious like humans has prompted debates among philosophers and scientists. While most people gladly accept that complex mammals - such as dogs - share emotions and experiences with us, the matter of simpler creatures is much less clear. Meanwhile, the advent of the digital age and artificial i…Read more
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118Does Conscious Seeing Have A Finer Grain Than Attention?Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (2): 154-158. 2014.Ned Block says ‘yes’ (, ). His position is based on the phenomenon of identity-crowding. According to Block, in cases of identity-crowding, something is consciously seen even though one cannot attend to it. In taking this view, Block is opposing a position I have taken in recent work (Tye 2009a, 2009b, 2010). He is also contributing to a vigorous recent debate in the philosophy of mind over the relation, if any, between consciousness and attention. Who is right? Not surprisingly, I think I am
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49Externalism, twin earth, and self-knowledgeIn C. Macdonald, Peter K. Smith & C. Wright (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds: Essays in Self-Knowledge, Oxford University Press. pp. 285--320. 1998.
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175Consciousness and Persons: Unity and IdentityMIT Press. 2003.In Consciousness and Persons: Unity and Identity, Michael Tye takes on the thorny issue of the unity of consciousness and answers these important questions: What exactly is the unity of consciousness? Can a single person have a divided consciousness? What is a single person? Tye argues that unity is a fundamental part of human consciousness -- something so basic to everyday experience that it is easy to overlook. For example, when we hear the sound of waves crashing on a beach and at the same ti…Read more
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367Why the vague need not be higher-order vagueMind 103 (409): 43-45. 1994.Is higher-order vagueness a real phenomenon? Dominic Hyde (1994) claims that it is, and that it is part and parcel of vagueness itself. According to Hyde, any genuinely vague predicate must also be higher-order vague. His argument for this view is unsound, however. The purpose of this note is to expose the fallacy, and to make some related observations on the vague, the higher-order vague, and the vaguely vague.
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14Blurry images, double vision, and other oddities: New problems for representationalismIn Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives, Oxford University Press. 2002.
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4Reply to Block, Jackson, and Shoemaker on Ten Problems of ConsciousnessPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3). 1998.
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1Image indeterminacyIn Naomi M. Eilan (ed.), Spatial Representation, Blackwell. pp. 356--372. 1993.