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34Knowing What It Is LikeIn John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (eds.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action, Oxford University Press, Usa. pp. 300. 2011.
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2Another look at representationalism and painIn Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study, Mit Press. 2005.
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193The puzzle of true blueAnalysis 66 (3): 173-178. 2006.Most men and nearly all women have non-defective colour vision, as measured by standard colour tests such as those of Ishihara and Farns- worth. But people vary, according to gender, race and age in their per- formance in matching experiments. For example, when subjects are shown a screen, one half of which is lit by a mixture of red and green lights and the other by yellow or orange light, and they are asked to ad- just the mixture of lights so as to make the two halves of the screen match in c…Read more
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7In defense of representationalism: Reply to commentariesIn Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study, Bradford Book/mit Press. pp. 163-176. 2005.
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188Is content-externalism compatible with privileged access?Philosophical Review 107 (3): 349-380. 1998.
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103True blue reduxAnalysis 67 (1): 92-93. 2007.A chip looks true blue to John and greenish blue to Jane. On the face of it, at least one of the two perceivers has an inaccurate colour experience; for the chip cannot be both true blue and greenish blue. But John and Jane are “normal” perceivers, and there is no privileged class of normal perceivers (Block 1999). This is the puzzle of true blue (Tye
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1Do pains have representational content?In Roberto Casati, B. Smith & Stephen L. White (eds.), Philosophy and Cognitive Sciences: Proceedings of the 16th International Wittgenstein Symposium (Kirchberg Am Wechsel, Austria 1993), Holder-pichler-tempsky. 1994.
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35Phenomenal consciousness and cognitive accessibilityBehavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6): 527-528. 2007.Block tries to show that the results of the Sperling experiment lend support to the view that phenomenology outstrips cognitive accessibility. I argue that Block fails to make a compelling case for this general claim on the basis of the Sperling data
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84Blindsight, orgasm, and representational overlapBehavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2): 268-269. 1995.It is argued that there is no fallacy in the reasoning in the example of the thirsty blindsight subject, on one reconstruction of that reasoning. Neither the case of orgasm nor the case of a visual versus an auditory experience as of something overheard shows that phenomenal content is not representational.
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173Up close with the speckled henAnalysis 70 (2): 283-286. 2010.(No abstract is available for this citation).
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136Naturalism and the problem of intentionalityMidwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1): 122-42. 1994.
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153Reflections on Dennett and consciousness (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4): 891-6. 1993.
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468Absent qualia and the mind-body problemPhilosophical Review 115 (2): 139-168. 2006.At the very heart of the mind-body problem is the question of the nature of consciousness. It is consciousness, and in particular _phenomenal_ consciousness, that makes the mind-body relation so deeply perplexing. Many philosophers hold that no defi nition of phenomenal consciousness is possible: any such putative defi nition would automatically use the concept of phenomenal consciousness and thus render the defi nition circular. The usual view is that the concept of phenomenal consciousness is …Read more
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63The puzzle of Hesperus and PhosphorusAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 56 (3). 1978.This Article does not have an abstract
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164Is there a phenomenology of thought?In Tim Bayne & Michelle Montague (eds.), Cognitive Phenomenology, Oxford University Press. pp. 35. 2011.
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1Precis of Ten Problems of ConsciousnessIn John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology, Oxford University Press. 2003.
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133Seven Puzzles of Thought and How to Solve Them: An Originalist Theory of ConceptsOxford University Press. 2012.Sainsbury and Tye present a new theory, 'originalism', which provides natural, simple solutions to puzzles about thought that have troubled philosophers for centuries. They argue that concepts are to be individuated by their origin, rather than epistemically or semantically. Although thought is special, no special mystery attaches to its nature.
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93Is consciousness vague or arbitrary?Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3): 679-685. 1996.
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4Against the token identity theoryIn Brian P. McLaughlin & Ernest LePore (eds.), Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, Blackwell. 1985.
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260The admissible contents of visual experiencePhilosophical Quarterly 59 (236): 541-562. 2009.My purpose is to take a close look at the nature of visual content. I discuss the view that visual experiences have only existential contents, the view that visual experiences have either singular or gappy contents, and the view that visual experiences have multiple contents. I also consider a proposal about visual content inspired by Kaplan's well known theory of indexicals. I draw out some consequences of my discussion for the thesis of intentionalism with respect to the phenomenal character o…Read more
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5Christopher Peacocke, Sense and Content: Experience, Thought and Their Relations Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 5 (4): 173-175. 1985.
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1370Intentionalism and the Argument from No Common ContentPhilosophical Perspectives 21 (1): 589-613. 2007.Disjunctivists (Hinton 1973, Snowdon 1990, Martin 2002, 2006) often motivate their approach to perceptual experience by appealing in part to the claim that in cases of veridical perception, the subject is directly in contact with the perceived object. When I perceive a table, for example, there is no table-like sense-impression that stands as an intermediary between the table and me. Nor am I related to the table as I am to a deer when I see its footprint in the snow. I do not experience the tab…Read more