Lorenzo Peña

This paper deals with an (otherwise classical) two-(non-interacting) particle system immersed in a common stochastic zero-point radiation field. The treatment is an extension of the one-particle case for which it has been shown that the quantum properties of the particle emerge from its interaction with the background field under stationary and ergodic conditions. In the present case we show that non-classical correlations—describable only in terms of entanglement—arise between the (nearby) particles whenever both of them resonate to a common frequency of the field. For identical particles the entanglement becomes maximum and must be described by totally (anti)symmetric states

An analysis is briefly presented of the possible causes of the failure of stochastic electrodynamics (SED) when applied to systems with nonlinear forces, on the basis that the main principles of the theory are correct. In light of this analysis, an alternative approach to the theory is discussed, whose postulates allow to establish contact with quantum mechanics in a natural way. The ensuing theory, linear SED, confirms the essential role of the vacuum–particle interaction as the source of quantum phenomena.

We discuss the main results of Linear Stochastic Electrodynamics, starting from a reformulation of its basic assumptions. This theory shares with Stochastic Electrodynamics the core assumption that quantization comes about from the permanent interaction between matter and the vacuum radiation field, but it departs from it when it comes to considering the effect that this interaction has on the statistical properties of the nearby field. In the transition to the quantum regime, correlations between field modes of well-defined characteristic frequencies arise, which coincide with the transition frequencies of quantum mechanics and are therefore directly related with the energy quantization. The Heisenberg equations of motion of (non-relativistic) quantum electrodynamics are thus obtained. After a detailed consideration of the significance of the approximations made, we present a discussion on some of the most delicate or controversial features of quantum mechanics from the perspective provided by the present theory.

Three (apparent ) deontic antinomies are discussed: the paradoxes of the watchman and the praiser, as weIl as deontic dilemmas. A paraconsistent deontic logic, Ad, is put forward whose underlying 1st-order calculus is an infinite-valued tensorial logic. Several arguments are offered bearing out be existence of deontic contradictions, while two ways of dealing with conditional obligation paradoxes within the framework of Ad are canvassed. While the aggregation rule and the ought-implies-can principle are upheld, sundry schemata are shown not to obtain which involve iterated deontic operators (most conspicuously: that whatever ought to be obligatory is obligatory; and that it is obligatory that whatever ought to be the case should in fact be the case).

In his 1686 essay GI Leibniz undertook to reduce sentences to noun-phrases, truth to being. Such a reduction arose from his equating proof with conceptual analysis. Within limits Leibniz’s logical calculus provides a reasonable way of surmounting the dichotomy, thus allowing a reduction of hypothetical to categorical statements. However it yields the disastrous result that, whenever A is possible and so is B, there can be an entity being both A and B. Yet, Leibniz was in the GI the forerunner of 20th century combinatory logic, which (successfully!) practices - sometimes for reasons not entirely unlike Leibniz’s own grounds - reductions of the same kinds he tried to carry out.

The main claim of this paper is that the boundary between scientific and non scientific knowledge does exist -- which means several things. First, it's not the case that anything goes: some irrationalists have been mistaken into acceptance of that wrong conclusion because they have remarked that, however the boundary might be drawn, some important scientific developments would fall afoul of the standards entitling a research practice to count as scientific. Second, the boundary is not an imaginary one, that is to say besides what is scientific and what is unscientific there also is what lies at the boundary, certain research practices which are neither wholly scientific nor fully unscientific. Third, studying what is science is itself a kind of research belonging to the boundary, since the methods available in that research are not as strictly rigorous as those used in science proper; in fact, all of philosophy is included in the boundary in question. Fourth, the boundary (and in fact science itself) displays a characteristic structure pertaining to what are by now usually called «non wellfounded sets» -- sets, that is, which are somehow or other involved in themselves, whether as members, or as members of members or so on; the significance of the last thesis is that the best way of approaching philosophy of science is not standard set theory, but theories allowing non wellfounded sets are preferable. Fifth, and last, admission of the boundary's existence compels us to go beyond standard classical logic and to look for a more suitable logic, as for instance some kind of fuzzy paraconsistent logic.