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394The modified predicate theory of proper namesIn New Waves in Philosophy of Language, Palgrave-macmillan. pp. 206--225. 2009.This is a defence of the claim that names are predicates with a demonstrative element in their singular use.
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341Abstract Artifacts in PretencePhilosophical Papers 31 (2): 183-198. 2002.Abstract In this paper I criticise a recent account of fictional discourse proposed by Nathan Salmon. Salmon invokes abstract artifacts as the referents of fictional names in both object- and meta-fictional discourse alike. He then invokes a theory of pretence to forge the requisite connection between object-fictional sentences and meta-fictional sentences, in virtue of which the latter can be assigned appropriate truth-values. I argue that Salmon's account of pretence renders his appeal to abst…Read more
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440Is there a deductive argument for semantic externalism? Reply to Yli-VakkuriAnalysis 78 (4): 675-681. 2018.Juhani Yli-Vakkuri has argued that the Twin Earth thought experiments offered in favour of semantic externalism can be replaced by a straightforward deductive argument from premisses widely accepted by both internalists and externalists alike. The deductive argument depends, however, on premisses that, on standard formulations of internalism, cannot be satisfied by a single belief simultaneously. It does not therefore, constitute a proof of externalism. The aim of this article is to explain why.
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106In Defence of Burge's ThesisPhilosophical Studies 107 (2): 109-128. 2002.Burge's thesis is the thesis that certain second-order self-ascriptionsare self-verifying in virtue of their self-referential form. The thesis hasrecently come under attack on the grounds that it does not yield a theory ofself-knowledge consistent with semantic externalism, and also on the groundsthat it is false. In this paper I defend Burge's thesis against both charges,in particular against the arguments of Bernecker, Gallois and Goldberg. Thealleged counterexamples they provide are merely ap…Read more
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29Externalism, apriority and transmission of warrantIn Tomáš Marvan (ed.), What Determines Content?: The Internalism/Externalism Dispute, Cambridge Scholars Press. pp. 142-153. 2006.In this paper, I defend the compatibility of externalism and privileged access and argue that the warrant transmission succeeds in cases of armchair knowledge, but that it does not have the anti-sceptical consequences that it is typically thought to have.
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450Conceptual errors and social externalismPhilosophical Quarterly 53 (211): 265-273. 2003.Åsa Maria Wikforss has proposed a response to Burge's thought-experiments in favour of social externalism, one which allows the individualist to maintain that narrow content is truth-conditional without being idiosyncratic. The narrow aim of this paper is to show that Wikforss' argument against social externalism fails, and hence that the individualist position she endorses is inadequate. The more general aim is to attain clarity on the social externalist thesis. Social externalism need not rest…Read more
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26Reflecting on Content SkepticismSouthwest Philosophy Review 18 (2): 89-94. 2002.In this paper I argue that content externalism does not imply a form of content skepticism. In particular, I defend content externalism against William Larkin's argument that it engenders a form of content skepticism.
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43New waves in philosophy of language (edited book)Palgrave-Macmillan. 2010.A collection of papers to illustrate new waves in Philosophy of Language: "Linguistic Puzzles and Semantic Pretence" by B. Armour-Garb & J. Woodbridge; "Minimal Semantics and the Nature of Psychological Evidence" by E. Borg; "A Naturalistic Approach to the Philosophy of Language" by J. Collins; "In Praise of our Linguistic Intuitions" by A. Everett; "Phenomenal Continua and Secondary Properties" by P. Greenough; "Semantic Oughts in Context" by A. Hattiangadi; "Content Force and Semantic Norm…Read more
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475Contrastive self-knowledge and the McKinsey paradoxIn Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.), Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Skepticism: New Essays, Cambridge University Press. pp. 75-93. 2015.In this paper I argue first, that a contrastive account of self-knowledge and the propositional attitudes entails an anti-individualist account of propositional attitude concepts, second, that the final account provides a solution to the McKinsey paradox, and third, that the account has the resources to explain why certain anti-skeptical arguments fail.
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68The Epistemic DivideSouthern Journal of Philosophy 39 (3): 385-401. 2001.This paper concerns content externalism and privileged access. I argue that externally-individuated concepts are not just subject to a causal constraint, but are also subject t an epistemic constraint. Their possession requires not merely that certain background presuppositions be true but, further, that the subject be in possession of true justified beliefs concerning their referents.
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88Absences, presences and sufficient conditionsAnalysis 64 (4): 354-57. 2004.In this paper, I defend the claim that the determination conditions for thought must include absences.
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227An Externalist Account of Introspective KnowledgePacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (4): 358-378. 1999.The Content Skeptic argues that a subject could not have introspective knowledge of a thought whose content is individuated widely. This claim is incorrect, relying on the tacit assumption that introspective knowledge differs significantly from other species of knowledge. The paper proposes a reliabilist model for understanding introspective knowledge according to which introspective knowledge is simply another species of knowledge, and according to which claims to introspective knowledge are no…Read more
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254There is no viable notion of narrow contentIn Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, Blackwell. pp. 20-34. 2007.This is an attack on the very notion of narrow content. In particular, I argue against two-factor theories of mental content, Chalmers's epistemic two-dimensional account of narrow content and Segal's truth-conditional account of narrow content.
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54Contrastivism and anti-individualism: a response to Aikin and DabaySocial Epistemology Review and Reply Collective. 2014.In this paper I clarify my argument for the claim that contrastive self-knowledge entails anti-individualism.
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121The epistemological argument for content externalismPhilosophical Perspectives 19 (1): 257-280. 2005.The aim of this paper is to show that the truth of content externalism can be grounded in purely epistemological considerations in which no appeal is made to Twin‐Earth style cases. Content externalism is required to provide an adequate account of perceptual warrant.
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592Entitlement, opacity, and connectionIn Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Internalism and externalism in semantics and epistemology, Oxford University Press. pp. 131. 2007.This paper looks at the debates between internalism and externalism in mind and epistemology. In each realm, internalists face what we call 'The Connection Problem', while externalists face what we call 'The Problem of Opacity'. We offer an integrated account of thought content and epistemic warrant that overcomes the problems. We then apply the framework to debates between internalists and externalists in metaethics.
Areas of Specialization
3 more
Conceptual Engineering |
Philosophy of Mind |
Content Internalism and Externalism |
Object-Dependent Contents |
Social Epistemology |
Names |
Reference |
Fregean Sense |
Areas of Interest
Content Internalism and Externalism |
Conceptual Engineering |