Anthony Savile

[Richard Glauser] Shaftesbury's theory of aesthetic experience is based on his conception of a natural disposition to apprehend beauty, a real 'form' of things. I examine the implications of the disposition's naturalness. I argue that the disposition is not an extra faculty or a sixth sense, and attempt to situate Shaftesbury's position on this issue between those of Locke and Hutcheson. I argue that the natural disposition is to be perfected in many different ways in order to be exercised in the perception of the different degrees of beauty within Shaftesbury's hierarchy. This leads to the conclusion that the exercise of the disposition depends, from case to case, on many different cognitive and affective conditions, that are realised by the collaborative functionings of our ordinary faculties. Essential to Shaftesbury's conception of aesthetic experience is a disinterested, contemplative love, that causes what we may call a 'disinterested pleasure', but also an interested pleasure. I argue that, within any given aesthetic experience, the role of the disinterested pleasure is secondary to that of the disinterested love. However, an important function of the disinterested pleasure is that, in combination with the interested pleasure, it leads one to aspire to pass from the aesthetic experience of lower degrees of beauty to the experience of higher ones in the hierarchy. /// [Anthony Savile] If Shaftesbury is to be seen as the doyen of modern aesthetics, his most valuable legacy to us may not so much be his viewing aesthetic response as a sui generis disinterested delight as his insistence on its turning 'wholly on [experience of] what is exterior and foreign to ourselves'. Not that we cannot experience ourselves, or what is our own, as a source of such admiration. Rather our responses, favourable or no, are improperly grounded in any essentially reflexive, or first-personal, ways of taking what engages us. The suggestion is tested against the case of Narcissus. Glauser interestingly emphasizes Shaftesbury's neo-Platonic conception of a hierarchy of aesthetic experience that culminates in the joyful contemplation of God. That hierarchy must be something that is less unitary and systematic than Shaftesbury himself had supposed, even when his emphasis on the tie between aesthetic pleasure and contemplative experience is allowed to extend beyond perception and to encompass episodes of thought itself.

Nous ecartons ici deux tentatives visant a rendre compte de l’irrationalite de l’action akratique au sein du systeme de Spinoza: celle contenue dans Spinoza meme et une seconde toute recente, due a della Rocca, qui pretend parler au nom de Spinoza. Nous tracons a larges traits une troisieme voie, laquelle n’est pas manifestement en porte-a-faux avec les principes de la psychologie morale de Spinoza. Cette tentative tourne autour d’une conception du conatus integrant un element normatif et subjectif, soit le besoin de former un moi structure de facon stable. Sans ce dernier, le plus grand bien que les humains soient susceptible d’atteindre, l’acquiescientia in se ipso, serait en fait irrealisable. Concevoir ainsi le conatus donne la latitude dont Spinoza a besoin pour representer le desir irresistible que concoit Medee pour Jason comme contre-conatif et celle dont Medee a besoin pour en etre elle-meme pleinement consciente