Yong Huang

Apolipoprotein E4 is the major genetic risk factor for Alzheimer's disease. ApoE4 has sex-dependent effects, whereby the risk of developing AD is higher in apoE4-expressing females than males. However, the mechanism underlying the sex difference, in relation to apoE4, is unknown. Previous findings indicate that apoE4 causes age-dependent impairments of hilar GABAergic interneurons in female mice, leading to learning and memory deficits. Here, we investigate whether the detrimental effects of apoE4 on hilar GABAergic interneurons are sex-dependent using apoE knock-in mice across different ages. We found that in female apoE-KI mice, there was an age-dependent depletion of hilar GABAergic interneurons, whereby GAD67- or somatostatin-positive-but not NPY- or parvalbumin-positive-interneuron loss was exacerbated by apoE4. Loss of these neuronal populations was correlated with the severity of spatial learning deficits at 16 months of age in female apoE4-KI mice; however, this effect was not observed in female apoE3-KI mice. In contrast, we found an increase in the numbers of hilar GABAergic interneurons with advancing age in male apoE-KI mice, regardless of apoE genotype. Moreover, male apoE-KI mice showed a consistent ratio of hilar inhibitory GABAergic interneurons to excitatory mossy cells approximating 1.5 that is independent of apoE genotype and age, whereas female apoE-KI mice exhibited an age-dependent decrease in this ratio, which was exacerbated by apoE4. Interestingly, there are no apoE genotype effects on GABAergic interneurons in the CA1 and CA3 subregions of the hippocampus as well as the entorhinal and auditory cortexes. These findings suggest that the sex-dependent effects of apoE4 on developing AD is in part attributable to inherent sex-based differences in the numbers of hilar GABAergic interneurons, which is further modulated by apoE genotype. © 2012 Leung et al.

Apolipoprotein E4 is the leading genetic risk factor for Alzheimer's disease, and it has a gene dose-dependent effect on the risk and age of onset of AD. Although apoE4 is primarily produced by astrocytes in the brain, neurons can also produce apoE4 under stress conditions. ApoE4 is known to inhibit neurite outgrowth and spine development in vitro and in vivo, but the potential influence of apoE4's cellular source on dendritic arborization and spine development has not yet been investigated. In this study, we report impairments in dendritic arborization and a loss of spines, especially thin and mushroom spines, in the hippocampus and entorhinal cortex of 19-21-month-old female neuron-specific-enolase -apoE4 and apoE4-knockin mice compared to their respective apoE3-expressing counterparts. In general, NSE-apoE4 mice had more severe and widespread deficits in dendritic arborization as well as spine density and morphology than apoE4-KI mice. The loss of dendritic spines, especially mushroom spines, occurred in NSE-apoE4 mice as early as 7-8 months of age. In contrast, glial fibrillary acidic protein -apoE4 mice, which express apoE4 solely in astrocytes, did not have impairments in their dendrite arborization or spine density and morphology compared to GFAP-apoE3 mice at both ages. These results indicate that the effects of apoE4 on dendrite arborization, spine density, and spine morphology depend critically on its cellular source, with neuronal apoE4 having more detrimental effects than astrocytic apoE4. © 2013 Jain et al.

© 2016 American Chemical Society.Layered transition metal chalcogenides with large spin orbit coupling have recently sparked much interest due to their potential applications for electronic, optoelectronic, spintronics, and valleytronics. However, most current understanding of the electronic structure near band valleys in momentum space is based on either theoretical investigations or optical measurements, leaving the detailed band structure elusive. For example, the exact position of the conduction band valley of bulk MoS2 remains controversial. Here, using angle-resolved photoemission spectroscopy with submicron spatial resolution, we systematically imaged the conduction/valence band structure evolution across representative chalcogenides MoS2, WS2, and WSe2, as well as the thickness dependent electronic structure from bulk to the monolayer limit. These results establish a solid basis to understand the underlying valley physics of these materials, and also provide a link between chalcogenide electronic band structure and their physical properties for potential valleytronics applications.

Background: Pulsed dye laser is the gold standard for treatment of port-wine stain birthmarks but multiple treatments are required and complete resolution is often not achieved. Posttreatment vessel recurrence is thought to be a factor that limits efficacy of PDL treatment of PWS. Imiquimod 5% cream is an immunomodulator with antiangiogenic effects. Objective: We sought to determine if application of imiquimod 5% cream after PDL improves treatment outcome. Methods: Healthy individuals with PWS were treated with PDL and then randomized to apply posttreatment placebo or imiquimod 5% cream for 8 weeks. Chromameter measurements for 57 PWS sites were taken at baseline and compared with measurements taken 8 weeks posttreatment. The Δa and ΔE were measured to quantify treatment outcome. Results: Two patients developed minor skin irritation. Other adverse effects were not noted. Average a was 0.43 for PDL + placebo sites and 1.27 for PDL + imiquimod sites indicating a greater reduction in erythema with imiquimod. Average E was 2.59 for PDL + placebo and 4.08 for PDL + imiquimod, again indicating a greater color improvement with imiquimod. Limitations: Effects were evaluated after a single treatment and duration of effect is unknown. Conclusion: Combined selective photothermolysis and antiangiogenic therapy may enhance PWS treatment efficacy. © 2011 by the American Academy of Dermatology, Inc.

Background and Objective: During laser therapy of port wine stain birthmarks, regions of perfusionmay persist. We hypothesize that such regions are not readily observable even when laser surgery is performed by highly experienced clinicians. The objective of this study was to use objective feedback to assess the acute vascular response to laser therapy. Study Design/Materials and Methods: A clinic-friendly laser speckle imaging instrument was developed to provide the clinician with real-time images of blood flow during laser therapy. Images were acquired from patients undergoing laser therapy of PWS birthmarks at Scripps Clinic and the Beckman Laser Institute and Medical Clinic. Blood flow maps were extracted from the acquired imaging data. Histogram-based analysis was applied in grading the degree of heterogeneity present in the blood flow maps after laser therapy. Results: Collectively, two types of patient responses were observed in response to laser exposure: an immediate increase in perfusion within minutes after laser therapy; and an overall decrease in blood perfusion ∼1 hour after laser therapy, with distinct regions of persistent perfusion apparent in the majority of post-treatment blood-flow images. A comparison of blood flow in PWS and adjacent normal skin demonstrated that PWS blood flow can be greater than, or sometimes equivalent to, that of normal skin. Conclusion: In general, a decrease in skin perfusion is observed during pulsed laser therapy of PWS birthmarks. However, a heterogeneous perfusion map was frequently observed. These regions of persistent perfusion may be due to incomplete photocoagulation of the targeted vessels. We hypothesize that immediate retreatment of these regions identified with LSI, will result in enhanced removal of the PWS vasculature. © 2009 Wiley-Liss, Inc.

Explores the resources for contemporary ethics found in the work of the Cheng brothers, canonical neo-Confucian philosophers. Yong Huang presents a new way of doing comparative philosophy as he demonstrates the resources for contemporary ethics offered by the Cheng brothers, Cheng Hao (1032–1085) and Cheng Yi (1033–1107), canonical neo-Confucian philosophers. Huang departs from the standard method of Chinese/Western comparison, which tends to interest those already interested in Chinese philosophy. While Western-oriented scholars may be excited to learn about Chinese philosophers who have said things similar to what they or their favored philosophers have to say, they hardly find anything philosophically new from such comparative work. Instead of comparing and contrasting philosophers, each chapter of this book discusses a significant topic in Western moral philosophy, examines the representative views on this topic in the Western tradition, identifies their respective difficulties, and discusses how the Cheng brothers have better things to say on the subject. Topics discussed include why one should be moral, how weakness of will is not possible, whether virtue ethics is self-centered, in what sense the political is also personal, how a moral theory can be of an antitheoretical nature, and whether moral metaphysics is still possible in this postmodern and postmetaphysical age. “This book presents the philosophical ideas of the Cheng brothers intelligently, convincingly, and powerfully. It is among the best books ever written on the Cheng brothers, including works in the Chinese language.” — Kam-por Yu, coeditor of Taking Confucian Ethics Seriously: Contemporary Theories and Applications.

It has been widely observed that virtue ethics, regarded as an ethics of the ancient, in contrast to deontology and consequentialism, seen as an ethics of the modern (Larmore 1996: 19–23), is experiencing an impressive revival and is becoming a strong rival to utilitarianism and deontology in the English-speaking world in the last a few decades. Despite this, it has been perceived as having an obvious weakness in comparison with its two major rivals. While both utilitarianism and deontology can at the same time serve as an ethical theory, providing guidance for individual persons and a political philosophy, offering ways to structure social institutions, virtue ethics, as it is concerned with character traits of individual persons, seems to be ill-equipped to be politically useful. In recent years, some attempts have been made to develop the so-called virtue politics, but most of them, including my own (see Huang 2014: Chapter 5), are limited to arguing for the perfectionist view that the state has the obligation to do things to help its members develop their virtues, and so the focus is still on the character traits of individual persons. However important those attempts are, such a notion of virtue politics is clearly too narrow, unless one thinks that the only job the state is supposed to do is to cultivate its people’s virtues. Yet obviously the government has many other jobs to do such as making laws and social policies, many if not most of which are not for the purpose of making people virtuous. The question is then in what sense such laws and social policies are moral in general and just in particular. Utilitarianism and deontology have their ready answers in the light of utility or moral principles respectively. Can virtue ethics provide its own answer? This paper attempts to argue for an affirmative answer to this question from the Confucian point of view, as represented by Mencius. It does so with a focus on the virtue of justice, as it is a central concept in both virtue ethics and political philosophy.

The development of Confucianism has most frequently been divided into three periods: the classical period from Pre‐Qin to Han dynasty, the neo‐Confucian period in (Tang) Song, Yuan, Ming, and Qing dynasties, and contemporary new Confucianism in the 20th and 21st centuries. This chapter is devoted to the third period. If neo‐Confucianism can be seen as a Confucian response to challenges posed by Buddhism, contemporary new Confucianism is a Confucian response to the challenge posed by modern Western ideology. If what is unique about the neo‐Confucian response is to provide a metaphysical foundation for or explanation of classical Confucian values, what is unique about the contemporary Confucian response is its attempt to show that traditional Confucian values and such modern Western values as rationality, modernity, science, and democracy, among others are not only compatible but can also significantly enrich each other.

In this chapter, we examine the neo-Confucian Cheng Brothers’ Mencian hermeneutics in two senses. On the one hand, we show that they adopt a Mencian hermeneutics in their approach to Confucian classics, which gives the priority to the fundamental principles underlining a classic over its literal meaning. On the other hand, to illustrate this Mencius hermeneutics, we focus on Cheng Brothers’ interpretations of the Mencius. Thus, in contrast to the common criticism of Cheng Brothers’ hermeneutics in particular and neo-Confucian hermeneutics in Song and Ming dynasties in general, especially by some Confucians in Qing dynasty, that it tends to impose their own philosophical ideas upon the text of Mencius while ignoring clear textual evidence, we argue that the Cheng Brothers’ interpretations of the Mencius is indeed authentically Mencian.

Toleration has been almost universally regarded as an indispensable virtue one ought to have when encountering people of races, religions, languages, cultures, genders, and sexual orientations different from one’s own. This is unfortunate, however, because toleration includes objection as one of its necessary components: to tolerate an object means to have objection to it though without interfering with it. However, it is wrong to think we have, and it is wrong for us to have, objection to people simply because of their races, religions, languages, cultures, genders, and sextual orientations different from us. The proper virtue we ought to cultivate in this context is respect as advocated in the Zhuangzi, which is fundamentally different from respect that has sometimes been associated with the very conception of toleration.

A major figure in the Anglo-American analytic tradition, Ernest Sosa is a pioneer of contemporary virtue epistemology. Engaging with his important work for the first time, a team of renowned scholars of Chinese philosophy bring Western analytic epistemology into dialogue with themes and issues in the history of the Chinese tradition in order to reveal multiple points of connection. Drawing on thinkers and texts from Confucianism, Daoism and Chinese Buddhism, chapters explore issues central to virtue epistemology, such as the reliabilist and responsibilist divide, the distinction between virtues constitutive of knowledge and virtues auxiliary to knowledge, epistemic competence and the role of testimony. Including Sosa's constructive and systematic responses to each scholar's interpretation of his work, this volume demonstrates the value of cross-cultural dialogue, advancing the field of virtue epistemology and paving the way for further engagement between philosophical traditions.

Abstract:Tu develops his idea of tizhi 体知 primarily or at least initially to characterize the Neo-Confucian idea of knowledge of/as virtue in contrast to knowledge from hearing and seeing. Instead of depending upon our sense organs' perceptions of external things and events, it relies upon the comprehension of our xin; instead of purely intellectual understanding of the mind aspect of xin, it is more due to the affective experiences of the heart aspect of xin; and instead of merely a piece of knowledge added to its possessor, it is existentially transformative of its possessor. Knowledge of such a nature can be accounted for neither by our traditional conception of knowledge as justified true belief nor by Ryle's knowing-how. It is a third type of knowledge, knowing-to. In this sense, it is a significant contribution that Tu's Confucian idea can make to contemporary epistemology.

I have been developing an ethics that I initially identified in the text of the Zhuangzi and which I have characterized in different ways under different names. First, in contrast to the moral Golden Rule, which asks us to do unto others as we would like to have done unto us, I call it the moral Copper Rule: do unto others as they would like to have done unto them. Second, in contrast to the ethics of commonality, I call it ethics of difference. Ethics of Commonality is a general term I use to include the moral Golden Rule, Kantian ethics, and even Rorty’s anti-Kantian ethics...

This book debates the values and ideals of Confucian politics—harmony, virtue, freedom, justice, order—and what these ideals mean for Confucian political philosophy today. The authors deliberate these eminent topics in five debates centering on recent innovative and influential publications in the field. Challenging and building on those works, the dialogues consider the roles of benevolence, family determination, public reason, distributive justice, and social stability in Confucian political philosophy. In response, the authors defend their views and evaluate their critics in turn. Taking up a broad range of crucial issues—autonomy, liberty, democracy, political legitimacy, human welfare—these author-meets-critic debates will appeal to scholars interested in political, comparative, and East Asian philosophy. Their interlaced themes weave a portrait of what is at stake in discussing Confucian values and theory. Most importantly, they engage and develop the state of the field of Confucian political philosophy today.

Although there are various studies comparing Greek and Indian philosophy and religion, and Chinese and Western philosophy and religion, Brahman and Dao: Comparatives Studies in Indian and Chinese Philosophy and Religion is a first of its kind that brings together Indian and Chinese philosophies and religions. Brahman and Dao helps close the gap on a much needed examination on the rich history of Buddhist transmission to China, and the many generations of Indian Buddhist missionaries to China and Chinese Buddhist pilgrims to India, including the legendary Bodhidharma, and Faxian and Xuanzang

This paper addresses one of the three main themes of Neville's The Goodness Is One, Its Manifestations Many: Whether Confucian ethics can be appropriately characterized as a virtue ethics. It first examines some unique features of virtues ethics, concluding that Confucian ethics may be plausibly regarded as a virtue ethics. Then it shows that virtue ethics is immune to the two diseases that Neville worries about: subjectivism and individualism. Finally, it argues that what Neville regards as salient features of Confucian ethics, (1) situationism, (2) attention to knowledge and skills beyond virtues, and (3) consequentialism of principle, can all be kept intact when it is characterized as a virtue ethics.

It has been widely observed that virtue ethics, regarded as an ethics of the ancient, in contrast to deontology and consequentialism, seen as an ethics of the modern (Larmore 1996: 19–23), is experiencing an impressive revival and is becoming a strong rival to utilitarianism and deontology in the English-speaking world in the last a few decades. Despite this, it has been perceived as having an obvious weakness in comparison with its two major rivals. While both utilitarianism and deontology can at the same time serve as an ethical theory, providing guidance for individual persons and a political philosophy, offering ways to structure social institutions, virtue ethics, as it is concerned with character traits of individual persons, seems to be ill-equipped to be politically useful. In recent years, some attempts have been made to develop the so-called virtue politics, but most of them, including my own (see Huang 2014: Chapter 5), are limited to arguing for the perfectionist view that the state has the obligation to do things to help its members develop their virtues, and so the focus is still on the character traits of individual persons. However important those attempts are, such a notion of virtue politics is clearly too narrow, unless one thinks that the only job the state is supposed to do is to cultivate its people’s virtues. Yet obviously the government has many other jobs to do such as making laws and social policies, many if not most of which are not for the purpose of making people virtuous. The question is then in what sense such laws and social policies are moral in general and just in particular. Utilitarianism and deontology have their ready answers in the light of utility or moral principles respectively. Can virtue ethics provide its own answer? This paper attempts to argue for an affirmative answer to this question from the Confucian point of view, as represented by Mencius. It does so with a focus on the virtue of justice, as it is a central concept in both virtue ethics and political philosophy.

Zhu Xi has been commonly and justifiably recognized as the most influential philosopher of Neo-Confucianism, a revival of classical Confucianism in face of the challenges coming from Daoism and, more importantly, Buddhism. His place in the Confucian tradition is often and also very plausibly compared to that of Thomas Aquinas, slightly later, in the Christian tradition. This book presents the most comprehensive and updated study of this great philosopher. It situates Zhu Xi’s philosophy in the historical context of not only Confucian philosophy but also Chinese philosophy as a whole. Topics covered within Zhu Xi’s thought are metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, political philosophy, hermeneutics, philosophy of religion, moral psychology, and moral education. This text shows both how Zhu Xi responded to earlier thinkers and how his thoughts resonate in contemporary philosophy, particularly in the analytic tradition. This companion will appeal to students, researchers and educators in the field.