David K. Chan

In this paper, I discuss an example from Buchanan of active voluntary euthanasia (AVE). I first refute objections to the intuitive permissibility of the killing described in the example. After explaining why the killing is intentional, I evaluate Buchanan's solution to the ‘problem of intending death’. According to Buchanan, what justifies a physician in intentionally bringing about a patient's death by AVE is a principle that embodies the values of patient self-determination and well-being. I argue that these two considerations are not sufficient for justifying AVE. The motive of the physician matters, but it is his desire rather than his intention that is relevant. An ethical physician may bring about intentionally the death of his patient if in forming his intention, he began with an appropriate desire to keep the patient alive as well as a legitimate desire to prevent prolonged suffering, with the latter outweighing the former. The ethical physician also desires to respect the choice of his patient wherever possible. On my account, the physician should be guided by the virtues and goals of his profession rather than by strict ‘all-or-nothing’ principles. I defend my account by describing the advantages of my account, and dismissing possible objections.

The ethics of gene patenting is concerned with whether human genes are the kind of thing that is appropriate for patenting, and whether it is ethical to do so. Is genetic technology a special case compared to other medical technology that have been patented? Much of the debate has revolved around the benefits and harms of allowing gene sequences to be patented. In this paper, I am concerned with a non-consequential consideration: Can someone patent my genes? If genes are the common property of humankind, are genes patentable? I present an objection to the patenting of processes used to manipulate our genes that have the potential to change human nature. Should not all members of the human species have a say regarding genetic engineering that can be used to irreversibly change what makes each one a human? I conclude with an examination of how genetic research may be democratically controlled.

The supreme emergency exemption proposed by Michael Walzer has engendered controversy because it permits violations of the jus in bello principle of discrimination when a state is faced with imminent defeat at the hands of a very evil enemy. Traditionalists among just war theorists believe that noncombatants should never be deliberately targeted in war whether or not there is a supreme emergency. Pacifists on the other hand reject war as immoral even in a supreme emergency. Unlike Walzer, neither just war traditionalists nor pacifists make a special case for supreme emergencies. In this paper, I borrow Walzer’s concept to provide support for a different ethics of war that limits war to supreme emergencies. In non-supreme emergency situations, I agree with pacifists in rejecting war even if just war requirements are satisfied. But in supreme emergencies, I agree with just war traditionalists that war can be legitimately fought provided that moral constraints that protect noncombatants are respected.

The Simple View (SV) holds that for someone to intentionally A, he must intend to A. Critics of SV point to intentional actions which, due to belief-conditions or consistency constraints, agents cannot intend. By recognizing species of intention which vary according to the agent's confidence in acting, I argue that the stringency of consistency constraints depends on the agent's confidence. A more sophisticated SV holds that the species of intending is related to the degree of intentionality of the action. Finally, I show that where agents do what they believe impossible, without intending to do so, the action is not intentional.

Warren Quinn and Philippa Foot have given versions of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing justifying a moral distinction between doing something to bring about harm, and doing nothing to prevent harm. They argue that it is justified to allow one person to die so that one can save a larger number of people, but not to kill one person to achieve the same purpose. In this chapter, I show that the examples typically used to support the DDA do not in fact do so. Contrary to the deontological ethics supported by the DDA, I argue that it can be justified to minimize harm by killing a smaller number of people, in preference to letting a greater number die. But unlike for the consequentialist, my position is that the distinction between killing and letting die does have moral significance. I shall examine what other non-consequentialist considerations, besides the appeal to positive and negative rights, could account for the distinction; and suggest a middle position between the deontological and consequentialist approaches to the ethics of killing.

There are two contrasting paradigms for dealing with terrorists: war and law enforcement. In this paper, I first discuss how the just war theory assesses the military response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States. I argue that the ethical problems with the U.S. attack on Afghanistan in response to 9/11 concern principles of jus ad bellum besides just cause. I show that the principles of right intention, last resort, proportionality and likelihood of success were violated. Furthermore, both jus in bello principles of proportionality and discrimination were not satisfied in targeting terrorists in places where civilians not linked to them live. The law enforcement that takes place in liberal democracies is fully respectful and protective of innocent lives. Crime is dealt with by apprehending lawbreakers and putting them on trial if possible, and by keeping criminal elements on the loose away from potential victims. Good law enforcement also includes acting to remove causes of crime. I examine how this model applies to the problem of terrorism and address objections concerning the impossibility ofeliminating terrorism, the slowness of success, and the possibility that there are “nut cases” who hate America no matter what.

The aim of the paper is to show that there are actions which are non-intentional. An account is first given which links intentional and unintentional action to acting for a reason, or appropriate causation by an intention. Mannerisms and habitual actions are then presented as examples of behavior which are actions, but which are not done in the course of acting for a reason. This account has advantages over that of Hursthouse's "arational actions," which are allegedly intentional actions done for no reason at all. Finally, one consequence of neglecting non-intentional action is discussed to illustrate its importance.