-
376Age change in healthcare settings: a reply to Lippert-Rasmussen and PetersenJournal of Medical Ethics 46 (9): 636-637. 2020.Lippert-Rasmussen and Petersen discuss my ‘Moral case for legal age change’ in their article ‘Age change, official age and fairness in health’. They argue that in important healthcare settings (such as distributing vital organs for dying patients), the state should treat people on the basis of their chronological age because chronological age is a better proxy for what matters from the point of view of justice than adjusted official age. While adjusted legal age should not be used in deciding wh…Read more
-
786Arguments about Abortion: Personhood Morality and Law, written by Kate Greasley (review)Journal of Moral Philosophy 16 (4): 521-523. 2019.
-
599Schrödinger’s FetusMedicine, Health Care and Philosophy 23 (1): 125-130. 2020.This paper defends and develops Elizabeth Harman’s Actual Future Principle with a concept called Schrödinger’s Fetus. I argue that all early fetuses are Schrödinger’s Fetuses: those early fetuses that survive and become conscious beings have full moral status already as early fetuses, but those fetuses that die as early fetuses lack moral status. With Schrödinger’s Fetus, it becomes possible to accept two widely held but contradictory intuitions to be true, and to avoid certain reductiones ad ab…Read more
-
407Further defence of legal age change: a reply to the criticsJournal of Medical Ethics 45 (7): 471-472. 2019.In ‘Moral case for legal age change’, I argue that sometimes people should be allowed to change their age. I refute six immediate objections against the view that age change is permissible. I argue that the objections cannot show that legal age change should always be prohibited. In this paper, I consider some further objections against legal age change raised by Iain Brassington, Toni Saad and William Simkulet. I argue that the objections fail to show that age change should never be allowed.
-
5173Moral Case for Legal Age ChangeJournal of Medical Ethics 45 (7): 461-464. 2019.Should a person who feels his legal age does not correspond with his experienced age be allowed to change his legal age? In this paper, I argue that in some cases people should be allowed to change their legal age. Such cases would be when: 1) the person genuinely feels his age differs significantly from his chronological age and 2) the person’s biological age is recognized to be significantly different from his chronological age and 3) age change would likely prevent, stop or reduce ageism, dis…Read more
-
1325Why pro‐life arguments still are not convincing: A reply to my criticsBioethics 32 (9): 628-633. 2018.I argued in ‘Pro‐life arguments against infanticide and why they are not convincing’ that arguments presented by pro‐life philosophers are mistaken and cannot show infanticide to be immoral. Several scholars have offered responses to my arguments. In this paper, I reply to my critics: Daniel Rodger, Bruce P. Blackshaw and Clinton Wilcox. I also reply to Christopher Kaczor. I argue that pro‐life arguments still are not convincing.
-
2181Ectogenesis, abortion and a right to the death of the fetusBioethics 31 (9): 697-702. 2017.Many people believe that the abortion debate will end when at some point in the future it will be possible for fetuses to develop outside the womb. Ectogenesis, as this technology is called, would make possible to reconcile pro-life and pro-choice positions. That is because it is commonly believed that there is no right to the death of the fetus if it can be detached alive and gestated in an artificial womb. Recently Eric Mathison and Jeremy Davis defended this position, by arguing against three…Read more
-
2720Pro‐Life Arguments Against Infanticide and Why they are Not ConvincingBioethics 30 (9): 656-662. 2016.Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva's controversial article ‘After-Birth Abortion: Why Should the Baby Live?’ has received a lot of criticism since its publishing. Part of the recent criticism has been made by pro-life philosopher Christopher Kaczor, who argues against infanticide in his updated book ‘Ethics of Abortion’. Kaczor makes four arguments to show where Giubilini and Minerva's argument for permitting infanticide goes wrong. In this article I argue that Kaczor's arguments, and some …Read more
Turku, Finland
Areas of Specialization
Applied Ethics |
Biomedical Ethics |
Medical Ethics |
Reproductive Ethics |
Sexual Ethics |
Areas of Interest
Applied Ethics |
Biomedical Ethics |
Medical Ethics |
Reproductive Ethics |
Sexual Ethics |