Cesare Cozzo

Chi ha l'abitudine di sfogliare le riviste filosofiche sa che "metafisica" non è più una parola che scotta. I maestri dell'inizio del secolo (gli empiristi logici sono l'esempio più tipico) identificarono la metafisica con il non-senso e usarono la parola come un marchio di infamia. Non mancavano precedenti nella storia della filosofia. Ma oggi gli allievi di quei maestri preferiscono rifarsi ad un uso diverso, meno fazioso, del termine per indicare con esso un'indagine filosofica, che non solo non deve essere trascurata, ma concerne i fondamenti di molte altre ricerche, ed è quindi per molti versi centrale.

In his book Perché ancora la filosofia Carlo Cellucci argues that truth does not play any role in (modern) science: truth is only a chimera that prevents us «from adequately understanding the character of knowledge» and therefore «must be disposed of». I summarize Cellucci’s evidence for his contention that truth is a chimera. I then raise four objections to Cellucci’s views on truth. My conclusion is that, Cellucci’s arguments notwithstanding, a notion of truth is necessary for the human activity of problem solving and therefore for an adequate understanding of the phenomenon of knowledge.

There are various proposals for a general characterization of holism1. In this paper I propose the following: a variety of holism is the view that every X of an appropriate kind, which is part of a relevant whole W, cannot be legitimately separated or taken in isolation from W. Then, I distinguish two general kinds of holism, depending on two different reasons which can debar us from taking X in isolation from W. One reason can be that separating X from W always amounts to transforming X into something else. Correspondingly, a strong holism is the view that if the whole W is modified anywhere, X ceases to be X and becomes something else. Another reason why it may be illegitimate to consider X in isolation from W can be that if we separate X from W, nothing that we know entitles us to exclude that X might be transformed into something else. Correspondingly, virtual holism is the view that if the whole W is modified anywhere, we can never rule out that X ceases to be X and becomes something else.

Professor Von Wright is a prominent analytical philosopher who has written about the very notion of analytical philosophy. Other analytical philosophers are present here and they have their ideas on this notion. As for me, I believe that it is not at all an obvious notion. Sometimes it seemed to me that analytical philosophy does not exist, or at least that there is no single common feature shared by all so-called analytical philosophers and only by them, though there are many family resemblances. Therefore I thought I might take the opportunity of this meeting in honour of Professor Von Wright and propose as one of our themes for discussion, precisely the question: “what is analytical philosophy?”. The natural start is Professor Von Wright’s description of analytical philosophy.