-
64The Fall and HypertimeOxford University Press. 2014.Hud Hudson shows that apparently irreconcilable conflicts between science and religion often turn out to be misdescribed battles about negotiable philosophical assumptions. He defends an original Hypertime Hypothesis which reconciles the Christian doctrines of The Fall and Original Sin with reigning scientific orthodoxy
-
65Review of Theodore Sider, Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2002 (6). 2002.
-
4Fission, Freedom, and the FallIn Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion: Volume 2, Oxford University Press Uk. 2009.
-
88A true, necessary falsehoodAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (1). 1999.This Article does not have an abstract
-
20I. Familiar Characterizations of SculptureIn Christy Mag Uidhir (ed.), Art & Abstract Objects, Oxford University Press. pp. 223. 2013.
-
59Van Inwagen on Time Travel and Changing the PastOxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 5 5 41. 2010.
-
257A materialist metaphysics of the human personCornell University Press. 2001.Introduction In the first four chapters of this book, I develop and defend a monistic account of human persons according to which human persons are highly ...
-
73Reply to Parsons, Reply to Heller, and Reply to Rea (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2): 452-470. 2008.
-
35Feinberg on the Criterion of Moral PersonhoodJournal of Applied Philosophy 13 (3): 311-318. 1996.In a very influential paper, Abortion, Joel Feinberg offers a series of arguments against four popular proposals for the criterion of moral personhood and defends a fifth proposal. In this paper, I demonstrate that two widely‐accepted arguments employed by Feinberg against the modified species criterion and the strict potentiality criterion, respectively, are unsound. Moreover, I argue that there is a general feature of his inquiry into the criteria for moral personhood which undermines his effo…Read more
-
126Temporal parts and moral personhoodPhilosophical Studies 93 (3): 299-316. 1999.Three Dimensionalists and Four Dimensionalists are engaged in a debate on the topics of persistence and mereology. In this paper, I explore implications of Four Dimensionalism for the formulation of the criterion of personhood and on the question of which individuals satisfy that criterion. In my discussion I argue that the Four Dimensionalist has reason to identify a human person with a proper part of a human organism, and that the Four Dimensionalist has reason to believe that if there is some…Read more
-
34Science, Skepticism, Scripture, and Supertasks: Replies to Torrance, Deng, Madueme, Goldschmidt and LebensJournal of Analytic Theology 5 637-659. 2017.ㅤ
-
37On constitution and all-fusionsPacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (3). 2000.Recently, Judith Jarvis Thomson has offered a definition of the constitution relation against the backdrop of a robust ontology of objects she calls all‐fusions. Despite finding her reasons to believe in all manner of all‐fusions intriguing, in this paper I note an unsatisfactory consequence of her position for constitution‐theorists. I argue that an unrestricted commitmentto all‐fusions should lead the constitution‐theorist to reject her definitionof the constitution relation, on the grounds th…Read more
-
Jürgen Habermas. "Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action" (review)Journal of Speculative Philosophy 9 (1): 74. 1995.
-
61Temporally Incongruent CounterpartsPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2): 337-343. 2004.Despite its first page this paper is not yet another piece on Kant! Rather, the paper is a contribution to the literature on incongruent counterparts. Specifically, it concerns the question of whether we can construct a temporal version of the puzzle of incongruent counterparts—a question which (as far as 1 can tell) has been thoroughly neglected. I maintain that we can construct such a version of the puzzle, and that this temporal variant on the phenomenon has something to teach us about popula…Read more
-
8I am not an animalIn Peter van Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Persons: Human and Divine, Oxford University Press. pp. 216--34. 2007.
Bellingham, Washington, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Religion |
Metaphysics |
17th/18th Century Philosophy |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Religion |
17th/18th Century Philosophy |
Aesthetics |
Normative Ethics |