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10Freedom, Forgetting, and Solidarity: A Response to GinevIn Giovanni Galizia & David Schulman (eds.), Forgetting: An Interdisciplinary Conversation, The Hebrew University Magnes Press. pp. 244-246. 2015.This is a brief, invited response to Dimitri Ginev's chapter "Narrating the Self and Narrative Technologies of Forgetting"
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137Popper's CommunitarianismIn Zuzana Parusniková & Robert S. Cohen (eds.), Rethinking Popper (Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 272), Springer. pp. 287--303. 2009.In this chapter, I argue that Karl Popper was a communitarian philosopher. This will surprise some readers. Liberals often tout Popper as one of their champions. Indeed, there is no doubt that Popper shared much in common with liberals. However, I will argue that Popper rejected a central, though perhaps not essential, pillar of liberal theory, namely, individualism. This claim may seem to contradict Popper's professed methodological individualism. Yet I argue that Popper was a methodological in…Read more
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116Feenberg and STS: counter-reflections on bridging the gapStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37 (4): 702-720. 2006.Essay review of Andrew Feenberg, Heidegger and Marcuse: The Catastrophe and Redemption of History (Routledge, 2005).
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505Review of Isabelle Stengers, Cosmopolitics I (review)Isis 102 (3): 594-595. 2011.Review of: Isabelle Stengers (2010), Cosmopolitics I, trans. Robert Bononno (Posthumanities, 9) (Minneapolis/London: University of Minnesota Press).
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182Subjectivity and Emotion in Scientific ResearchStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (3): 354-362. 2013.A persistent puzzle for philosophers of science is the well-documented appeal made by scientists to their aesthetic emotions in the course of scientific research. Emotions are usually viewed as irremediably subjective, and thus of no epistemological interest. Yet, by denying an epistemic role for scientists’ emotional dispositions, philosophers find themselves in the awkward position of ignoring phenomena which scientists themselves often insist are of importance. This paper suggests a possible …Read more
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159Latour's HeideggerSocial Studies of Science 40 (4): 579-598. 2010.Bruno Latour has had a tremendous impact on the field of science studies. Yet, it is not always easy to say what he stands for. Indeed, Latour has often claimed that his work lacks any overall unity. In this essay, I suggest that at least one concept remains constant throughout Latour’s diverse studies of modern science and technology, namely, mediation. I try to make good this claim by focussing on Latour’s numerous attempts over the years to distance himself from, so as to discredit, the philo…Read more
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496Objective Styles in Northern Field ScienceStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 52 1-12. 2015.Social studies of science have often treated natural field sites as extensions of the laboratory. But this overlooks the unique specificities of field sites. While lab sites are usually private spaces with carefully controlled borders, field sites are more typically public spaces with fluid boundaries and diverse inhabitants. Field scientists must therefore often adapt their work to the demands and interests of local agents. I propose to address the difference between lab and field in sociologic…Read more
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339Reason, Emotion, and the Context DistinctionPhilosophia Scientiae 19 (1): 35-43. 2015.Recent empirical and philosophical research challenges the view that reason and emotion necessarily conflict with one another. Philosophers of science have, however, been slow in responding to this research. I argue that they continue to exclude emotion from their models of scientific reasoning because they typically see emotion as belonging to the context of discovery rather than of justification. I suggest, however, that recent work in epistemology challenges the authority usually granted the …Read more
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16Reason, Emotion, and the Context DistinctionPhilosophia Scientiae 19 35-43. 2015.La recherche empirique et philosophique récente remet en question l’idée selon laquelle raison et émotion sont nécessairement en conflit l’une avec l’autre. Pourtant, les philosophes des sciences ont été lents à réagir à cette recherche. Je soutiens qu’ils continuent à exclure l’émotion de leurs modèles du raisonnement scientifique, parce qu’ils considèrent qu’elle appartient typiquement au contexte de découverte plutôt qu’au contexte de justification. Je suggère toutefois, en prenant pour exemp…Read more
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