MIguel Garcia

En este contexto interesa preguntarse por la significación y la utilidad que puede tener hoy una conversación con los escritos de Wittgenstein. No es una pregunta que deba interesar sólo a los especialistas, sean filósofos profesionales o de otros campos científicos, sino que es una pregunta que toca los intereses de las personas en cualquiera de los ámbitos de la acción. En el contexto del giro hermenéutico en el pensamiento de Wittgenstein me propongo destacar algunos puntos que pueden dar lugar a un diálogo más amplio entre el pensamiento de Wittgenstein y la hermenéutica filosófica contemporánea, tales como la relación entre los conceptos de ethos o forma de vida, logos, juego, sentido común y cotidianidad

Este escrito retoma el planteamiento que Kant elaboró sobre el sentido y el uso de la idea de Dios en el conjunto de los intereses de la razón, cuestión que se halla planteada en la parte de la Crítica de la razón pura titulada Dialéctica trascendental. Esta reinterpretación de Kant tendrá como uno de sus propósitos delinear los pasos que Kant dio en el desmontaje o en el desmantelamiento de la teología racional. En un segundo momento, apreciar las implicaciones que dicho desmontaje tiene en la creación del concepto de racionalidad práctica a partir del uso de ideas y, finalmente, poner la mirada en el concepto kantiano de creencia ; obre todo, en la rehabilitación de este concepto propondré algunas observaciones que permitan en un trabajo posterior poner en diálogo a Kant con algunos desarrollos de la filosofía contemporánea, en particular, Heidegger, Wittgenstein y filósofo jesuita Michel de Certeau

The claim that knowledge is grounded on a basic, non-inferentially grasped set of principles, which seems to be Aristotle’s view, in contemporary epistemology can be seen as part of a wider foundationalist account. Foundationalists assume that there must be some premise-beliefs at the basis of every felicitous reasoning which cannot be themselves in need of justification and may not be challenged. They provide justification for truths based on these premises, which Aristotle unusually call principles (archái). Can Aristotle be considered a foundationalist? Are his first principles necessary premises to right inferences? We will look at the issue here.

In this paper we address the problem of short-term electric energy prediction using a time series forecasting approach applied to data generated by a Paraguayan electricity distribution provider. The dataset used in this work contains data collected over a three-year period. This is the first time that these data have been used; therefore, a preprocessing phase of the data was also performed. In particular, we propose a comparative study of various machine learning and statistical strategies with the objective of predicting the electric energy consumption for a given prediction horizon, in our case seven days, using historical data. In this paper we have tested the effectiveness of the techniques with different historical window sizes. Specifically, we considered two ensemble strategies, a neural network, a deep learning technique and linear regression. Moreover, in this study, we tested whether the inclusion of meteorological data can help achieve better predictions. In particular, we considered data regarding temperature, humidity, wind speed and atmospheric pressure registered during the three-year period of data collection. The results show that, in general, the deep learning approach obtains the best results and that such results are obtained when meteorological data are also considered. Moreover, when meteorological data is used, a smaller historical window size is required to obtain precise predictions.

Following Ballantyne, we can distinguish between descriptive and regulative epistemology. Whereas descriptive epistemology analyzes epistemic categories such as knowledge, justified belief, or evidence, regulative epistemology attempts to guide our thinking. In this paper, we argue that regulative epistemologists should focus their attention on what we call epistemic prudence. Our argument proceeds as follows: First, we lay out an objection to virtue-based regulative epistemology that is analogous to the no-guidance objection to virtue ethics. According to this objection, virtue-based regulative epistemology cannot offer us useful guidance in our deliberations, because an abstract knowledge of virtue does not tell us what we should do here and now, especially in hard cases. We respond to this objection by showing that our making good epistemic decisions cannot simply be a matter of our following the right epistemic rules. In order to reliably inquire and deliberate well, we need epistemic prudence. Thus, while virtue-based regulative epistemology fails to determine how we should inquire and resolve deliberation here and now, this is also true of norm-based regulative epistemology. The upshot of this argument is that regulative epistemologists should focus their attention on understanding the nature of epistemic prudence and on understanding how we can promote its development in ourselves and others.

En este artículo se presentan algunas reflexiones que se alimentan en cerca ya de 10 años de experimentación en materia de innovación docente estimulada por el proceso de construcción del Espacio Europeo de Educación Superior. Algunas de estas reflexiones tienen que ver con la forma en que una buena parte del profesorado que se ha embarcado en la aventura está viviendo el proceso de innovación docente. Otras reflexiones tienen que ver con la forma en que la institución está facilitando (o más bien debería facilitar) este proceso de cambio.

Historical legitimacy of hermeneutics has not exclusively depended on the encouragement made by philosophers. In accordance with its hope of universality, philosophical hermeneutics has spread its influence over other research fields, with which the dialogical principle that characterizes it has realized itself as praxis of comprehension. In a wide sense, with the development of hermeneutics, Human and Social Sciences have rethought their cognitive frameworks and their role in society. An example of this expansion can be found in the sociology developed by Zygmunt Bauman. The purpose of this paper is to present the fundamental features of the sociological realization of hermeneutics in the work of this contemporary society’s analyst. We will mainly focus on the following: sociology as critical mediation of the present, which means to understand, in moral and political perspectives, the operation of the consumer society, as well as the human consequences of the consumption-based way of life. In short, this means to understand the challenges that human condition faces nowadays.

En este texto se plantea el comienzo de un tratado de filosofía primera que divide los problemas de ésta en asuntos de ontología, agatología y lógica. Se presentan luego las bases de la lógica como teoría del conocimiento y las bases de la ontología como teoría de las pluralidades. Se critican las posiciones aparentemente más plausibles, en dirección a mostrar cómo el peculiar fenomenismo defendido por Husserl en su madurez filosófica es la mejor de las soluciones globales para la problemática lógica.The text puts forward how to begin an exposition of prima philosophia dividing its problems in ontological, agathological and logical ones. The foundations of logics as the theory of knowledge and the foundations of ontology as the theory of pluralities are explored by the way of critizing apparently plausible solutions. The aim is to guess why the peculiar phenomenalism sustained by Husserl in his mature philosophy is the best approach to logical nuclear problems.

En este trabajo se propone una revisión de la fenomenología de la vida de Michel Henry y su relación con la intencionalidad, tal como esta es pensada en y por Husserl. Se pasa revista al modo en el que el fundador del método fenomenológico se ocupa de cuestiones centrales de la fenomenología de la vida, así como de la forma en la que Henry habla de la vida, la autodonación, la autorevelación, la verdad, el cuerpo originario o absoluto, etc. La tesis es que en el fenomenólogo francés no se trata, en sentido propio, de una inversión de la intencionalidad, sino de una “absorción en sí misma”.