Roberta De Monticelli

Il pensiero pratico dominante nel Novecento europeo fornisce risposte negative alla questione se sia possibile una fondazione razionale del pensiero pratico, configurando una posizione di scetticismo assiologico e morale ancora oggi maggioritaria. Ma il secolo XX, se da un lato ha rappresentato la bancarotta della ragione pratica, dall’altro ne ha prodotto una vera e propria incarnazione, nelle istituzioni e organizzazioni internazionali, nelle costituzioni rigide degli Stati europei del dopoguerra, nella Dichiarazione universaledei diritti dell’essere umano del 1948 ecc. Come può la filosofia pratica portarsi all’altezza della ragione pratica incarnata, invece di minacciarla dall’interno con le sue neo-sofistiche, attraverso relativismi, soggettivismi, nichilismi, politeismi assiologici e simili?Axiologic and moral scepticism has nourishedmainstream European practical philosophy during the XXth century, a time of bankruptcy of practical reason on the Continent. Yet the XXthcentury has also produced a kind of embodiment of practical reason, within the international organizations and institutions, as well as by means of the rigid post-war constitutions of the European States, the Declaration of the Human Rights in 1948 etc. How can practical philosophy grow up to the standards of embodied practical reason, instead of challenging it from a neo-sophistic point of view, through relativism, value polytheism and the like?

Each person is perceived by others and by herself as an individual in a very strong sense, namely as a unique individual. Moreover, this supposed uniqueness is commonly thought of as linked with another character that we tend to attribute\nto persons (as opposed to stones or chairs and even non-human animals): a kind of depth, hidden to sensory perception, yet in some measure accessible to other means of knowledge. I propose a theory of strong or essential individuality. This theory is introduced by way of a critical discussion of Van Inwagen’s and Baker’s ontologies of persons. Composition\nTheory and Constitution Theory are shown to be complementary, in their opposite strong and weak points. I argue that both\ntheories have unsatisfactory consequences concerning personal identity, a problem which the proposed theory seems to solve\nmore faithfully both to folk intuitions and the phenomenology of personal life

This paper compares two basic approaches to “ontology”. One originated within the analytic tradition, and it encompasses two diverging streams, philosophy of language and (contemporary) philosophy of mind which lead to “reduced ontology” and “neo-Aristotelian ontology”, respectively. The other approach is “phenomenological ontology” (more precisely, the Husserlian, not the Heideggerian version).Ontology as a theory of reference (“reduced” ontology, or ontology dependent on semantics) is presented and justified on the basis of some classical thesis of traditional philosophy of language (from Frege to Quine). “Reduced ontology” is shown to be identifiable with one level of the traditional, Aristotelian ontology, which corresponds to one ofthe four “senses of Being” listed in Aristotle’s Metaphysics: “being” as “being true”. This identification is justified on the basis of Brentano’s “rules for translation” of the Aristotelian table of judgements in terms of (positive and negative) existential judgments such as are easily translatable into sentences of first order predicate logic.The second part of the paper is concerned with “neo-Aristotelian ontology”, i.e. with naturalism and physicalism as the main ontological options underlying most of the contemporary discussion in philosophy of mind. The qualification of such options as “neo-Aristotelian” is justified; the relationships between “neo-Aristotelian” and “reduced” ontology are discussed. The third part presents the basic claim of “phenomenological ontology”: the claim that a logical theory of existence and being does capture a sense of “existing” and “being” which, even if not itself the basic one, is grounded in the basic one. An attempt is done at further clarifying this “more basic” sense of “being”. An argument making use of this supposedly “more basic” sense is advanced in favour of “phenomenological ontology”.

Selon une de ses nombreuses acceptions, philosophie signifie traduction d'une experience de realite en une experience de sens. C'est la la demarche distinctive de la phenomenologie. Les dix chapitres qui composent ce livre la precisent d'abord a l'aide d'une mise en question de la philosophie contemporaine de l'esprit et de ses tentations naturalistes, pour ensuite les appliquer aux domaines de l'ethique, de l'esthetique, des fondements de la psychologie et de la psychopathologie. L'ascese de la pensee qui remonte aux idees et aux valeurs constitutives de chaque domaine d'experience differe de la tendance a s'interroger sur les causes des faits, tout comme l'esprit platonicien de la philosophie differe de son esprit aristotelicien. Ces etudes proposent autant une phenomenologie sur un mode platonicien que des exercices de philosophie dans cet esprit platonicien.