Luis Gonzalez

School achievement and failure have become growing political and social concerns due to the negative consequences of school failure for individuals and society. The inclusive educational movement, which calls for equal access, permanence, participation, and promotion of all students worldwide, poses many challenges for schools and school systems. As a public policy strategy, some countries have provided additional funds for incorporating non-teaching professionals such as school psychologists and social workers in regular K-12 schools. However, there is lack of research on the effects of these psychosocial professionals on student outcomes. This national multilevel study explored the effect of psychologists (n= 8,469) and social workers (n= 3,524) on indicators of eighth-grade (n= 147,531) and 10th-grade (n= 106,347) students' academic achievement and dropout in Chile. A multilevel secondary analysis was performed using national records of non-teaching professionals working as school staff members, achievement scores on the national SIMCE test, and dropout rates based on official records. Results showed that after controlling for individual and school variables known to affect achievement and dropout, schools with psychologists and social workers working as staff members had lower short- and long-term dropout rates. The presence and higher number of school psychologists per school was positively associated with higher math achievement, with a reduced effect in low-SES schools. Lower-SES schools with more social workers had higher math scores. These results support policies that increase funding for school psychologists and social workers, since their incorporation partly explains better school achievement and less school failure when controlling for individual and school characteristics, but emphasize the need to further explore the mechanisms through which school achievement and failure are developed with the support of psychologists and social workers in schools. We discuss the need to regulate the type of prevention and intervention strategies from a whole-school, evidence-based approach, as well as to incorporate psychosocial training modules and comprehensive guidelines as part of professional training programs and as certified requisites for working in schools.

However broad or vague the notion of connexivity may be, it seems to be similar to the notion of relevance even when relevance and connexive logics have been shown to be incompatible to one another. Relevance logics can be examined by suggesting syntactic relevance principles and inspecting if the theorems of a logic abide to them. In this paper we want to suggest that a similar strategy can be employed with connexive logics. To do so, we will suggest some properties that seem to be hinted at in Nelson’s work. Following this strategy will ideally shed some light over the notion of content and will also help make a clear comparison between relevance and connexive logics.

Beall has given more or less convincing arguments to the effect that neither classical logic, nor K3, nor LP, nor S3 can play the role he expects from logic: to be the basement theory for all true theories, including true theology. However, he has not considered all the pertinent competitors, and he has not given any reassurance that he has not gone too low in the hierarchy of logics to find his desired “universal closure of all true theories”. In this paper, I put forward those additional arguments to show the superiority of FDE with respect to logics that include a detachable conditional but that are very much like FDE otherwise. I also discuss the problem that theological consequence might not contrapose even if theological consequence is supposed to extend FDE consequence and the latter does contrapose.

PurposeGraham Priest has recently argued that the distinctive trait of classical mathematics is that the conditional of its underlying logic—that is, classical logic—is extensional. In this article, I aim to present an alternate explanation of the specificity of classical mathematics.MethodI examine Priest's argument for his claim and show its shortcomings. Then I deploy a model-theoretic presentation of logics that allows comparing them, and the mathematics based on them, more fine-grainedly.ResultsSuch a model-theoretic presentation of logics suggests that the specific character of classical logic consists in the structure that it confers to its truth values and in the structure of the evaluation indices of its formulas, and that this trait is useful to explain the specific character of the logics and the mathematics based on them.ConclusionThe extensionality of the conditional in classical logic is a by-product of other structural features of a logic, which are more likely to be what gives a kind of mathematics based on it its specific character.

According to logical non-necessitarianism, every inference may fail in some situation. In his defense of logical monism, Graham Priest has put forward an argument against non-necessitarianism based on the meaning of connectives. According to him, as long as the meanings of connectives are fixed, some inferences have to hold in all situations. Hence, in order to accept the non-necessitarianist thesis one would have to dispose arbitrarily of those meanings. I want to show here that non-necessitarianism can stand, without disposing arbitrarily of the meanings of connectives, based on a minimalist view on the meanings of connectives

It has been claimed that contracting connectivesContracting connective are conditionalsConditional. Our modest aim here is to show that the conditional-like features of a contracting connectiveContracting connective depend on the defining features of the conditionalConditional in a particular logic, yes, but they also depend on the underlying notion of logical consequence and the structure of the collection of truth values. More concretely, we will show that under P-consequenceP-consequence and suitable satisfiability conditions for the conditionalConditional, conjunctionsConjunction are contracting connectivesContracting connective for some logics without thereby being conditional-ish.

A contra-classical logic is a logic that, over the same language as that of classical logic, validates arguments that are not classically valid. In this paper I investigate whether there is a single, non-trivial logic that exhibits many features of already known contra-classical logics. I show that Mortensen’s three-valued connexive logic _M3V_ is one such logic and, furthermore, that following the example in building _M3V_, that is, putting a suitable conditional on top of the \(\{\sim, \wedge, \vee \}\) -fragment of _LP_, one can get a logic exhibiting even more contra-classical features.

Esta nota, que resume una conferencia pronunciada en octubre de 2011 en las Jornadas Nacionales de Liturgia de Barcelona, analiza y estudia la aportación de Sacramentum Caritatis al importante tema de la participación activa de los fieles en la liturgia. El autor concluye, entre otras cosas, que la sutil distinción entre condiciones personales para la participación y la participación misma enriquece el concepto de actuosa participatio acentuando sus dimensiones más hondas desde el punto de vista de la antropología sacramental.

Francez has suggested that connexivity can be predicated of connectives other than the conditional, in particular conjunction and disjunction. Since connexivity is not any connection between antecedents and consequents—there might be other connections among them, such as relevance—, my question here is whether Francez’s conjunction and disjunction can properly be called ‘connexive’. I analyze three ways in which those connectives may somehow inherit connexivity from the conditional by standing in certain relations to it. I will show that Francez’s connectives fail all these three ways, and that even other connectives obtained by following more closely Wansing’s method to get a connexive conditional, fail to be connexive as well.

The presence of the past is of prime importance in today's Mexican society. According to José Fuentes Mares, among the “peoples of the world the Mexican is the one who lives history the most”. With regard to the unsatisfactory relations between Mexico and North America, the journalist Alan Riding asks himself: “How can a people who relish the past to the point of intoxication understand another that looks constantly to the future?” In the Republic of Mexico, according to him, “the entire past of the country throws a dense shadow over the present”. Conforming to a universal custom, every country divides its present past into four groups (survival, residues, memories and history), but in few nations are the four groups as copious as in this one. Although Mexico is rapidly shedding many old customs and is selling residual objects to foreign collectors on the sly, its historical treasure is still enormous, perhaps the largest in the world.

Schools are an essential part of students’ lives and can promote and facilitate their well-being. Although research on well-being among school-aged children and adolescents has distinguished subjective well-being from social well-being, very few studies examined student’s social well-being at school. SWS is understood as students’ valuation of the circumstances and functioning of their school. This framework posits that the context of the schools can shape students’ perception of feeling integrated and making significant contributions to their schools. However, not much is known regarding the joint contribution of individual, family, and school characteristics to students’ SWS. This study analyzed these joint contributions in a nationally representative sample of 6,389 children and adolescents enrolled in 5th–11th grades. Findings show that being female and younger were individual predictors of SWS. Students’ satisfaction with their family and fewer changes of schools were also significant contributors. When students’ perceptions of their schools were incorporated, the individual and family characteristics decreased or lost significance. In the full model, the highest contribution to SWS was explained by the school-level aggregated perception of school climate. These findings call for integrated policies and practices to foster students’ sense of belonging, feeling integrated, and contribution to their schools, with a focus on school-level interventions to improve SWS through positive and engaging school climates that foster students’ sense of agency.

In her, Martínez-Ordaz puts forward an argument whose conclusion pretends to be a dilemma for selective realists: either selective realists cannot rule true contradictions out or the usual characterization of selective realism is incomplete. Then she argues that one should take the second horn and complete such a characterization with some logical constraints. In this note, I will defend that her argument for the dilemma is flawed at several steps and, moreover, that the dilemma is not dangerous and that her proposed completion of selective realism is not needed.

Alberic of Paris put forward an argument, ‘the most embarrassing of all twelfth-century arguments’ according to Christopher Martin, which shows that the connexive principles contradict some other logical principles that have become deeply entrenched in our most widely accepted logical theories. Building upon some of Everett Nelson’s ideas, we will show that the steps in Alberic of Paris’ argument that should be rejected are precisely the ones that presuppose the validity of schemas that are nowadays taken as some of the most trivial logical truths: (A∧B) → A and (A∧B) → B, i.e. Simplification.

Philosophy of logic is a fundamental part of philosophical study, and one which is increasingly recognized as being immensely important in relation to many issues in metaphysics, metametaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mathematics, and philosophy of language. This textbook provides a comprehensive and accessible introduction to topics including the objectivity of logical inference rules and its relevance in discussions of epistemological relativism, the revived interest in logical pluralism, the question of logic's metaphysical neutrality, and the demarcation between logic and mathematics. Chapters in the book cover the state of the art in contemporary philosophy of logic, and allow students to understand the philosophical relevance of these debates without having to contend with complex technical arguments. This will be a major new resource for students working on logic, as well as for readers seeking a better understanding of philosophy of logic in its wider context.

In this paper I argue, contra Mortensen, that there is a case, namely that of a degenerate topos, an extremely simple mathematical universe in which everything is true, in which no mathematical “catastrophe” is implied by mathematical triviality. I will show that either one of the premises of Dunn’s trivialization result for real number theory –on which Mortensen mounts his case– cannot obtain (from a point of view “external” to the universe) and thus the argument is unsound, or that it obtains in calculations “internal” to such trivial universe and the theory associated, yet the calculations are possible and meaningful albeit extremely simple.

Nowadays there is a growing tendency in the philosophy of science to think that some phenomena cannot be exhaustively explained, or even described, by a single theory or a particular approach. Thus, we are occasionally required to use various approaches in order to give account of the phenomenon we are analyzing. And sometimes, we can appreciate this as an invitation to be pluralist in certain respects about our understanding of a particular aspect in science. During the last decade applications of pluralism have increased and led to several other relevant debates in the philosophy of science. By the strengthening of pluralism, new questions have emerged, and more importantly, new alternatives have been offered in dealing with problems about how to interpret the ontology and the ontological commitments of particular theories, or how to apply strategies to analyze and understand specific episodes from the history of science, or how to work within different, and sometimes incompatible, explanations about a particular phenomenon, among others. In general, pluralism seems to be a very rich and yet not enough explored path for the philosophy of science in general. Today, it is recognized that, at least for methodological purposes, the application of pluralism to the study of science can offer a great number of benefits. One of them would be the opportunity of analyzing the role that some epistemic virtues -such as scope, fruitfulness, consistency, and simplicity, to name just a few- play in the scientific activity. From the different pluralist positions, a lot has been said about empirical adequacy, refutability and explanatory power yet consistency power, yet, consistency has not been equally dealt with. As a matter of fact, the lack of consistency and its philosophical implications have been studied from an angle that does not necessarily involve a pluralism of any kind. At the moment, it is commonly accepted that inconsistencies are more frequent in scientific development that the traditional philosophy of science could have expected and the idea that inconsistency is not always a synonym of logical anarchy, as it was suggested in the classical literature of logic and the philosophy of science, has been gaining support. All this has been possible, mostly, thanks to the emergence of paraconsistent logics and the availability of case studies that show how inconsistency is not an uncommon phenomenon in science. But pluralism does not necessarily entail inconsistency toleration nor vice versa. Accordingly the main motivation for this volume is to explore the links between pluralism and inconsistency toleration in science, in order to connect the reflections on inconsistency toleration with broader and major issues in philosophy of science. In order to do so, we will suggest two different lines of investigation: first, to focus on the implication of some pluralistic accounts in the philosophy of science, regarding inconsistency; and second to analyze the implications of some paraconsistent approaches regarding pluralism in science.