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64I—R. Jay Wallace: Duties of LoveAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 86 (1): 175-198. 2012.
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57Margaret Gilbert: Rights and Demands: A Foundational InquiryJournal of Philosophy 117 (1): 55-59. 2020.
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55The Moral NexusPrinceton University Press. 2019.The Moral Nexus develops and defends a new interpretation of morality—namely, as a set of requirements that connect agents normatively to other persons in a nexus of moral relations. According to this relational interpretation, moral demands are directed to other individuals, who have claims that the agent comply with these demands. Interpersonal morality, so conceived, is the domain of what we owe to each other, insofar as we are each persons with equal moral standing. The book offers an interp…Read more
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55Explanation, Deliberation, and ReasonsPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2): 429-435. 2003.Jonathan Dancy’s Practical Reality defends a strikingly nonpsychologistic account of motivating reasons for action. When we explain what people do by citing their reasons, we are trying to isolate the considerations that were actually effective in moving them to act. But it is crucial, Dancy contends, that these considerations be understood in a way that preserves their connection to the normative contexts in which the concept of a reason also has a place. The considerations that move agents to …Read more
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47Recognition and the moral nexusEuropean Journal of Philosophy 29 (3): 634-645. 2021.European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 29, Issue 3, Page 634-645, September 2021.
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44Freedom and responsibilityPhilosophical Review 109 (4): 592-595. 2000.It is not a new thought that an adequate understanding of freedom and responsibility might require us to distinguish between the theoretical and practical points of view. This distinction is at the heart of the Kantian approach to moral philosophy. But while the Kantian strategy is deeply suggestive, it has proved difficult to work out the idea that freedom and responsibility are artifacts of the practical standpoint. Hilary Bok’s book Freedom and Responsibility provides a new interpretation and…Read more
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43Autonomie, Charakter und praktische Vernunft: Überlegungen am Beispiel des UtilitarismusAnalyse & Kritik 21 (2): 213-230. 1999.This paper explores the question whether utilitarianism is compatible with the autonomy of the moral agent. The paper begins by considering Bernard Williams' famous complaint that utilitarianism cannot do justice to the personal projects and commitments constitutive of character. Recent work (by Peter Railton among others) has established that a utilitarian agent need not be free of such personal projects and commitments, and could even affirm them morally at the level of second"order reflection…Read more
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42Moralische Gründe: Aus der Sicht des HandelndenZeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 55 (1). 2001.In den heutigen Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaften herrscht eine Vorstellung von Handlungsgründen, die von dem englischen Moralphilosophen Bernard Williams als „Internalismus„ bezeichnet worden ist. Dieser Vorstellung zufolge hängt die Beantwortung der Frage, was eine gegebene Person P Grund hat zu tun, letztendlich von P’s Motivationsprofil ab, insbesondere von P’s Wünschen und Dispositionen; normative Handlungsgründe sind demnach als subjektiv bedingt zu verstehen. Mein Anliegen in diesem Aufsa…Read more
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39Mattering, value, and our obligations to the animalsPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (1): 236-241. 2022.
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36I—R. Jay Wallace: Duties of LoveAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 86 (1): 175-198. 2012.A defence of the idea that there are sui generis duties of love: duties, that is, that we owe to people in virtue of standing in loving relationships with them. I contrast this non‐reductionist position with the widespread reductionist view that our duties to those we love all derive from more generic moral principles. The paper mounts a cumulative argument in favour of the non‐reductionist position, adducing a variety of considerations that together speak strongly in favour of adopting it. The …Read more
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34Moral responsibility and the practical point of viewIn A. van den Beld (ed.), Moral Responsibility and Ontology, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 25--47. 2000.
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32Addiction as Defect of the Will: Some Philosophical ReflectionsLaw and Philosophy 18 (6): 621-654. 1999.
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32A Modest Defense of RegretIn Ralf Stoecker & Marco Iorio (eds.), Actions, Reasons and Reason, De Gruyter. pp. 87-98. 2015.
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30Freedom and ResponsibilityPhilosophical Review 109 (4): 592. 2000.It is not a new thought that an adequate understanding of freedom and responsibility might require us to distinguish between the theoretical and practical points of view. This distinction is at the heart of the Kantian approach to moral philosophy. But while the Kantian strategy is deeply suggestive, it has proved difficult to work out the idea that freedom and responsibility are artifacts of the practical standpoint. Hilary Bok’s book Freedom and Responsibility provides a new interpretation and…Read more
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21Alasdair Macintyre, "after virtue: A study in moral theory", and "whose justice? Which rationality?" (review)History and Theory 28 (3): 326. 1989.
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21The Ethics of Social Research: Surveys and ExperimentsHastings Center Report 13 (2): 44. 1983.Book reviewed in this article: Ethical Issues in Social Research. Edited by Tom L. Beauchamp, Ruth R. Faden, R. Jay Wallace, Jr., and LeRoy Walters. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982. xii + 436 pp. $25.00 (hardcover); $8.95 (paper). Ethics of Human Subject Research. Edited by Allan J. Kimmel, Jr. San Francisco: Jossey‐Bass, 1981. 106 pp. $6.95 (paper). Social Research Ethics. Edited by Martin Bulmer. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1982. xiv + 284 pp. $39.50 (hardcover); $14.50 (pape…Read more
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21The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and ReasonPhilosophical Books 29 (4): 225-227. 1988.
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20Recognition: A Chapter in the History of European Ideas, by Axel HonnethMind 132 (525): 259-269. 2023.Axel Honneth has done more than any other philosopher to develop and explore the significance of recognition to our social relations. On the broadly Hegelian ap.
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17Reasons and Recognition: Essays on the Philosophy of T.M. Scanlon (edited book)Oxford University Press USA. 2011.For close to forty years now T.M. Scanlon has been one of the most important contributors to moral and political philosophy in the Anglo-American world. Through both his writing and his teaching, he has played a central role in shaping the questions with which research in moral and political philosophy now grapples. Reasons and Recognition brings together fourteen new papers on an array of topics from the many areas to which Scanlon has made path-breaking contributions, each of which develops a …Read more
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14T. L. S. Sprigge, "The Rational Foundations of Ethics" (review)Philosophical Quarterly 39 (57): 509. 1989.
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14Comment on Kwong-loi Shun, ‘Anger, Compassion, and the Distinction between First and Third Person’Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (4): 374-382. 2021.A critical discussion of Kwong-loi Shun’s account of anger as a response to situations rather than agents. The paper draws on a relational interpretation of the moral domain to argue that it makes a normative difference to one’s moral emotions whether one was the immediate victim of wrongful conduct, or merely a third-party observer of such conduct. Those who have been wronged by immoral actions have warrant for a kind of angry resentment that does not carry over to third parties. The paper also…Read more
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Areas of Specialization
Value Theory |
Areas of Interest
Value Theory |