•  3441
    The real distinction between mind and body
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16 (sup1): 149--201. 1990.
    Descartes's "conceivability argument" for substance-dualism is defended against Arnauld's criticism that, for all he knows, Descartes can conceive himself without a body only because he underestimates his true essence; one could suggest with equal plausibility that it is only for ignorance of his essential hairiness that Descartes can conceive himself as bald. Conceivability intuitions are defeasible but special reasons are required; a model for such defeat is offered, and various potential defe…Read more
  •  283
    Carnap’s Paradox and Easy Ontology
    Journal of Philosophy 111 (9-10): 470-501. 2014.
  •  179
    Truth and reflection
    Journal of Philosophical Logic 14 (3). 1985.
    Many topics have not been covered, in most cases because I don't know quite what to say about them. Would it be possible to add a decidability predicate to the language? What about stronger connectives, like exclusion negation or Lukasiewicz implication? Would an expanded language do better at expressing its own semantics? Would it contain new and more terrible paradoxes? Can the account be supplemented with a workable notion of inherent truth (see note 36)? In what sense does stage semantics li…Read more
  •  38
    A reply to new Zeno
    Analysis 60 (2): 148-151. 2000.
  •  80
  •  60
    Replies to commentators
    Philosophical Studies 174 (3): 809-820. 2017.
    I reply to three commentators—Friederike Moltmann, Daniel Rothschild, and Zoltán Szabó—on six topics—sense and reference, the unity of subject matter, questions, presupposition, partial truth, and content mereology.
  •  103
    Abstract Objects: A Case Study
    Philosophical Issues 12 (1): 220-240. 2002.
  •  88
  •  144
    Prime causation (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2). 2005.
    No one doubts that mental states can be wide. Why should this seem to prevent them from causing behavior? Tim points to an "internalist line of thought"
  •  23
    8. Extrapolation and Its Limits
    In Aboutness, Princeton University Press. pp. 131-141. 2014.
  •  200
    New Grounds for Naive Truth Theory
    In J. C. Beall (ed.), Liars and Heaps: New Essays on Paradox, Oxford University Press Uk. pp. 312-330. 2003.
  •  182
    Definitions, consistent and inconsistent
    Philosophical Studies 72 (2-3). 1993.
    Peer Reviewed.
  •  30
    1. I Wasn’t Talking about That
    In Aboutness, Princeton University Press. pp. 7-22. 2014.
  •  75
  •  285
    Cause and essence
    Synthese 93 (3). 1992.
    Essence and causation are fundamental in metaphysics, but little is said about their relations. Some essential properties are of course causal, as it is essential to footprints to have been caused by feet. But I am interested less in causation's role in essence than the reverse: the bearing a thing's essence has on its causal powers. That essencemight make a causal contribution is hinted already by the counterfactual element in causation; and the hint is confirmed by the explanation essence offe…Read more
  •  194
    Seven habits of highly effective thinkers
    In Bernard Elevitch (ed.), The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Philosophy Documentation Center. pp. 35-45. 2000.
    By effective thinkers I mean not people who think effectively, but people who understand “how it’s done,” i.e., people not paralyzed by the philosophical problem of epiphenomenalism. I argue that mental causes are not preempted by either neural or narrow content states, and that extrinsically individuated mental states are not out of proportion with their putative effects. I give three examples/models of how an extrinsic cause might be more proportional to an effect than the competition
  •  410
    A problem about permission and possibility
    In Andy Egan & Brian Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality, Oxford University Press. 2009.
  •  35
    Index
    In Aboutness, Princeton University Press. pp. 219-222. 2014.
  •  80
    Red, Bitter, Best (review)
    Philosophical Books 41 (1). 2002.
    Book reviewed in this article: Jackson, F., From Metaphysics to Ethics
  •  260
    Aboutness
    Princeton University Press. 2014.
    Aboutness has been studied from any number of angles. Brentano made it the defining feature of the mental. Phenomenologists try to pin down the aboutness-features of particular mental states. Materialists sometimes claim to have grounded aboutness in natural regularities. Attempts have even been made, in library science and information theory, to operationalize the notion. But it has played no real role in philosophical semantics. This is surprising; sentences have aboutness-properties if anythi…Read more
  •  26
    10. Pretense and Presupposition
    In Aboutness, Princeton University Press. pp. 165-177. 2014.
  •  26
    12. What Is Said
    In Aboutness, Princeton University Press. pp. 189-206. 2014.
  •  92
    I_– _Stephen Yablo
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 72 (1): 229-261. 1998.
  •  25
    The Real Distinction Between Mind and Body
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 20 (sup1): 149-201. 1990.
    ….it [is] wholly irrational to regard as doubtful matters that are perceived clearly and distinctly by the understanding in its purity, on account of mere prejudices of the senses and hypotheses in which there is an element of the unknown.Descartes, Geometrical Exposition of the MeditationsSubstance dualism, once a main preoccupation of Western metaphysics, has fallen strangely out of view; today’s mental/physical dualisms are dualisms of fact, property, or event. So if someone claims to find a …Read more
  •  73
    Truth, Definite Truth, and Paradox
    Journal of Philosophy 86 (10): 539-541. 1989.