•  21
    Index
    In Aboutness, Princeton University Press. pp. 219-222. 2014.
  •  21
  •  20
    How to Read This Book
    In Aboutness, Princeton University Press. 2014.
  •  20
    Replies to Comments on If-Thenism
    Australasian Philosophical Review 1 (2): 212-227. 2017.
  •  20
    9. Going On in the Same Way
    In Aboutness, Princeton University Press. pp. 142-164. 2014.
  •  19
    Preface
    In Aboutness, Princeton University Press. 2014.
  •  19
    Bibliography
    In Aboutness, Princeton University Press. pp. 209-218. 2014.
  •  18
    8. Extrapolation and Its Limits
    In Aboutness, Princeton University Press. pp. 131-141. 2014.
  •  18
    10. Pretense and Presupposition
    In Aboutness, Princeton University Press. pp. 165-177. 2014.
  •  18
    11. The Missing Premise
    In Aboutness, Princeton University Press. pp. 178-188. 2014.
  •  16
    The Real Distinction Between Mind and Body
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 20 (sup1): 149-201. 1990.
  •  15
    3. Inclusion in Metaphysics and Semantics
    In Aboutness, Princeton University Press. pp. 45-53. 2014.
  •  15
    A reply to new Zeno
    Analysis 60 (2): 148-151. 2000.
  •  12
    Superproportionality and Mind-Body Relations
    Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 16 (1): 65-75. 2001.
    Mental causes are threatened from two directions: from below, since they would appear to be screened off by lower-order, e.g., neural states; and from within, since they would also appear to be screened off by intrinsic, e.g., syntactical states. A principle needed to parry the first threat -causes should be proportional to their effects- appears to leave us open to the second; for why should unneeded extrinsic detail be any less offensive to proportionality than excess microstructure? I say tha…Read more
  •  6
    Prime Causation
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2): 459-467. 2005.
    No one doubts that mental states can be wide. Why should this seem to prevent them from causing behavior? Tim points to an "internalist line of thought"
  •  2
    Things
    Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley. 1986.
    Essentialists hold that certain of a thing's properties are specially fundamental, antiessentialists that all of a thing's properties are on a par. As a result, essentialists can explain how, e.g., a statue and its clay are different, but not how they are the same, whereas antiessentialists can explain how they're the same but not how they're different. Ordinarily, though, we reckon them in one sense the same and in another different. ;To accomodate the ordinary view, essentialism and antiessent…Read more
  •  1
    Illusions of possibility
    In Manuel Garcia-Carpintero & Josep Macià (eds.), Two-Dimensional Semantics, Clarendon Press. 2006.
  • Intrinsicness
    In Robert M. Francescotti (ed.), Companion to Intrinsic Properties, De Gruyter. pp. 41-68. 2014.